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Abstract
Mexican migrants in the U.S. are one of the largest diasporas of the modern era and an impor-
tant case study for transnationalism and development. Collective remittances are remittances that
emigrants pool towards developmental goals in their home community. Collective remittances are
a small fraction of total remittances, but in partnerships with their federal and local governments
Mexican emigrants partially fund public goods and infrastructure development in their home com-
munities. Mexico’s experience with collective remittances is influential and has shaped migration
and development practice around the globe. The following chapters present an analysis of collective
remittances in Mexican communities and link the data and theory from Mexico to other nations
and emigrants around the globe. The analysis finds that Mexican migrant’s wages in the U.S. are
the strongest predictors of collectively funded projects. Migrant’s wages are consistent with a moti-
vation to diminish future migration by improving home towns and providing jobs. The comparison
between Mexico and other diasporas demonstrates that motivations are indeed a useful lens for
applying the knowledge and observations from one diaspora to another, but also identifies that
important affordances for migrants to organize and partner are absent from the model, including
geography, ethnicity, and international politics. Motivations and their interactions with community
history and economic context are one of the least understood aspects of collective remittances, and
the results of this dissertation help fill this notable gap, but the absence of political-geographic and
ethnic aspects in remittance motivation theory remain a shortcoming.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mexico today is a precedent for migration-driven development and in particular collective remit-
tances. Collective remittances are individual donations that migrants channel through organizations
and collectively provide to their hometown or country for developmental purposes (Burgess, 2005).
Collective remittances are not new, nor are they limited to Mexico. In Mexico collective remittances
expanded from small localized relationships into a partnership between migrants, their communities,
and the federal government. Mexico has become one of the most prominent examples of migrant-
state partnerships in benefit of developmental goals, and their success has attracted attention from
researchers and policymakers seeking to replicate the results. Naive adoption of methods and policy
from Mexico into other contexts is likely to have poor results. In what follows, this dissertation will
explore what makes collective remittances to Mexico unique, and what elements are generalizable
to other contexts.
Mexico’s relative success reflects 1) the large Mexican-US economic and social differences across
an expansive shared border, 2) Mexico’s federal level efforts to implement migrant friendly policies,
and 3) the culture of Mexico’s diaspora. Of these the first is the most exogenous because it
represents international and geographic influences. The second and third items represent political
and cultural relationships that are shaped by both exogenous and endogenous influences, meaning
they are shaped by external factors but also have unique aspects that do not generalize.
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Collective remittances to Mexican communities fund local development projects (Orozco, 2000,
2003; Portes & Zhou, 2012) and cultivate social and political investments from migrants and commu-
nities (Burgess, 2005; Fox & Bada, 2008). The income may also help preserve community cultural
and familial bonds by allowing rural families, who might otherwise be forced to move to urban cen-
ters, to preserve their lifestyles (Grindle, 1988). “Collective” refers to the fact that through these
remittances no single migrant funds development, and that regardless of transmission methods
migrants pool these remittances to accomplish something. How collective remittances are spent,
however, is often negotiated and managed by only a few migrants in cooperation with community
and government agents. It is often the case that migrants have differences among themselves and
with government agents over how collective remittances should be used.
Mexican communities and hometown associations often use collective remittances for public
goods, but other nations and emigrants prioritize different migration and development strategies.
The diasporas of other nations often use a different set of methods for funding development that
are neither philanthropic nor centrally organized but nonetheless depend on collective action. A
broader definition of “remittances for development” that includes savings and investments may
be more inclusive (Schu¨ttler, 2008). Collective remittances are one aspect in the constellation of
migration and development and for each diaspora may have a different relationship to other aspects
of that constellation.
The volume of collective remittances are difficult to assess because they often move through in-
formal channels, or are lumped with other types of remittances. Estimates of collective remittances
to Mexico are about a quarter of a percent of family remittances (Bada, 2011; Co´rdova, 2013).
Collective remittances to Latin and Central American nations are 1% or less of the region’s total
remittance flows (Vargas-Lundius, 2004), and global estimates of collective remittances also are ap-
proximately 1% of total worldwide remittance flows (Hostettler, 2006). Analysis can use different
methods or definitions for collective remittances, and communities can use different channels for
transfer and systems for managing collective remittances. The ambiguity in defining and identifying
collective remittances is one obstacle to research in this area.
A key feature of Mexican emigrant’s participation in collective remittances is their cooperation
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with government bodies back in Mexico. The most important vehicle of cooperation is tres por
uno, or 3x1, that matches each collective remittance dollar with 3 more dollars provided by the
municipal, state, and federal levels of government. Tres por uno involves actors both domestic
and international and builds upon migrant’s transnational lives, organizations, and culture. The
primary goal of 3x1 is development of less wealthy communities with high migration. Tres por uno
commands the second greatest share of social welfare funds, behind only the cash transfer program
Oportunidades. Tres por uno obtained fresh injections of funds in 2012 (A´ngela Fu´nez, 2012), and
as of 2014 34% of Mexican municipalities were active in the program (Duquette-Rury, 2014). From
2002 to 2008 total funds channeled through 3x1 into development increased from 424 million to 1700
million (Duquette-Rury, 2014; Simpser, Duquette-Rury, Company, & Ibarra, 2016). During that
time period 3x1 funds comprised up to 20% of the public works budget in 67% of the participating
municipalities, between 20% and 50% of the budget in 25% of the municipalities, over 100% of the
public works budget in 8% of the participating municipalities, and in some communities 3x1 is the
only source of funds for public works (Duquette-Rury, 2014; Orozco & Welle, 2005).
Collective remittances can be a useful resource but are not exempt from abuse or politicking.
Collective remittances, despite the benefits they provide, have significant non-collective ulterior mo-
tives. Better organized and wealthier communities better direct and exploit collective remittances
to advance their personal and community goals (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2011). Municipalities loyal to
the majority party are more likely to benefit from tres por uno grants (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2011),
and political maneuvering can influence project selection (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2009; Meseguer &
Aparicio, 2009). Interviews with the program administrators, local politicians, and migrants sug-
gest that government officials use tres por uno to finance personal political objectives (Aparicio &
Meseguer, 2012). Migrants also may have personal motives driving their participation in collective
remittances, and some developmental projects may benefit some migrants and families more than
others, but no research seems to exist on this aspect. Little also is known of how existing develop-
mental conditions influence collective remittances, only that community wealth has a bell-shaped
relationship with collective remittances (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2011).
In addition to monetary support, collective remittances bring public oversight and migrant’s
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personal engagement (Goldring, 2004; Zamora, 1998; Burgess & Tinajero, 2012; Burgess, 2012;
Orozco & Welle, 2005). Migrants have always participated in local development (Rempel & Lobdell,
1978; Stark, 1980; Lucas & Stark, 1985) but today states and third parties are more involved
than ever before and cooperating with migrants and communities to achieve developmental goals
(Collyer, 2013). Outside influence can also introduce undesirable and divisive influences, and it is
not uncommon for migrants and communities to resist external help (Flores-Mac´ıas, 2012; Mason &
Beard, 2008). Despite these drawbacks evidence suggests that 3x1 improved recipient communities
compared to controls (Kajima & Gonzalez-Ramirez, 2012), and that the help migrants provide for
community development can be valuable (Merz, 2005; Merz & Chen, 2005; Zamora, 2005).
Development is a vague term and the expectations may vary for what development entails.
Mexican emigrants will have different goals and expectations than Moroccan emigrants or Indian
emigrants. Each nation is subject to different global and international experiences, and within each
nation different classes of people and emigrants have different ideas for development. The Mexican
diaspora has produced a culture and programme of migration and development that another di-
aspora may not be able to reproduce. Mexican emigrants enjoy extraordinary circumstances that
helped that diaspora to explode in size while maintaining a strong transnational presence, and in
such an environment Mexican emigrants began institutionalizing migrant’s role in development by
the mid 20th century (Bada, 2014). Within Mexico there exist differences between communities
in the accessibility to developmental help and what development means (Mason & Beard, 2008).
Migrants, moreover, differ from their communities and states and often desire quality of life im-
provements whereas communities and states prefer construction and restoration of infrastructure
(Mason & Beard, 2008; Villacres, 2009). Each actor can hold a different vision for development
dependent upon their position, status, resources, and goals. Some actors obtain greater benefit
from migration and development while others bear a greater amount of the cost and responsibility
(Delgado-Wise & Guarnizo, 2007).
Expanding the meaning of development decenters the responsibility for “migration and develop-
ment” away from migrants exclusively to incorporate multiple sectors including migrants, govern-
ment, and finance. Ignoring what development means to migrants risks using migrants as pawns in
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highly opportunistic development schemes (Vezzoli & Lacroix, 2010). Each diaspora have it’s own
political relationships with their home and host states that often implicate the cultural meaning of
development and migrant’s role in the process, and subgroups within a diaspora may have methods
and preferences that differ from the larger diaspora. Some indigenous Mexican communities em-
ploy traditional governing mechanisms that obligate migrants to help out; migrants may not enjoy
the requirements but understand them to be an important social symbol (VanWey, Tucker, & Mc-
Connell, 2005). Development from migration focuses upon home communities, but migrant’s status
in the host nation is an important factor, and migrants with social and economic security in their
host nation are more likely to transnationally engage with their homes (Bilgili, 2016). Prioritizing
quick policy answers for migration and development ignores the heterogeneity of emigrants, their
diasporas, and communities.
Diaspora also defies definition but scholars generally agree that a diaspora displays a few impor-
tant characteristics. Migrants of a diaspora share a memory of dispersal and an idealized collective
memory of the homeland, retain an ongoing connection to the homeland, maintain strong group
consciousness, and integrate only with great difficulty (R. Cohen, 2008; J. H. Cohen, Rios, &
Byars, 2009; Brubaker, 2005). A diaspora also implies an element of antiquity. New communities
of migrants possess too short a history. Initial migrants may return or integrate and provide no
foundation for a diaspora to form. State migration and development policies that target broader
financial behaviors of migrants–including remittances, savings, and investments–do not require a di-
aspora. But state policies designed to engage collective transnational behavior depend on a diaspora
with rich social connections.
Other states and diasporas will take Mexico as a role model in their own migration and de-
velopment endeavors. El Salvador, for example, obtained $20000k USD from the World Bank to
help implement a social development fund modeled upon Mexico’s popular remittance matching
program tres por uno (D. R. Agunias & Newland, 2012). Migrant activists of the Zimbabwean
diaspora cite Mexico as an inspiration for the formation of Zimbabwean hometown associations to
assist with development (Gonouya, 2012). Worldwide many states have implemented co-financing
for development partnerships with migrants, including Mali, Somalia, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru,
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France, Netherlands, Haiti, and Philippines (Duquette-Rury, 2014). A relationship between mi-
grants and home governments seems to be the rule, not the exception, and Mexico’s successes are
likely to influence many of these existing forms of migrant activism and civil society.
Efforts to replicate Mexico’s success must be cognizant of the contexts, culture, and elements that
support collective remittances from Mexico’s migrants. El Salvador’s effort encountered significant
distrust between state and migrants that often led migrants to withdraw from participation in
the remittance matching programs (Burgess & Tinajero, 2012; Burgess, 2012; Flores-Mac´ıas, 2012;
Popkin, 2003). Policies designed to leverage and help direct collective remittances must respect that
this resource belongs to migrants. Mexico’s 3x1 program exists along side a complex arrangement
of organizations and actors that include Mexico’s federal and municipal governments, migrants and
community civic organizations, and external organizations that help finance tres por uno (Bada,
2011, 2014). The agents involved in Mexico’s 3x1 operate together, sometimes cooperatively and
sometimes adversarially, to select projects, allocate funds, and oversee the project and the other
agents. Future efforts to work with collective remittances around the globe must understand what
motivates migrants to participate and how structural characteristics enable or constrain the forms
and flows of collective remittances and migrant activism.
The dissertation structures the analysis using motivations of remittances. What motivates
collective remittances is critical for a policy perspective. We know a lot about the organizations
and mechanisms that facilitate collective remittances, but not a lot about the motivations that
animate the donors (Sidel, 2008) Guided by remittance theory, an analysis of the relationship
between collective remittances and community socioeconomic structures provide yield deductive
inferences of the motivations that drive migrants to donate to collective remittances.
Remittance motivation theories generally do not separate structural from individual elements.
Community level data are intrinsic to remittance motivations models, the theories make statements
about individual motivations, but make predictions only of group outcomes. So, individuals are
aggregated to their communities, and the models look for patterns in group behaviors. Group
level analysis is a strength of remittance motivation models; they are based on individual dynamics
but abstracted to a group level of analysis where models are easier to generalize among different
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structural contexts. The structural elements include migration history and wages in the home and
host community. These simple metrics are a product of many others, and capture the effects of
migration over time, and the effects of inflation and currency risk on migrant’s wages.
Along with the motivation of migrants, contemporary collective remittances are distinguished
by the motivations of the home states. Collective remittances reflect one aspect of a type of transna-
tionalism centered on state-migrant relationships (Collyer, 2013). States and migrants recognize
the mutual benefits of partnerships, and have the ability to adapt and learn. Migrants learn about
partnership strategies from other migrants, and states also have goals and will adapt methods used
by other states. The analysis of collective remittances that follows will depend upon state creativity
and an exchange of ideas between migrants and states (Iskander, 2006, 2010; Collyer, 2013).
The dissertation will fit a model of collective remittances to data collected by the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP154 , 2016). The model is founded upon remittance motivation theory,
a theory of migration history, and an international lens focused on state-migrant relationships.
Chapter two will discuss the background literature and theory. Chapter three will describe the
data preparation, formal hypothesis, and method and provide model results. Chapter four checks
the models from chapter three in an international scope and identifies the challenges of broadening
a model from one context to others. Chapter five summarizes the key elements of the analysis
and characterizes a use case that could benefit from an application of the model and what we will
learn throughout the analysis. The remainder of chapter one discusses collective remittances within
the larger practice of migration and development, and which relevant aspects are covered in this
dissertation, and which are saved for another time.
At stake in the analysis is the generalizability of Mexico’s experience with collective remittances
to that of other diasporas. Mexico is steeped in a migrant culture that may hold the key to its
success. Terms like “migrant network” and “migrant culture” are frustratingly abstract but the
concepts represent the broad social changes migrants engender in their home nations and abroad due
to networks forming around migration activities (de Haas, 2010a; Massey, 1990; Massey, Goldring,
& Durand, 1994; Massey & Espinosa, 1997). The networks help migrants to cross borders and
find jobs abroad, and sustain migration for long periods and overtime alter home communities.
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Generalizing Mexico’s experiences with collective remittances require generalizing that nation’s
experience with migrant networks.
1.1 Migration and Development
Migration for development paradigms emerged around the 1960s and have since that time oscillated
between optimism and pessimism (de Haas, 2010b, 2012). A spectacular rise in global remittance
flows began in the early 1980s and exploded in the 1990s and reignited debates in migration and
development studies that had began in the 1970s. In the 1990s the uneasy consensus seemed to be
that migration is often the best option in a bad situation but could in some places be deleterious
to development goals (Binford, 2003; J. Cohen, Jones, & Conway, 2005). Now in the 21st century
the practice and theory of migration and development are delinking development from return (de
Haas, 2010b), and collective remittances renewed again the debate within the social sciences over
the developmental potential for remittances. Sending states now explore policy options that allow
emigrants to contribute to development while remaining indefinitely abroad.
People care about collective remittances because they also care about migration and develop-
ment. Policy makers are often committed to a migration for development program. Migration
exists regardless of if it is deleterious or beneficial to development so for some leveraging migration
for development is obligatory. The literature coming out of actively applied and policy-oriented
organizations reflect this commitment.
Migration for development theory focus on the localized effects of emigrant’s remittances, includ-
ing collective remittances, but migration for development policy typically is guided by a strategy
at the national scale. Nations with geographic access to well developed neighbors commonly use
economic, foreign, and migration policy to encourage emigration and support a diaspora abroad;
examples include Mexico, Morocco, and El Salvador. Emigration has many benefits at a national
scale, migration reduces labour supply and injects large sums of foreign currency into the economy.
Without remittances nations like Mexico and Morocco would have trouble remaining solvent.
In theory the goal of migration for development is to replace the dependence upon migration with
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sustainable local economies. In reality migration often supplies only short term poverty alleviation
and quality of life improvement, and it isn’t clear that economic or social remittances offset the loss
of human capital (Adams, 2011; de Haas, 2010b). Both theory and policy lack a clear and obtainable
goal for migration and development because scholars and policy makers often fail to consider the
goals of migrants. Remittance matching programs are an effort to solve this problem, and appear
to be relatively successful in Mexico, but in El Salvador and Morocco programs are more commonly
defeated by state’s unwillingness to share power in project management (Burgess & Tinajero, 2012;
Burgess, 2012; Popkin, 2003; Flores-Mac´ıas, 2012). Even under ideal conditions in Mexico, however,
remittance matching programs do not appear to contribute to state-level development (Bada, 2016),
but do seem to improve recipient communities (Kajima & Gonzalez-Ramirez, 2012). Remittance
matching programs may not be the best option for any given diaspora or home state looking for a
way to utilize migration for development.
Emigrant’s first priority is personal and family gain and security. Developmental considerations
are always subject to emigrant’s primary motivation. A rural community is not, generally, a location
with investment opportunities and migrants may not see themselves as developmental workers
(Lacroix, de Haas, & Vezzoli, 2010). Economic investments, for example in a workshop or factory,
may be ill-suited for the location and face difficult competition or logistical barriers (Schu¨ttler,
2008; Iskander, 2006). Investing in a factory can cost tens of thousands of dollars, and it may
be a waste of resources attempting to prop up community economies with emigrant’s remittances.
Public goods are prone to inappropriateness or frivolousness. Emigrants might wish to fund a
sports facility to enjoy during return visits, while the community may suffer from decaying water
or power infrastructure. Where migrants fail to invest in long term community needs it may
reflect their uncertainty in the community’s future. Quality of life projects combined with poverty
alleviating family remittances relieve economic and cultural distress in the community for the life
of the migrants. While this is disappointing for migration and development, it is perhaps reality
for some emigrant communities.
While emigrant endeavors to contribute new economic development often fail (Bada, 2016), no
research seems to exist comparing the failure rate of emigrant collectively supported enterprise to
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a control group. Case studies also show that while emigrant investments are often unwise, they
are usually emotional and reflect a desire to remain in a community and maintain traditional and
sustainable manufacturing techniques (de Haas, 2006; Vezzoli, 2009; Vezzoli & Lacroix, 2010).
Another seemingly irrational investment common among emigrants are houses back home. Houses
may be used only rarely or even never at all, and emigrants may not wish to rent them out
because they are unable to manage a rental property. But real estate presents one investment that
emigrants might better understand and can control, and no matter what happens an emigrant can
always return to a house. Migrants often lack sound investment advice, but Mexico provides limited
business and investment information resources for migrants. Whether in infrastructure, enterprise,
or real estate, emigrant investments are usually sentimental in nature. Discovering how states can
best serve emigrant needs to support and encourage emigrant enterprise is an important task facing
migration and development scholarship.
Programs like tres por uno provide additional funding, oversight, and accountability for projects.
Emigrants and their governments together tackle more ambitious goals. Tres por uno did not arise
via analytical rationale but rather as a political need (Iskander, 2006, 2010). Programs arose in
Mexico, Morocco, and India just as state leaders required emigrant’s political assistance. Political
ambitions may have provided the motivation and resources for tres por uno, but the efficacy of
this program isn’t an accident. The ideology behind tres por uno is couched in migration and
development theory and philosophical principles of equal participation.
Although collective remittances usually funnel to communities via hometown associations, emi-
grants of some diasporas are comfortable giving on a national scale, to their governments or NGOs.
For some emigrants extra-community scales provide better opportunities for their remittance dol-
lars, including investments and donations. National-scale strategies align nicely with pro-emigration
policies, but they also solve some key problems with community-based migration and development.
First they remove the community as an opportunity for political manipulation. Second they reduce
wasteful spending in communities unsuited for certain types of investments. Third, the national
scale organization is potentially longer lasting than community-based organizations that tend to
disappear with each generation of migrants (Haller & Landolt, 2005; Orozco, 2003). A final, but
10
ambiguous, result is that national strategies facilitate greater pooling of resources The downside
of national-based policies is that they seem to work against the principle that small is beautiful
(Schumacher, 1973). Many of the Mexican hometown associations are geographically federated
so that collective remittances via HTAs already are pooled and managed at scales beyond each
community. When communities cooperate among themselves they can achieve larger projects that
benefit the entire area. Supra-community organization can achieve similar impacts by expanding
the scope of emigrant’s development efforts while still keeping communities as the primary unit.
Today researchers are laying the groundwork to incorporate new findings on the extent and
nature of migrant transnationalism, in particular collective remittances and emigrant’s preferences
for investing in their home nations. An important if pedestrian insight is that there is so far
no mechanism whereby migration automatically results in development (Papademetriou, 1991).
Migration theory evolves to better explain new data. Neoclassical models of migration could not
explain remittances or persistent transnational linkages between emigrants and their homes. In the
1980s it became clear that remittances are a major cash flow among areas of the world and an
important component of immigrant’s home-nation-household income. New Economics of Labour
migration helped to better explain the newly available evidence. Historical-structural theories of
migration emerged in the 1950s and 1960s with pessimistic interpretations of migration, but often
discounted evidence of migration’s benefits. Concurrent with NELM, migrant network theories also
began to reapply historical-structural methodology to identify persistent transnational linkages
between migrants and their homes. Today migrants and their states are finding new ways to
leverage migrant networks for development without requiring return migration.
1.2 Beyond Mexico
In the work “Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and
Mexico” Iskander compares the history of migration and development between Mexico and Mo-
rocco (Iskander, 2010). Therein Iskander argues that any strategy designed to generalize and
identify “best practices” in migration and development policy is incomplete if not inadequate. Pol-
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icy and normative culture surrounding a state and its diaspora is a product of creative labour and
engagement between state and migrants and is not generalizable or transferable. For Iskander how
migrants and state establish policy is just as important as the policy goals. Applying policy adopted
from one state or diaspora to another is not likely to yield successful results because the other state
and diaspora have not engaged in the same creative struggle to produce the policy.
Mexico’s diaspora is not monolithic. Tres por uno emerged from Zacatecan initiatives, and
other migrant heavy states also have state-specific programs outside of 3x1 (Bada, 2011). Not all of
Mexico’s states have a long migration history. Oaxaca lacks the migration history of Mexico’s major
emigrant states, and only since the 1980s has Oaxaca contributed large shares to Mexico’s migration
flows. Despite a short history of migration and no past of state engagement with migration and
development, Oaxaca today boasts well developed migrant civil society (Mason & Beard, 2008).
Oaxacan emigrants share national and international contexts with other migrants of Mexico and
can draw upon the experiences and sustained partnerships with the federal government without
requiring the migration history wherein Mexico’s migrants established these precedents. Tres por
uno emerged from state, not national, politics but all of Mexico’s diaspora share enough context to
benefit from the program.
Each diaspora has used different methods based upon size, history, demographics, and socioeco-
nomic contexts. The qualities and quantities of collective remittances vary for each diaspora and a
simple formula may not be appropriate for all cases. Iskander highlights that migration’s structural
and cultural contexts do not naively generalize. Emigrants of Mexico and Morocco have different
histories of migration and state relations, as well as different types, methods, and styles of transna-
tionalism and collective engagement. Nonetheless 3x1 is a successful program across many Mexican
states, even those without a long migration history, and some aspects of the program and Mexico’s
general experience with collective remittances should be applicable to other nations and diasporas.
This dissertation addresses the difficulties of generalization by analyzing migrant motivations.
Mexico’s history and scale of migration set it apart from other diasporas and the organizing
motivation for this research is to discover the aspects of Mexico’s collective remittances most re-
sponsible for that nation’s experience and to investigate differences in methods other diasporas use
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to organize migrants towards community development. The results will be useful to those who wish
to understand application of state or international initiatives to leverage collective remittances.
The gulf between how policy emerges and what aspects of policy are generalizable is a matter of
scale. A long term, macro scale, plan involving migrants is necessary if states wish to mitigate the
deleterious effects of migration and engage the diaspora in productive development (Heredia, 2006).
Collective remittances are not a new topic and have significant coverage in transnationalism
literature. Collective remittances is an artificial term with little meaning outside of a small commu-
nity of researchers, but many others investigate phenomenon with properties relevant to collective
remittances. Migrants of most diasporas in the late-modern U.S. maintain financially involved
relationships with their families and communities (Glick-Schiller, 1999). What is new in the re-
cent literature is the concept of planned government involvement, cooperation, and support. Past
transnationalism research brought to light the decentralized role of the state in diaspora engage-
ments in the homeland, but today states across the globe are taking note of the practical outcomes
of the dynamics described in transnational theory, and the states are seeing new avenues of planned
state involvement in migration for development. It’s not clear that many governments can or should
engage a diaspora or what aspects of a diaspora or the home nation are important when planning
an initiative. It’s also not clear if Mexico’s success will continue or if its government will sustain
funding lines for tres por uno and follow on programs.
1.3 Conclusion: agenda
This introductory chapter demonstrated that in Mexico there exist a wide range of structural
contexts and behavioral strategies that migrants and communities use when solving developmental
problems and cooperating in these endeavors with the state. The following chapters will explore
the variety of contexts in Mexico and how these affect migration and development, before moving
on to examining collective remittances and migration and development around the world. The
dissertation proceeds through the following chapters:
chapter 2 Review of the Literature
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chapter 3 Exploration of collective remittances to communities within Mexico
chapter 4 Comparison of Mexico’s diaspora and collective remittances to those of other nations
chapter 5 Theoretical synthesis and Conclusion
The literature review in the second chapter will detail a model for discretizing and describing
the stages that communities seem to go through as they are changed by migration. This analysis
uses stages of migration to summarize the effects of migration. A model for stages of migration
facilitate analysis of migration and also permit the analysis to more efficiently investigate other
aspects and questions relevant to collective remittances. The literature review will discuss the
difference between stages and history of migration, and review the history of migration and collective
remittances in Mexico. The literature review ends with a review of theory relevant to analysis of
collective remittances, including migrant networks, transnationalism, and the motivations that drive
remittances.
Chapter three focuses upon Mexico and collective remittances in Mexican communities and
establishes some high-level facts about Mexico’s collective remittances. That analysis will explore
theory and available data for factors that explain the existence of migrant-funded development
projects in Mexican communities. The results of chapter three also guide interpretation of the
results of chapter four’s comparative analysis.
The international comparison of chapter four reinterprets the analysis of Mexico within the
context of other major diasporas. The comparison begins with Central and Latin American states.
Emigrants from almost every Central and Latin American states migrate overwhelmingly to the
U.S. so that these diasporas share many things in common with Mexico’s due to a common host
state. Nations of Central and Latin America also share many possibly relevant cultural and political
contexts. The international comparison then moves on to the remainder of the world to explore
diasporas that share little in common with Mexico. The globe is divided into major regions and
the comparison selects one important and characteristic diaspora from each region. This provides a
broad contextual base for the comparative analysis. Throughout the comparison the analysis seeks
counterexamples and important differences that point to where theory based on empirical analysis
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of Mexico’s experiences with collective remittances may not generalize.
The concluding chapter will review the results of the analysis of Mexico’s collective remittances
in terms of the comparison between Mexico’s diaspora and that of other Latin American nations.
The conclusion will use the results to argue that future diasporas engaging in development must
be more comfortable with a broader focus than community organization and collective remittances.
The major contribution of migration and development in the 2000s was the delinking of development
from return; the conclusion will argue that the next major step in migration and development must
be decentering migration and development from the community to include migration motivations
and national needs.
Mexico today is an exemplar for successful migration and development policy. Emerging dias-
poras without a history and institution of migration are especially keen to follow Mexico’s example.
Sometimes it is a state, like El Salvador, wishing to replicate a program like tres por uno. Sometimes
it is a diaspora, like the grassroots of Zimbabwean emigrants, following the example of Mexican
and other HTAs. Most Mexican HTAs are small and serve a single community. Not all diasporas
share a community focus, for example Colombians most often donate through NGOs or national
migrant organizations. But in Mexico some HTAs also surpass the community, and are federated
into larger organizations that serve regions. Migration and development among different nations
and diasporas share as many commonalities as differences, and today analysts and policymakers
are attempting to understand these differences and apply methods the emerged in one diaspora to
other diasporas.
15
Chapter 2
History and theory of migration,
transnationalism, and collective
remittances
This chapter reviews the history of Mexican-U.S. migration, introduces a stage model of migration,
examines how transnationalism supports progression of migration stages, and discusses motivations
that drive migrants to remit. The review describes how and why the Mexican diaspora and state
institutionalized collective remittances, how migrant’s lives in the host nation impel collective re-
mittances, and discusses theories of motivations that drive remittances. With this foundation the
next chapters will proceed with analysis of structural determinants of collective remittances and
the motivations of migrants to contribute towards collectively funded developmental projects.
Migration history is a distinct concept from migration stages. Mexican migration history is
the unique series of events and responses from Mexican and U.S. populations that have shaped
Mexican migration to the U.S. Stages reflect the cumulative effects of migration upon migrant’s
home communities. History is unique but stages represent a generalizable process that we can apply
anywhere with sufficient migration. Later chapters will cover the particulars of each stage and the
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interaction between stage and migration and development theory.
Stages structure analysis by discretizing and characterizing important ranges in the cumulative
effects of migration through time. Stages are an important theoretical description of the progressive
effects of migration and also provide a method for quantitatively comparing communities with
different migration histories. The effects of contemporary migration depend upon the migration
history of a community, and stages help to delineate and explain the seemingly contradictory effects
of migration from one community to another. Some of the initial literature that foreshadowed a
stage-based model come from Stark (Stark, Taylor, & Yitzhaki, 1986), who identified two phases in
the impacts of migration upon inequality characterized by the prevailing migration selection effects.
Early stages experience a different selection processes than later stages where the socioeconomic
environment has been altered by the injection of economic, social, and human capital obtained
by community members via migration. Massey (Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 1993; Massey &
Espinosa, 1997) and later Jones (Jones, 1998, 2013) provided further extensions to the stage model
of migration and its effects. Understanding the stages of migration where collective remittances
arose among Mexican emigrants will also help in comparing and generalizing Mexico’s experience
to other diasporas of the globe.
Transnationalism is the interconnectivity between migrants and their homes and the evanes-
cence of the state’s power in regulating cross-border relationships (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Blanz-
Szanton, 1994). Transnational studies grapple with the evolving nature of migrant’s relationships
to their homes and struggle to find definitions that usefully demarcate the contemporary forms
of transnationalism without constraining their variety. The analysis of collective remittances will
require a wide scope transnationalism that encompasses casual and daily transnational behaviors
and reconsiders the role of home community and state in migrant’s transnational engagements.
Migrant motivations provide a link between analysis of collective remittances in one context,
and generalization of that analysis into policy and theory applicable anywhere. Where migration
stages generalize the progressive structural effects of migration, migrant motivations generalize the
goals and rationale of remittances. Motivations are difficult to know or prove, and analysis of
motivations depend upon deductive inferences from migrant’s behavior.
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2.1 History
Mexico’s diaspora enjoys many geographical benefits that have shaped the history of Mexican-US
migration. The economic difference between Mexico and the U.S. is among the largest of any
two neighboring nations. Still Mexico is not an underdeveloped nation and many families have
the capital necessary to fund migration. Wage differentials, distance, and availability of funding
capital are some of the most important factors that determine who migrates and why. Mexico’s
development in combination with it’s proximity to a much greater developed neighbor provides a
very favorable environment for migration.
The seed of modern Mexican-American migration may exist in the late 19th century when U.S.
corporations began using Mexico’s enchagadore system to recruit Mexican peasants into jobs in
the U.S. Massey argues that early railroads structured recruitment and emigration of peasants
because contractors would travel via railroad and recruit from the villages closest to rail stops
(Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). Indeed a distinction of Massey’s theory is that through all
the waves of migration from Mexico to the U.S. the foundations laid by the historical rail and
recruitment patterns continue to explain substantial aspects of contemporary migration patterns.
Rails continue to play a role in contemporary migration too, with many migrating north via freight
trains (Amnesty International, 2010).
The Mexican civil war of 1910 generated a surge of emigration that eclipsed the steady but
slow northward movement of labour-seekers and recruits. This first wave of Mexican migration
coincided with an economic boom in agriculture and transportation industries in the American
southwest during and after World War I. Between 1910 and 1930 as many as 1.5 million individuals
crossed into the U.S. from Mexico. Movement was at first relatively unrestricted but shortly the
U.S. passed the Immigration Act of 1917 that required entrants to the U.S. to pay a head tax, pass
a literacy test, and undergo a medical exam. In 1924 the U.S. established the Border Patrol to
enforce the Immigration Act, however people easily found routes to enter surreptitiously. The Great
Depression broke the first wave of Mexican migration as many people of Mexican-origin voluntarily
or forcibly relocated to Mexico. But even during the economic hardships of the 1930s U.S. businesses
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continued to recruit Mexicans into U.S. agricultural jobs, especially in Texas (Camarillo, 2007).
The second wave of Mexican migration begins in 1942 when World War II creates labour short-
ages in the U.S. The U.S. implemented the bracero program to provide Mexicans with temporary
work visas. By the end of WW II U.S. agriculture was dependent on labour from Mexico and the
bracero program remained in place until 1964. The number of migrants that entered during this
time is an order of magnitude greater than the first wave.
The cessation of the bracero program marks the final waves of Mexican migration that are
characterized by a quickly increasing flood of migrants and often substantial undocumented border
crossing. As the bracero program ends Mexico is experiencing a fitful industrialization that has
drawn people from rural farms to urban centers but often left them unemployed and displaced as
Mexico’s stuttering urban economies are unable to absorb the incoming labour supply. Many people
decided to venture northward and enter the U.S., illegally if necessary.
The historical migration destination is Texas, but the surge of migration since the 1960s has
been overwhelmingly into California. However in the 1980s and 1990s the social environment
in California turned hostile to Mexican migrants (Camarillo, 2007). In response migration flows
diffused and branched out in greater proportions to Colorado, Illinois, North Carolina, Florida, and
Georgia, among other states.
At the turn of the 20th century Mexican net migration to the U.S. peaked. The growth of
Mexican migration through the 20th century was so steady that the percentage of Mexicans as all
migrants and percentage of Mexican-born among Mexican-Americans has increased year-over-year
every decade until the 21st century (Camarillo, 2007). In the mid-2000s Mexican-U.S. migration
fell to net zero migration, and today net Mexican immigration hovers around zero, but is slightly
negative and may decrease further.
Now, too, the diversity of Mexico’s U.S. diaspora is greater than ever before and possibly ever
will be. Migrants from the initial years of the three decade long surge in Mexican migration are
now elderly, and the generational range is as wide as it may ever be. Income diversity is great,
with some migrants very wealthy while others and especially the newest are often poor. Migrants
may also have children and even grandchildren in the U.S. so that generations span not only across
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migrants but also within their U.S. born families. Still despite rapid filial growth the proportion of
Mexican-origin as a total of the Mexican ethnic population in the U.S. has grown for three decades.
Mexican immigrants through the 1960s and 1970s more often were short term visitors as com-
pared to immigrants from later decades who more often became permanent residents. In 1986 the
U.S. congress passed the Immigration Control and Reform Act with the intent to curtail undocu-
mented migration, and in 1990 passed the Immigration Act that better defined numerical limits, a
preference system for migrants, immigrant status, and pathways to naturalization. As a result of
efforts to control migration the environment become more difficult for seasonal migrants who then
more often decided to settle permanently.
The proximity, volume, and antiquity of Mexico’s U.S. diaspora have lent it several character-
istics that may have helped Mexico’s migrants to construct and maintain such close relationships
with their homes. These characteristics may have also helped migrants to establish and eventually
institutionalize some of the relationships with their home community and nation.
Through it’s history the Mexican-U.S. diaspora faced hostilities from both Mexico and the U.S.
governments. In fact, most diasporas of the world have faced such antagonism, and what distin-
guishes collective remittances from the diasporic and transnational philanthropy and engagement
of the past is the involvement and cooperation of the state. Mexico’s diaspora reached a critical
mass of transnational culture fostered by increasing naturalization of Mexican migrants in America
and a greater openness to the diaspora from the Mexican state. Mexican migrants today have the
facilities available that allow them to live in two nations, culturally and politically if not phys-
ically. Unlike the two contradicting narratives, one that legalization will decrease transnational
engagement and, two that transnational engagement will decreases assimilation–it appears that
naturalization, assimilation, and transnational engagement all support each other (Goldring, 1999;
Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Snel, Engbersen, & Leerkes, 2006). Transnationalism is an in-
trinsic aspect of immigrant identity, rather than an alternative to assimilation (Massey, Williams,
Axinn, & Ghimire, 2010). The narratives, nonetheless, can become self-supporting symbols that
galvanize immigrants into transnational activism (Tarrow, 2005). Contemporary transnationalism,
furthermore, transcends national and state boundaries. Dual citizenship is a feasible option for
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many migrants, and migrants do not choose between states but instead between ethnic and civic
allegiances (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008). Home state economies and politicians are
now dependent on migrants, and this dependence provides the impetus for home state cooperation
with migrants that support collective remittances.
2.1.1 History of collective remittances in Mexico
In Zacatecas, Mexico, 1986, government and migrant organizations established a social development
fund that would match all collective remittances that migrants donate for development in their home
communities. President Salinas, eager to capture migrant political support, quickly expanded the
Zacatecan initiative to the federal level by adding matching funds from the federal government.
This became the dos por uno program because every migrant peso was matched by both state and
federal governments.
Roots of dos por uno and migrant HTAs extends back to the 1960s when migrants establish
Federacio´n Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California, a federation of Zacatecan HTAs. Prior to
the Zacatecan federation, small hometown clubs existed in their modern form by the 1950s, and
even after the Zacatecan federation hometown clubs did not gain in popularity until the 1970s
(Villela, 2014). In the 1980s the relationship between the federation and the Zacatecan state
became institutionalized when then governor, Genaro Borrego (1986-1992), reached an agreement
whereby HTAs and the state government would jointly fund public works. In 1993, under the
direction of the Salinas administration, the Mexican Ministry of Social Development extended the
Zacatecan initiative to other states, thus establishing dos por uno.
Zedillo, who succeeded Salinas presidency in 1995, later terminated the dos por uno program,
but again the Zacatecan state continued the program under a new arrangement. In 1997 the new
Zacatecan governor, Ricardo Monreal, managed to establish the tres por uno program that in-
volved municipal, state, and federal governments in cooperatively funding community development
projects. In one year’s time the program was managing five million dollars and 93 projects in 27
Zacatecan municipalities (Bada, 2003).
In 2001 President Fox resurrected dos por uno as tres por uno wherein municipalities also match
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migrant pesos for a total of three pesos for every one a migrant donates. Since the 1990’s migrants
and government at all levels in Mexico are getting more organized and proactive in managing
development through transnational spaces (D. Agunias, 2009; D. R. Agunias, 2009; D. R. Agunias
& Newland, 2013; Ionescu, 2006). Mexico has been implementing reforms to institutionalize and
formalize migrant-state relations, and migrants are organizing and acting with political intent to
protect their rights as extraterritorial participants in their home nations. In 2006 the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) began to support 3x1 with loans, and in 2012 the IADB provided a
loan of 21 million dollars (A´ngela Fu´nez, 2012). From 2009 to 2012 collective remittances averaged
36 million a year, and the Mexican government’s contribution about 100 million a year.
Following their political and developmental success in the 1990s collective remittances received
significantly increased attention from governments, NGOs, and the social sciences. The World
Bank’s 2006 Global Economic Prospects report gave special attention to collective remittances and
conclude that collective remittances often better serve community needs and are more transparent
than other funding methods but that they may not scale up well or have the capacity to support
larger development plans (The World Bank, 2006). Around 1999 El Salvador’s FIDSL began
reaching out to its diaspora and by 2007 had obtained $20000k USD from the World Bank to
establish the United for Solidarity program based on Mexico’s tres por uno (D. R. Agunias &
Newland, 2012).
The motivations for Mexico’s remittance matching programs begin within Mexican politics
(Alarcon, 2002; Iskander, 2006, 2010). There exist two main reasons. First, many Mexicans and
migrants found the Salinas 1988 election to be fraudulent. Salinas was eager to reach out to migrants
to establish some rapport, and the Zacatecan dos por uno program was both successful and popular
among migrants. Second Mexico and the US had entered negotiations for the NAFTA treaty and
Mexico wanted to solidify it’s relationship with the migrant population, which prompted Mexican
officials to establish the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) that later would manage the
dos por uno and tres por uno programs. Mexican migrants and their networks were able to support
the organization needed for collective remittances, and the state had an incentive to cooperate.
Hometown associations are not extensively studied but since about 2002 research began quickly
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accumulating. Most of the research uses Mexican data and cases, but recently scholars have also
mapped the emergence of HTAs and their features in other nations including Colombia and Do-
minican Republic HTAs in New York City (Portes, Escobar, & Radford, 2007), Sri Lankan emi-
grants in Milan (Comola & Mendola, 2014), and Ecuadorians in Spain (Boccagni, 2010), Ghanians,
Surinamese, and Moroccans in the Netherlands (Nijenhuis & Zoomer, 2012), and Afghans in the
Netherlands (Danie¨ls, 2015). HTAs are often based on a core alliance of local families who govern
the organization and draw support from hundreds of other local migrants (Orozco & Welle, 2005).
HTAs of Mexican society are increasingly political machines, and community leaders will establish
an HTA to compete for politicized development objectives (Villela, 2014). Early findings on the
qualities of Mexican HTAs identified the following characteristics (adapted from (Orozco, 2003)):
• Mexican HTAs are small philanthropic organizations
• Their organizational structure is commensurate to the groups’ proposed goals
• The activities focus on basic health, education and public infrastructure
• The resources raised are relatively small in volume
• Donations are significant to the recipient localities
• Partnerships with governments enhance development goals
• Mexican HTAs average lifespan is about 10 years
• Mexican HTAs begin as organizations of family or personal acquaintances and expand
What once was an emergent phenomenon, collective remittances, today are identified and ac-
tively encouraged by nations and international organizations alike as a new solution to underdevel-
opment (Kapur, 2004). State governments and international organizations are developing new ways
to engage migrants and leverage migrant’s resources and expertise. Social development funds and
remittance matching programs utilize existing transnational engagements between migrants and
their communities in order to bring state and international resources together with migrant’s local-
ized knowledge to implement local development. The manifest goals of these efforts is development,
23
but partnerships between migrants and state often initially are motivated by political ambitions.
Migrants are political tools and development is a politicized incentive.
2.2 Migration stages and formation of networks
History and growth of migration are important factors in the formation of migrant networks and
transnational communities. Stages of migration is a conceptual means to classify communities by
migration history and experience. Stages of migration are a discrete sequence of changes to a
community that occur due to the growth of migration. Each stage also brings changes to local
socioeconomic structures. Remittance dollars can have big impacts on local economies, and newly
wealthy migrants form a broad class of migrant elite that upend existing social strata. Stages also
proxy the growth of migrant networks and organizations that support collective remittances. Stages
of migration describes how the influence of migrants and remittances vary through time. A model
for the stages of migration facilitates analyzing the effect of migration’s changes overtime upon
collective remittances.
To the extent that a generalized relationship can exist between migration and geographical
locations, it is intuitive to envision a relationship that progresses and unfolds through a series of
stages. Some migration theory conceive a circular relationship between migration and its local
contexts, but the concept of stages of migration imply that migration at particular levels will alter
its community context in a specific way. Communities in the same stage will be similar in ways
other than migration, due to sharing the qualitatively similar effects of that stage of migration.
While it is self-evident that lesser rates of migration must precede greater rates of migration, this
progression may be punctuated by exogenous factors or community and migrant behaviors before
settling into a stable equilibrium. Communities are pulled or pushed into stages of migration by
both exogenous and endogenous factors and initial arbitrary directions can become entrenched as
the first migrants assist their friends, family, and neighbors to move abroad and find work (Massey,
1990). One may liken exogenous factors to structure and endogenous factors to agency. Which
of these factors is dominant will have important implications for our understanding of collective
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remittances. Structure implies that the stage of migration is beyond the control of community and
migrants, and any relationship between stage and collective remittances may also arise exogenously.
Agency implies communities and migrants strategically choose the stage of migration they expect
will have optimal returns for the entire community. Obviously, both structure and agency act to
push and pull a community into a stage of migration. The concept of chain migration recognizes
the endogenous growth of migration networks (MacDonald & MacDonald, 1964), and in concert
with social capital theory explains how migration patterns become self-sustaining (Massey, 1990).
It isn’t clear that anyone has observed a community move from one stage to the next, or a mi-
gration network grow in real time. Surprisingly little research exists on how migrant networks form,
their shape, or their types. Social networks do not form randomly, but clump around central nodes
and gatekeepers (Jackson & Yariv, 2007). Migrant networks seem to be preferential attachment,
and can take over a decade to develop and mature (Comola & Mendola, 2014). Migrant networks
facilitate migration and apply normative social pressure for younger people to join the ranks of
migrant workers (Garip & Asad, 2016). Empirical tests of the progressive effects of migration rely
on personally-related event history data, and the division of cross-sections of communities into the
different stages, under the assumption that earlier stage communities could grow to become like
those in the later stages. No community in the Mexican Migration Project data, at least, appears
to have grown in this fashion. Analysis of event history data has shown that communities did
at one time have lower migration prevalence than they do today and that migration has steadily
grown through time (Massey et al., 1994; Massey & Espinosa, 1997). The theories regarding the
progressive effects of migration require assumptions that, while testable in principal, have not been
tested within existing time frames.
Lacking sound inductive tests, the stages model of migration rest upon deductive inferences
drawn from theories of international migration drivers and their long term effects. The two major
families of international migration theory are neoclassical and historical-structural theories. Neo-
classical theories include the extensions of New Economics of Labour Migration, and historical
structural theories include World Systems Theory and migrant network theories. All of these the-
ories arose to explain aspects of migration that previous theories could not. The stages model of
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migration identifies patterns that the major theories do not explain and offers updated mechanisms
that better predict observations.
The earliest theories of international migration emphasized push and pull factors. Ravenstein,
perhaps the first theorist of international migration, speculated that differences in wages, health-
care, and other life necessities compelled people to cross international borders (Ravenstein, 1885).
Ravenstein anticipated the basic elements of neoclassical theory of economic migration, which mod-
els migrants as self-interested, rational, and optimizing agents who respond to international eco-
nomic differentials (Harris & Todaro, 1970). The shortcoming of Neoclassical economics isn’t a
focus upon agency over structure, but rather failure to consider the effects of non-labour markets
upon migration and the failure to consider higher units of analysis, like families or communities.
World Systems Theory (WST) asserts that interference from wealthy core nations into the less
developed periphery nations creates an environment conducive to migration (Wallerstein, 1974).
WST priorities the effects of structure. International structures exogenous to the community shape
migration patterns and moderate the effects of migration. WST claims that migration causes
brain drain, divestment of local populations, disintegration of local cultural and familial bonds,
and a forced dependency on migration. WST is structurally-focused and provides little room for
agency, but allows nations to traverse the global hierarchy with great difficulty and under special
circumstances. In history cases from South Korea, South Africa, and the BRIC nations, to name a
few, provide important examples of nations ascending to higher ranks in the global order.
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) is a relatively recent theory of migration seeking to
expand neoclassical economic theories. NELM allows for non-labour markets to influence migration,
for example insurance or credit markets (Stark & Bloom, 1985). In addition to labour and wage
differentials, people may also migrate to obtain funds in an environment of non-existent credit
markets or provide insurance in the form of diversified income. NELM incorporates new markets
by extending neoclassical analytical scopes to the family and community. Concepts like family
insurance or diversified income make no sense in the individualistic economically-rational framework
of Neoclassical economics. NELM favors agency over structure, but with it’s multilevel analysis
also foreshadowed the historical-structural theories that built upon WST.
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Cumulative causation is a historical-structural theory, like WST, but also synthesizes many as-
pects from NELM. Cumulative causation builds upon ideas from chain-migration (MacDonald &
MacDonald, 1964; Myrdal, 1957) and describe how migrant networks emerge from personal rela-
tionships between kin and friends that grow with migration and spread across entire communities
(Massey, 1990). Migrant networks spread information and resources that lower the cost of migra-
tion. Migrant networks are central to models for the progression of migration stage. Most models
seem to assume migrant networks serve only to generate migration, but they may have more com-
plex functions. Social networks can both support and burden resource-seeking individuals (Portes,
1998; Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson, 2004), and established migrants might want to impede additional
migration is to control labour supply and prevent downward pressure on wages at the destination
(Stark, 1995). Historical-structural contexts remain the primary factors in cumulative causation,
and the theory coopts migrant agency and network formation within the accumulation of migration
experience. The goal of cumulative causation was not to explore the nature of migrant networks,
but rather demonstrate that because of social networks migration is not easy to control using policy
tools.
The multilevel and network-centric properties of NELM and cumulative causation provide the
foundation for a stages model of migration. Historical-structural theories of international migration
proxy the growth of migrant networks with the growth of migration experience. Migration stages
build upon historical structural theories by identifying clusters of communities that share many
similarities brought on by the effects of migration. Throughout, however, the basic deductions of
chain migration and neoclassical theories are what explains why people migrate and how migrants
encourage and maintain migration flows from their homes.
Inequality often acts as an umbrella for the broader socioeconomic effects of migration, and a test
for the stages model of migration. The impetus for an extensible stage model of migration comes
from the empirical observation that quantitatively different relationships exit between migration and
inequality in different locations (Acosta, 2008). Some early studies found that remittances generate
a new class divide between migrants and non-migrants but are more progressively distributed than
most other sources of income and assistance (Mines & de Janvry, 1982), while others emphasize
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that remittances reach primarily wealthy households and magnify divides that might have been
previously obscured (Lipton, 1980; Reichert, 1982). Stark et al. reconcile these contradictions
by linking the derivative of inequality with respect to migration to the prevailing migration rates
(Stark et al., 1986). They find that in communities with low migration prevalence inequality rises
with migration, but that the opposite is true in communities with high migration prevalence. This
theory of selectivity by migration prevalence set the foundation for the classification of communities
into two stages of migration prevalence
In communities with low migration prevalence and no established migrant networks, new migra-
tion is uncertain and risky. In this stage only the relatively wealthy can afford to migrate, and most
remittances reach wealthy households resulting in greater inequality. The inequality increases and
may force others to migrate in order to “keep up.” But the first migrants brought back know-how
and experience, and as more people migrate this base of knowledge and resources accumulate and
become more widely available to everyone in the community. This has the de facto effect of lower-
ing the costs to migrate, which creates additional incentives (Massey, 1990; Stark & Bloom, 1985).
Non-migrants face greater relative poverty, but have access to the experiences of migrant friends
and family. In this environment greater numbers from across a wider range of the socioeconomic
distribution begin to migrate. This marks the transition from the first to the second stage.
In the second stage, migrant networks continue to grow around the experiences, knowledge, and
resources of existing migrants. These networks lower costs and allow also the less wealthy to migrate
and send remittances to their households (Massey, 1990). This lifts the relative wealth of poorer
households and lessens inequality. As migration experience and income saturate a community,
migration becomes a less attractive income source. Migration may become non-optimal for wealthy
families, while less wealthy families continue to depend on the income (Mckenzie & Rapoport, 2007;
Stark et al., 1986; Arslan & Taylor, 2012; Koechlin & Leon, 2007). Inequality drops again, as large
portions of the socioeconomic distribution gain access to migrant income.
The two stages taken together in theory form an inverted “U” inequality curve and a sigmoidal
migrant network density curve. Migration studies have produced contradictory findings regarding
the effects of migration upon inequality. Investigations of the causal relationship between inequal-
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ity and migration, using the same dataset but different theory and modeling methods, often will
reach different conclusions. Garip (Garip, 2012) employs a Heckman selection model using the
MMP dataset to investigate the effects of wealth upon selection into migration, and finds that
initial migrants in first stage communities are more likely to come from poor households, while
repeat migrants in second stage communities are more likely to come from wealthy households.
McKenzie (Mckenzie & Rapoport, 2007) fits an instrumental variables model testing the hypothesis
that migration prevalence non-monotonically alters the effects of wealth upon selection to migrate.
McKenzie’s model predicts that when migration prevalence is low migration will increase inequality
overtime, but that at some point the relationship between migration and inequality inflects down-
wards such that in high migration communities migration will decrease inequality overtime. Garip’s
model suggests that wealthy households continue to use migration as an income source even after a
community’s social networks are saturated with experiences and assistance of migrants. McKenzie
finds that at some value for the rate of migration the relative benefit of migration to the wealthy
will subside. The two models are not necessarily contradictory. McKenzie’s results support the
stage model of migration, but Garip’s results suggest that initial inequality in the early stages of
migration persist even into later stages of migration.
A three stage model can resolve many of the contradictory findings of the two stage model. In
the third stage many migrants have become relatively wealthy, and they create a new social class
(Jones, 1998, 2013). In rural areas the third stage can upset the local social order, creating a class
divide between migrants, especially legal migrants, and everyone else. In the third stage inequality
begins to increase again. The wealthy migrant class may even buoy some rural communities to
equal or surpass the average wealth of their more urban peers (Jones, 2013; Orozco, 2005). Thus,
at advanced levels of migration the effects of migration on inequality can reverse yet again, and
result in contradictory findings.
Stages can assist an analysis of collective remittances by controlling for the progressive effects
of migration through time. Chapter three will show that the data is consistent with the stages
models of migration, and will classify community stages by analyzing the data and developing a
clustering model. Stages provide simple way to summarize the complex but structural ways that
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migration shapes communities. Stages imply that there exist reasonably punctuated inflections or
changes in the effects of migration and remittances upon a community. Stages also suggest large
relatively constant spaces between points where effects of migration and remittances shift in size or
direction, such that communities appear to cluster. It’s also reasonable that communities do not
advance through stages but instead enter a stable equilibrium in one of the stages.
2.3 Migrant transnationalism and civil society
A key theoretical contribution of transnational studies was to deprivilege the state as the regulator
of migrant’s relationships with their homelands. Transnational studies emphasize instead the role
of non state actors, in particular migrants, in shaping international migration and remittance flows
(Collyer, 2013). Home and host nations constrain migrant’s abilities to live in and make political
claims in either nation, and through policy and incentives states constrain or enable migrant’s cross-
border movements, transfers, and relationships. Transnationalism is how migrants cope with the
structural and cultural demands imposed by the home and host state and societies. For example,
transnationalism can be a response to a migrant’s duty in their home communities, or an escape
from the discrimination in the host nation (Lacroix, 2014).
Transnationalism encompasses a great diversification of form and content that confounds clas-
sification. Narrow or core transnationalism that is formal and institutionalized, and broad or
extended transnationalism that is sporadic or casual (Itzigsohn, Dore, Fernandez, & Vazquez, n.d.;
Guarnizo, 2003). Portes argues for limiting transnational analysis to individuals who regularly en-
gage in transnational economic, social, and political activism (Portes, 2001, 2003). Most migrants
do not live immersive transnational lives, about 6% of migrants are transnational entrepreneurs,
10-15% engage in regular transnational activity, and 20% occasionally transnational (Portes, 2003).
Collective remittances are by definition organized transnational activity focused on development
(Scho¨nauer, 2003). Migrant organizations and transnational civil society first existed within the
U.S. in the mid 19th century (Cano & De´lano, 2007). HTAs and migrant organizations committed
to development are only the more recent in a series of forms of migrant organizations in the U.S.
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Initial organizations often were political, religious, patriotic, or dedicated to sporting events and
teams.
Collective remittances encompass both narrow and broad transnationalism. A few people take
great responsibility as leaders, volunteers, and organizers, while most people casually contribute
to collective remittances via the efforts of a small number of highly involved individuals. Mi-
grants who do not satisfy Portes definition of transnational nonetheless contribute to collective
remittances merely by attending events staged by HTAs in the host nation (Villela, 2014). An
important function of institutionalization of collective remittances is to lower the threshold to
participate in transnationally supported development. States encourage institutionalization with
remittance matching and other programs, especially when programs are limited to formal orga-
nizations (Duquette-Rury, 2014). Collective remittances are defined by migrant’s transnational
behavior in the host nation, but it is equally important to consider the role of community and state
outreach and policy in the home nation.
State-migrant partnerships reflect a new international paradigm and new forms of social engage-
ment (Lacroix, 2014). Neoliberalization of trade policies between Mexico and the U.S. may have
prompted a change of tone from Mexico’s state towards its diaspora (Smith & Bakker, 2008; Villela,
2014). Neoliberalism exploded worldwide through the 1980s and 90s and may similarly explain the
worldwide shift in tone from home states towards their diasporas. Through the last quarter of the
20th century remittances grew quickly and many states became economically dependent upon their
diasporas (Popkin, 2003).
Institutionalization of collective remittances embeds the supporting transnational behaviors into
emigrant society. Institutionalization of collective remittances refers to the formalization of the rela-
tionship between a state and diaspora in cooperation for collective remittances. Institutionalization
of collective remittances efficiently facilitate individual contributions without requiring a high degree
of involvement from all donors. Most people can contribute casually while dedicated bureaucrats
and committees oversee the collection and implementation of collective remittances (Bada, 2011,
2014). Transnational activity today is fundamentally different from historical transnationalism.
Collective remittances represent a new type of migrant-state transnational partnership. Transna-
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tional studies emerged from the recognition of the deterritorialized nation-state, but contemporary
migrant transnational activism is distinguished by partnerships and cooperation between migrants
and their homes.
Migrant organizations usually establish and support initial transnational engagement. The foun-
dation of migrant organizations exists in the everyday lifestyle struggles migrants face as foreigners
in a host nation. How migrants establish or join organizations depends upon their experiences, age,
and generation. Activism often begin with home community governance (Fox & Bada, 2008) and
the nurturing of civil society and citizenship in the host nation (The Oaxacalifornian Reporting
Team, 2013). In some situations migrants may bring organizational skills from their home com-
munities, but younger migrants often learn organizational skills through civic engagement in the
host nation, and then apply these skills to engagements with their home community (The Oax-
acalifornian Reporting Team, 2013). Activism can bring about positive social change but initial
motivations involve many factors. Emigrants organize as a means of belonging and managing status
in their home communities, and collective remittances serve these goals (Villela, 2014). Migrant
transnational activism often emerges from the struggles migrants face during their time spent in
the host nation. Mixtec migrant youth in Los Angeles organize as a means to cope with their
experiences in the U.S, especially with the symbolic violence inflicted by non-indigenous Mexican
migrants (The Oaxacalifornian Reporting Team, 2013). Youth learn organizational skills in after-
school clubs that they will apply towards activism in support of greater civic rights in the U.S. and
for transnational activism in their home towns.
Integration into a host society can dissolve filial bonds to home communities while strengthening
community level engagement (The Oaxacalifornian Reporting Team, 2013). The act of integration
can simultaneously create and destroy transnational spaces. The stability of integration provides
a foundation for transnationalism, and the struggles of integration give migrants the skills and
motivations to organize and maintain transnational lives (Al-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001; Portes,
Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Portes et al., 2007). Integration into a host
country supports home community engagement, of the migrants. Migrant’s children, however, are
usually less engaged with their home communities and nations, and future generations thereof are
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increasingly disconnected from their national roots and less likely to be transnationally engaged.
Future generations loose the motivation to organize with other migrant families or remain involved
with home communities, but may also enjoy greater access to resources. Some members of migrant’s
future generations will reconnect to their family’s home nation through nostalgic trade of goods
specific to a home nation, tourism, and national or local investment. Like collective remittances,
only a small fraction of migrant’s future generations may engage in nostalgia trade, but they can
support small specialized industries. Nostalgia tourism fosters nationalism and can result in follow
on nostalgia trade or investment, and some nations sponsor nostalgia tourism to introduce later
generations of migrants to their national heritage (Newland, Terrazas, & Munster, 2010).
In the short term transnational activism is directly dependent upon migrants, but in the long
term sustainable transnational communities depend on both the migrants and their home commu-
nities and states. The phenomena of transnationalism is rapidly evolving and today home states
and communities take part as actors equal to migrants in shaping transnational fields. Collective re-
mittances transcend individuals and depend on group level dynamics between states, communities,
and migrant’s organizations. Structural and political factors are just as important for collective
remittances as the transnational activism and motivations of individual migrants. Transnationalism
is not a feature only of the lives of migrants, but is also an aspect of paradigms of organizational,
international, and state policy.
2.4 Remittance motivations
The collective remittances literature lacks a thorough treatment of the relationships between the
individual participants and the institutional directions of collective remittances. In particular, it
is unknown if the individuals that comprise the mass of donors to collective remittances share the
same economic logics that guide institutional decision making. Or if individuals become donors for
social reasons unrelated to the economic logic that guides how communities, the state, and migrant
organizations use collective remittances.
Theories that explain why migrants remit to their families provide a foundation for analyzing
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migrant’s remittances to their community. The altruistic motivation and it’s inverse–the exchange
motivation–seem to appear in literature more often than any other. Two other popular explanations
are the investment and strategy motivations. The nature of collective remittances make these too
different for most of the explanations for family remittances to be perfect analogies, although the
altruistic motivation is largely congruent between family and collective remittances.
The altruistic motivation is simplest and states that migrants give money either independently
from or inverse to economic factors. Giving that is independent of economic factors imply that
migrants give because giving is the reward–altruism grants a “warm glow.” Giving that is inverse
to the usual economic-rational investment decisions implies that migrants are not just altruistic but
sympathetic.
Opposite altruism, the exchange hypothesis states that migrant remittances are dependent upon
economic factors. This hypothesis expects that migrants give more where there is stronger growth
and greater inflation. The reason is that services are more expensive in stronger economies, so that
if remittances buy services from family members then they should increase with economic prosperity
in the home community. The exchange hypothesis links remittances to home community economic
conditions.
The investment hypothesis states that remittances pay-off debt. Sometimes the debt is real, like
money owed a coyote, but often it is the obligations that migrants owe their family, not only for
migration but education and all the lifelong support a family provides. Families invest substantial
resources into each migrant. The investment hypothesis states that remittances are commensurate
with the size of the investment, but in this case that means merely the wealth of the family, since
wealthier families can provide more support. The investment hypothesis is to family wealth much
like the exchange hypothesis is to community wealth. For this reason also the investment hypothesis
is not interesting for research of collective remittances that exist only at the community scale.
The strategy hypothesis states that migrants use remittances to deter future migration from
their families or communities. This could, however, result in other communities or families sending
more migrants of their own to exploit any demand for labour. Thus migrants must believe that
employers favor people from the migrant’s own family or community and can discriminate those
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people from others. Within the strategy hypothesis migrants follow an economic motivation, but in
reality migrants may wish to dissuade future migration for altruistic reasons. In one interpretation
of the strategy hypothesis remittances are like bribes to not migration. Given their public nature,
collective remittances more likely reflect a desire to dissuade future migration out of a sense of
belonging (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004). Even so, all interpretations of the strategy hypothesis are
about what migrants want. Whether out of a desire to belong or to protect wages, the strategy
hypothesis makes a claim about what migrants desire, rather than what a community requires. A
straightforward proxy for migrant’s discretion is the money they have available through wages in
the host nation. From a structural perspective, the strategy hypothesis describes one way that host
state economic conditions can affect remittances through migrants.
Most motivations represent different sides of a single concept. Altruism and exchange are
mutually exclusive, and both depend on how migrants respond to community wealth. The strategy
hypothesis is compatible with either, because it represents how migrants respond to host country
conditions, including wages and social status. Altruism and exchange reflect how migrants respond
to home community, whereas strategy reflects how migrants respond to changes in the host state.
Migrants can respond to events in both home and host state, so exchange and strategy motivations
are consistent with each other. The strategy hypothesis requires some mental gymnastics, but the
basic idea is that migrants 1) place a value on resources available in the host state, and 2) believe
that additional migrants pose competition or a risk to host state resources.
Across different contexts emigrants and states may use very different methods of organiza-
tion and have different developmental goals. Mexican emigrants prefer urbanization, paving, en-
trepreneurial, water, and sanitation projects (Duquette-Rury, 2014), Turkish migrants instead favor
economic zones that facilitate new businesses or cross border trade, and Moroccan emigrants often
take advantage of computer or medical equipment discarded in their host nation that is valuable
for use in their homes. Different emigrants have different developmental goals and methods, but
motivations may remain more consistent.
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2.5 What’s left out?
Some elements important for the future of collective remittances do not fit within the scope of an
analysis of structural contexts and motivations. Some of these topics receive brief mention, but
despite their relevancy are not investigated in the primary analysis.
Migrant activism that results in transnational activism often emerges from migrant’s needs to
confront issues of race and gender discrimination from both their host societies and fellow migrants
(Curran & Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Curran, Garip, Chung, & Tangchonlatip, 2005; The Oaxacali-
fornian Reporting Team, 2013). The organizations that ultimately facilitate collective remittances
may begin as organizations that work to provide migrants with support in the host nation.
Transnational culture and the long term impacts of migration are dependent upon the demo-
graphics of those who migrate, especially with regards to gender (Levitt, 1998). Female migrants
typically differ from their male peers in how they remember and relate to their home families and
communities (Goldring, 1996, 2001), and how they integrate into their host society and participate
in transnational relationships with their home (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005). Transnational
spheres are politicized spaces where social inequities are both reproduced and confronted. Women
are often excluded from transnationalist initiation and innovation and are confined to the workforce
of developmental activities (Drake, 2014). The individuals and families that sponsor and lead HTAs
often do so in pursuit of political or entrepreneurial ambitions. The emergence of state remittance
matching programs are correlated with a rise in inequality.
Collective remittances are politically charged and potentially a vessel for political power and
new cultural values. While inequity from home nations can be perpetuated in transnational spaces,
transnationalism also remits new cultural values. Collective remittances and transnational forms
of political engagement, like binational voting, may also mutually support each other and enhance
the political capacity of both. Indeed, the political potential of collective remittances may be key
to sustainable transnationalism. A generalizable analysis of structural contexts and motivations of
collective remittances will provide a better foundation to investigate the cultural and political role
of collective remittances.
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2.6 Conclusion
The contemporary transnational environment is distinguished by the role of states and other large,
multi-scale, agents. High level actors more naturally observe and adapt the strategies of diasporas
in one location for that in another; applying old innovations in new locations, or developing new
innovations via analogy. The experiences of Mexico already inspire diasporas around the world, but
the Mexican diaspora and state may also borrow from the experiences of other diasporas. The new
migration for development is characterized, more than anything, by a greater flow of ideas between
diasporas, the state, and their organizations.
The following chapters examine Mexico, it’s diaspora, and the diasporas of other nations in light
of the theories of migration and development, transnationalism, cumulative effects of migration,
and the motivations of migrants who remit their money to their family, community, and nation.
Chapter three will classify communities and regions of Mexico using stages theory and examine
the relationship between the stages of migration and community contexts and the behavior of
migrants. The analysis of chapter three prepares for chapter four that presents a broad comparison
of diasporas around the world.
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Chapter 3
Community context, migrant
motivations, and collective
remittances
Collective remittances start with the structural factors that create a need for migration, but ulti-
mately are an expression of migrant agency, political effort, and social capital. This chapter begins
with an analysis of the secular financial and labour aspects that drive migration originating in
Mexico, and will then deduce what might be the motivations that drive migrants and hometown
associations to commit remittances into collective goals rather than saving the money or sending it
to their family. The goal of the analysis is to parse the structural and behavioral factors of which
collective remittances are a function.
Structural factors include: history of migration, wages at destination, and local economy and
development. Each of these elements have an important effect on the lives of migrants and commu-
nity’s history of migration but are not things people or communities have much power to change.
Behavioral factors include: the size of remittances and how these remittances are spent–e.g. on
consumption, maintenance, investment, etc. These factors indicate something about migrant intent
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and decision making. Migrants have some power to alter these behaviors so that they represent
part of migrant agency.
Results indicate that migrant’s wages are the most important factor for migrant’s contributions
to collective remittances. A relationship between migrant’s wages and collective remittances reflect
migrant’s agency, and their wages are largely independent from structural conditions in their home
nation. Migrant’s wages have a stronger effect than structural factors represented by migration stage
and domestic wages, and suggest that agency and motivations are more important than structural
determinants for collective remittances. The relative strength of agency compared to structural
factors vindicates the optimism that international organizations, states, and other diasporas show
towards collective remittances.
The research tests two groups of hypotheses. The first group concerns migration history and
community context. The second group concerns migrant’s wages abroad, remittance sizes, and how
families use remittances.
The first group of hypothesis focuses upon the community and tests the relationship between
collective remittances and a community’s stage of migration and average household wealth. The
first hypothesis is the migrant network hypothesis that states that collective remittances result
from the long-term effects of migration upon a community, most importantly the migrant networks
that form from persistent historical migration. Migrants accrue social and political capital that
manifests in the migration history, networks, and HTAs that provide migrants representation with
municipal, state, and federal leadership. The second hypothesis is the exchange hypothesis and
states that collective remittances purchase social and economic favors in the home community.
Collective remittances are relatively less valuable in wealthy and well developed communities so
that in wealthier communities migrants fund more public goods and projects to obtain the same
degree of social favor.
The second group of hypothesis focuses upon the migrants and test the relationship between
collective remittances and migrant’s investments in the home community and wages in the host
nation. The third hypothesis is the investment hypothesis. This hypothesis states that where
more migrants invest remittances in business or real estate collective remittances will also increase
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because they can often help support personal investments. The hypothesis lacks an analogue in
family remittances, and looks for a relationship between collective remittances and other forms of
active investment. The fourth hypothesis is the strategy hypothesis. This hypothesis states that
migrants send collective remittances to help damp incentives for future migrants. This hypothesis is
based on the similar strategy hypothesis for family remittances (Stark, 1995). Orozco surveys and
interviews Mexican HTAs and finds that collective remittances often are meant to ease economic
distress and dissuade future migrants (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004).
The four hypothesis found an empirical model of what shapes and motivates collective remit-
tances. Literature establish the history, breadth, and benefits of collective remittances but why
they exist at all and general applicability to any diaspora is not addressed in existing research. The
success of Mexico’s tres por uno program has inspired states worldwide to engineer social develop-
ment funds to kickstart and support a culture of diasporic philanthropy (Orozco & Rouse, 2007; de
Haas, 2007). It isn’t clear, however, why collective remittances have worked for Mexico and if other
nations and diasporas can truly replicate the elements responsible for Mexico’s success. Future
research and applied efforts to initiate and sustain collective remittances will benefit from better
understanding why these remittances exist in the Mexican case and what made them work.
This chapter presents a lot of data and methods. The first section presents methods that readers
may consult as necessary. The second section describes the procedure for classifying communities for
migration stage. The third section tabulates communities by migration stage along with descriptive
statistics and provides context for the models. The fourth section fits and interprets the models.
The fifth section concludes the chapter.
1. data
2. methods
3. classification of community migration stage
4. descriptive statistics by stages of migration
5. models
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6. conclusion
3.1 Data
Data comes from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) (MMP154 , 2016). Durand and Massey
initiated MMP data collection to provide an alternative to federal migration statistics, which they
believed did not faithfully characterize the true magnitude and profile of human movement be-
tween Mexico and the U.S. MMP data is sponsored by a partnership between Princeton and the
Universidad de Guadalajara. Every year the MMP selects three or four communities in Mexico and
randomly samples from among their households for survey data. At the time of writing, the MMP
contains one hundred fifty four communities.
Massey designed MMP data collection using a method called the ethnosurvey (Massey, 1987).
The ethnosurvey’s defining characteristic is its combination of quantitative methodology with qual-
itative data collection styles. Rather than employ strict survey schedules, field workers fill in
questionnaires using unstructured interviews. This allows field workers to chose when and how
to ask each question, which can be especially effective for sensitive topics. Investigators choose
multiple sites for data collection, and either survey the entire site or draw a representative sample.
Multiple sites lend the data to multilevel analysis. Surveys also collect life-history data, allowing in-
vestigators to extend beyond cross-sectional analysis, to consider how past events influence present
variables. Lastly, ethnosurveys should collect data from parallel sites. Parallel sites are in some
way connected. The MMP inquires for the whereabouts of community emigrants who have not
returned home, and then visits and interviews these individuals. These emigrants are parallel to
the community home population, and are often permanent migrants who rarely return home, but
nonetheless can indicate important qualities of migration patterns. Without parallel sampling these
individuals would remain absent from the dataset. Massey asserts this combination of features yield
superior data to that gathered using more traditional survey methodology (Massey, 1987)
MMP pilot surveys began in 1982, but it was not until 1987 that annual data collection ef-
forts reached full swing. In 1987 the MMP held data from 4 communities within the states of
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Jalisco and Michoaca´n, which historically supply the greatest volume of U.S. emigrants. Those
four communities represented a range of urbanism and included a rural town of 6,100 inhabitants,
and commercialized agrarian center of 9,900, a factory town of 9,400, and an urban barrio of 4,800
people located within the city of Guadalajara, Mexico’s second largest city. By 2016 the MMP
holds data from 154 communities, representing a range of community types, and spread across 22
of Mexico’s states.
Within each community of the MMP dataset, researchers draw a random sample of 200 house-
holds, and interview each member using a semi-structured format. The questionnaire solicits de-
tailed social and economic information on the household and each member. In addition to this
information, researchers identify a head of household and collect from them detailed life history
data on their all migrations and labor activities while abroad. During this process, field workers also
ask about emigrants who have not returned home, and visit and interview also these individuals.
It is clear that the MMP dataset applies each feature of the ethnosurvey method.
The MMP dataset has been essential for research over the past two decades yielding new findings
on everything from Mexican-U.S. migration patterns, to the influence of migration upon inequality
within home communities. Researchers outside migration studies also have used the dataset, making
a testament to MMP’s breadth and quality (see for example (Quinn, 2006b, 2006a). Life-history
and household data has been valuable for exploring the effects of social capital and individual
histories of migration experience upon current migration patterns. MMP also provides a range of
community level data, which existing research has not fully used.
Given the MMP’s temporal and international aspect, income data reflect different real values
due to price inflation over time, or rarely deflation. Income earned in the US is also in a different
currency than in Mexico and subject to different value fluctuations. The analysis standardize
income data to a reference year using consumer purchasing index (CPI), using the Mexican Peso
for income earned in Mexico, and US Dollar for income earned in the US. The MMP’s data on
Mexican income prior to 1998 is of poor quality, and in 1998 the question was revamped. Rather
than attempt to clean or match the old data, the analysis omits and imputes income data for years
prior to 1998. A later section will soon describe imputation.
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3.2 Methods
This section briefly describes methods for categorizing data and fitting models. The section covers
the following methods.
1. clustering
2. instrumental variables
3. imputation
4. bootstrapping
3.2.1 clustering
The analysis in this chapter uses clustering to identify the migration stage of each community. A
cluster is a set of cases from the data that are similar in some respect. For example, communities
in the same stage of migration should have similar rates, incidence, and history of migration. Many
methods of clustering exist. Some examples include those based on geometry (k-means), graph-
theory (hierarchical), probability theory (model-based), and even natural analogy (gravitational
clustering.) This chapter uses model based clustering, which often uses hierarchical clustering for
initialization.
Hierarchical clustering compares cases using a measure of dissimilarity and a linking criteria,
and either iteratively combines (agglomerative) or divides (divisive) clusters until reaching some
stopping criteria. Hierarchical clustering usually defines dissimilarity as distance between cluster
centroids, and multiple methods of measuring distance exist, with euclidean distance the most
popular. The linking criteria specifies the distance where clusters are combined or separated and,
again, multiple linkage criteria exist.
Hierarchical clustering can group cases in a dataset, but also works just as well on rows of
a correlation matrix. For correlation matrices, hierarchical clustering groups variables by their
similarity of correlations with all variables; this is useful for seeing relationships among variables in
the data.
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Model-based clustering is so named because it is based upon probability distribution models–
most often multivariate normal distributions. Model based clustering defines clusters as sets of
cases all belonging to the same underlying probability distribution. The underlying probability
distributions are mixed in the data, and the model based clustering finds the parameters of each
distribution and membership of each case that maximizes the likelihood of the data. The most
desirable properties of model-based clustering are that it optimizes both the number of clusters and
cluster membership, but another feature is that it expresses the multivariate correlation among the
underlying distributions, and resembles the generative properties of artificial data simulation.
Model based clustering is sometimes known as two-step clustering, because it uses the two-step
process of the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm to find distribution parameters and case
membership that maximize the likelihood of the data (Fraley & Raftery, 1998, 2002). Hierarchical
clustering often will provide starting cluster memberships to initialize the EM algorithm. The “M”
step of the algorithm then find maximum likelihood parameter estimates given cluster member-
ships, and then the “E” step recalculates cluster memberships given the parameter estimates. The
algorithm proceeds, back and forth between the two steps, until parameters and cluster membership
converge, so that they change little from iteration to iteration.
3.2.2 instrumental variables
Instrumental variables (IV) regression is a strategy for resolving endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002).
An instrument is a variable correlated with the endogenous variable but that has no independent
relationship with the omitted or response variables. Instrumental variables regression essentially
tests that, ceterus paribus, if changes in the instrument, operating through the endogenous variable,
are related to changes in the dependent variable.
Models for the effects of migration often employ instrumental variables regression because in
many models migration is correlated with unmodeled effects of geography, economy, and other
confounding omitted variables. Instrumental variables resolve this problem by projecting migration
onto an instrument that is uncorrelated with confounding variables. If the variance of the instrument
is uncorrelated with the omitted variables, then the variance of the endogenous variable explained
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by the instrument will also be uncorrelated with the omitted variables. IV regression essentially
tests that changes in the instrument operate through the endogenous variable to effect the response
variable. There can be no proof a variable is a good instrument, but often researchers have many
good reasons for suspecting an instrumented variable is better than the original.
A popular instrument for the effects of migration is migration distance. The assumption is that
as distance to destinations increase migration will decrease and that any omitted variables have no
effect on this relationship. Migration distance requires a destination. For migration from Mexican
communities, Woodruff tests both distance to the U.S. border and distance to train stations at
different time periods using historical rail data (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2007). Garip similarly tests
distance to U.S. border and distance to an airport and finds both have similar results (Garip, 2012).
The present analysis calculates distance as a weighted average of the distance to six different
border crossing locations, one in each Mexican border state. The weights are a function of the
number of border crossings at each border state from that community. For example if half of the
migrants from a community cross in Baja and the other half in Chihuahua then distance from the
community to the U.S. border is the average distance to the Baja and Chihuahua crossings.
Cumulative causation and migrant network theory suggest historical migration rates are another
potential instrument. The validity of historical migration rests on the assumption that historical
migration seeds contemporary migrant networks and migration independent from the many con-
temporary factors of migration that also pose potential confounds. Woodruff (Woodruff & Zenteno,
2001) tests historical migration data from statistics provided in a 1925 report to the U.S. Department
of Labor (Foerster, 1925) and from Bracero program registration data from 1955-1959 (Woodruff
& Zenteno, 2001) and finds both instruments have similar performance. Given Woodruff’s results,
the hypothesis tests of migrant motivations to engage in collective remittances will use Bracero
program data from 1955-1959 for historical migration rates, reproduced in table 3.1.
Arbitrary shocks and events that result in sharp changes to migration are also good instruments.
If the event is unrelated to the omitted variables then the changes that the events precipitate in
migration will also be unrelated to the omitted variables. Arbitrary shocks provide a natural
experiment but such events can be difficult to identify and capitalize upon.
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Choice of instrument is important for the research question because how an instrument re-
expresses migration also impacts the relationship between migration and the dependent variable.
Distance to the border and historical migration are different kinds of instruments from an arbitrary
shock to migration. distance to a destination and historical migration are more pertinent to the
long-term effects of migration than a short-lived shock like a drought or financial crisis.
Models can implement instrumental variables in two stages using two-stage least square (2SLS
or TSLS.) The first stage fits a model to all exogenous variables and the instrument to predict
the endogenous variable. The second stage fits the model of interest but replaces the endogenous
variable with the value fit in the first stage. Model interpretation must remain mindful of the
transformations of the endogenous variable. With distance instrumenting migration state, the
model is now fitting the effect of stage explained by distance, rather than stage only.
3.2.3 imputation
One piece of missing data can remove an entire case. Multiple imputation provides a solution by
providing multiple predictions for the missing data that reflect the most likely values and their
distribution (Rubin, 1987; J. Schafer, 1999; J. L. Schafer & Graham, 2002). If missing data is
missing at random or missing dependent on observed data, then multiple imputation can reduce
bias and increase precision.
An analysis usually fits a model to each imputation. Parameter estimates are the average of
estimates of each imputation, and the covariance matrix is the average of covariance matrices plus a
term that represents the variability of estimates across each imputation (Rubin, 1987; Brownstone
& Valletta, 1996). Increasing the number of imputations improves the accuracy of estimates, but
about five imputations is usually sufficient.
Literature disagrees on handling missing dependent variables. Missing dependent data are
predicted from the same data that the analysis will use to fit a model. Best practices dictate that the
cases with missing dependent data are usable for imputation but not model fitting (J. L. Schafer &
Graham, 2002; Hippel, 2007). Simulation analysis finds that with sufficient numbers of imputations,
around five, models can usefully retain cases with missing dependent variables (Young & Johnson,
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2011). If the dependent variable is an index with partially missing components, then the case is even
stronger to retain imputed dependent variables (J. L. Schafer & Graham, 2002; Graham, 2009).
The imputation of the multilevel MMP data proceeds through multiple levels (see (van Buuren,
2010).) Imputation begins with households and migrants from the households and produces m
imputations. The next step merges person level data to each imputation and imputes the missing
person level data once for each of the m imputations. The final step aggregates person, household,
and migrant data to the community level, and merges the aggregations from each imputation to
community level data and imputes the missing community level data, again once for each of the m
imputations.
The imputation procedure uses all variables in the analytical model and some additional vari-
ables to improve imputation. The additional variables include the head of household education and
proportion of the community with more than five years of education. The education variables are
to improve imputation of missing income and wage data.
3.2.4 bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is a method of estimating parameters about a population using multiple resamples
of the sample data (Efron, 1979). If sample data is a reasonable approximation of the population,
then bootstrap methods can infer the quality of estimators. Bootstrapping is a simple and straight-
forward method to estimate standard errors and confidence intervals of complex statistics with data
that may not satisfy assumptions of standard inferential methods. Bootstrapping is ideal for small
datasets or datasets that do not satisfy distributional assumptions.
Bootstrapping is particular attractive for analysis of collective remittances because most com-
munities do not obtain collective remittances. If small perturbations to the data result in large
changes to a statistical model then the bootstrapped confidence intervals will be wider than those
produced by standard asymptotic inferences. Jackknife after bootstrap can further investigate the
data for cases with an oversized influence on the results of a hypothesis test. Bootstrap provides a
check against standard asymptotic inferences, however both bootstrap and standard methods can
yield similar results yet both be wrong (Horowitz, 1997).
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Bootstrap methods treat a sample as a population and draw many resamples of the data with
replacement. A randomly chosen sample is the best asymptotic approximation of a population, and
resampling with replacement estimates the sampling distribution rather than requiring assumptions.
An analysis fits a model to each resample. Parameter estimates are the average of the model
estimates. The distribution of estimates is the sampling distribution and contains information to
construct confidence intervals (Brownstone & Valletta, 2001; Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Horowitz,
2001). Bootstrapped estimates will asymptotically improve whether errors are homoskedastic or
heteroskedastic.
Bootstrapping multiple imputations follows one of two procedures. The first approach boot-
straps each imputation and uses the standard imputation combination rules to obtain estimates,
or can pool the r ∗m estimates and find confidence intervals from the percentiles of the empirical
distribution–for example 95% confidence intervals use the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The second
approach imputes each bootstrap and again uses standard imputation combination within each
bootstrap or pools the r ∗ m estimates. The first approach is probably more common. The sec-
ond approach is more accurate (Schomaker & Heumann, 2016) but also computationally intensive,
especially if analysis further processes each imputation prior to model fitting.
3.3 classifying communities by stage
Stages are a simple way to summarize the complex changes that occur within a community overtime
due to migration. Migration has structured effects so that metrics of migration history are also
a reasonable proxy for the cumulative effects of migration overtime (Massey, 1990). NELM was
the first theory to demonstrate that the effects of migration change with accumulation remittances
and migration experience (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Stages overlay the inflections in the effects of
migration with periods of stability that persist for longer periods of time.
The quantitative analysis operationalizes stage using the prevalence and history of migration.
History is the length of time since first migration, and prevalence is the months of migration
experience; these represent the passage of time and growth of migration experience. In aggregation
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at the community level, prevalence and history characterize the progression along migration stages.
This approach is congruent with other investigations of the stages of migration (see, for example,
(Jones, 1998, 2013), and also is similar to how migrant networks research defines the progression of
migration within a community (see, for example, (Massey & Espinosa, 1997).)
Figure 3.1 plots communities by their migration prevalence and history. A clustering algorithm
has classified each community into a discrete stage based upon their position on the plot. The
algorithm found three clusters, or stages. Moving from the lower left to the upper right, the clusters
represent stage one, two, and three, represented by squares, circles, and triangles respectively.
Ellipses on the plot indicate the cluster centroids and shape.
The stage boundaries are uncertain. Stage one communities are tightly clustered but impinge on
the stage two communities. Stage three communities are separated from the rest, but curiously six
communities are within the stage three ellipse yet more likely belong to the stage two classification.
The means of migration prevalence and history by stage are in table 3.2, along with the number
of cases in each stage. The clustering algorithm classifies each imputation, but the results were very
similar and the values in table 3.2 are the average across imputations. In no case does a community
have a different classification for stage between imputations. The increase in prevalence and history
between stages is roughly proportional, with stage two about 3 times longer history and greater
prevalence than stage one, and stage three about 3 times greater than stage two.
Figure 3.2 displays a choropleth map, colored by migration stage at the state level. The map
uses the following procedure to determine the migration stage at the state level: if the state contains
any stage three communities then it is a third stage state, else if a state contains more stage two
than one communities then it is a stage two state, else it is a stage one state. Notably, the states
of central-western Mexico are stage three, states or northern Mexico are stage two and southern
stages are stage one. The states are numbered, and table 3.3 displays the state names by number.
Third stage states include Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Estado
de Mexico, Colima, and Guerrero and are the areas notable for sending the most migrants to the
U.S. Zacatecas, indeed, is the origin of the dos por uno and tres por uno programs. Today Guerrero
ranks first among Mexican states for emigrants to the U.S, but historically the primary senders are
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Jalisco, Michoacan, and Zacatecas. Colima is close to the top in HDI among Mexican states, and
ranks first in HDI among third stage states.
All third stage states, Jalisco in particular, are historically well connected via rail to the U.S.
When in the 19th century enganchadores traveled through Mexico seeking laborers for U.S employ-
ers, it was in presently third stage states that they reached the first major population centers, and
from these locations they would hire Mexican peasants to migrate via rail to the U.S. This estab-
lished an early pattern of migration that would grow and become self-sustaining migrant networks
(Massey et al., 2002). Michoacan also suffered a volcanic eruption in 1943 that disrupted local
agriculture and economies, and made migration the only available option for many people, thus
establishing a history of migration also from that state.
Michoacan and Zacatecas are notable for their dependence upon agriculture, including farming,
livestock, and fishing. Much of these activities are seasonal, resulting in large swathes of the year
when work may be locally unavailable, and making migration the only option for those who usually
work in these sectors. Both these states more than any other have greater proportions of stage
three communities, which suggests larger portions of the population depend upon migration.
Third stage states are of economic contexts that favor greater migration. Jalisco and San Luis
Potosi have relatively strong economies, both historically and contemporarily. Jalisco is Mexico’s
third strongest economy, trailing only Nuevo Leon and the Federal District of Mexico City. San
Luis Potosi has strong industry, and is centrally located and close to several major cities and
ports. Locations with abundant commercial and entrepreneurial opportunities provide alternative
opportunities to migration, whereas families in poor areas may lack resources to fund a migrant.
Jalisco and San Luis Potosi, however, seem to occupy the socioeconomic middle ground that tends
provide both incentive and means to migrate. Stage one communities should have the most to
gain from migration, but households in stage one communities likely are unable to fund migrants.
Figure 3.3 plots communities by migration prevalence and 2010 HDI score. Stage two states have
higher average HDI and stage one and three have similar HDI scores.
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3.4 Descriptive statistics
The variables in the model are stage classifications, invested remittances, standardized domestic
wages, standardized wages abroad, community population, and the dependent variables are projects
financed with help from migrants. Stage classification is described in figure 3.1. Invested remit-
tances are the proportion of reported remittances that were invested; table 3.9 describes criteria
for classifying remittances as investments. Domestic wages are in pesos and wages abroad are in
dollars, and both are standardized to real wages using a base of 2014. Community population is the
population of the community at the time of the survey. Table 3.4 displays mean values, range, and
mean values by stage for the variables of the model. Figure 3.4 plots stage by the year of survey
and shows that stage is fairly evenly distributed over the survey years with substantial jump in the
number of stage three communities in the 2014 MMP dataset.
The number of projects financed by migrants increase substantially moving up the stages.
Projects financed by migrants triples between stage one and two, and almost doubles again from
stage two to three.
Households and migrants of stage three communities on average are wealthier and invest more
remittances in productive enterprise. Migrants of stage one and two communities receive similar
hourly wages, whereas migrants of stage three communities make over a dollar more an hour.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that stage three communities have less education and that community
average education has little relationship with average wages of migrants from that community.
Another explanation, consistent with migrant network and migrant strategy theory is that migrant
networks of stage three communities secure better wages for migrants from these communities.
Descriptive statistics support theoretical predictions of the migration stage model and formation
of migrant networks. Populations of stage three communities have less education, but their migrants
obtain higher wages, because migrant networks encourage migration over education but help secure
better wages abroad. Economic thresholds beyond which migrant networks begin to drive migration
are a fingerprint of peers within a migrant network propagating useful information that reduces the
costs and uncertainty of migration (Garip & Asad, 2016).
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3.4.1 stages of migration and collective remittances
Communities of each stage differ not only in the degree of help migrants supply to developmental
projects, as shown in table 3.4, but also the type of projects migrants help to complete. Table 3.5
tabulates the proportion of communities by stage that have completed each type of community
development project. Only small proportions of stage one communities have completed anything
other than a church. Similar proportions of stage two communities have completed a church, but
stage two communities have completed all other types of projects in much greater proportions
than stage one communities. In the stage three communities the proportion completing a church is
almost doubled over stage two, and almost tripled over stage one. Stage three communities complete
schools, electric and and light service projects in similar proportions to stage two communities, and
roughly double the proportion of communities that complete water service, plazas, and sports
facilities. To summarize, churches are the most important projects for stage one communities,
whereas stage two communities focus on developmental projects like electricity and water, and stage
three communities are similar to stage two in terms of developmental projects and also complete
greater proportions of lifestyle projects like plazas, markets, and sports facilities.
Churches are the most common project, because the original goal of most HTAs was to provide
charitable contributions to churches, and only later did activities shift to infrastructure development
(Orozco, 2000). The number of non-church projects migrants help complete may indicate the degree
that migrants are taking on responsibilities beyond the original goals of HTAs. Table 3.6 displays
the proportion of communities where migrants help complete at least as many projects indicated by
each column. The second and third rows display the number of non-church projects completed in
communities where migrants have and have not helped to complete a project involving a community
church. In all communities where migrants have helped to complete 4 or more projects migrants
have also helped complete a church. Few communities have received help from migrants with any
non-project without also receiving help with a church. This suggests that local churches remain
key to HTA goals, even as HTA missions expand to involve broader community development.
Table 3.7 disaggregates by stage the proportions of communities where migrants help complete
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at least as many projects indicated by each column. The proportion of stage one communities
completing successive projects drops quickly, and by four projects the proportions of stage one
communities have vanished. Stage two communities follow a slower decrease than stage one, and
stage three slower still. In stage 3 the odds that migrants have helped complete a given number of
projects are consistently about four times greater than in stage two.
3.5 Models
The models test four hypothesis to investigate the relationship of collective remittances with com-
munity economic contexts, the endogenous progression of migration within communities, and the
motivations of migrants who send collective remittances. The hypothesis are the network, exchange,
investment, and strategy hypotheses. Each hypothesis tests with three models, for productive, non-
productive, and total projects completed with help from migrants. Table 3.8 describes how projects
are aggregated into productive and non-productive projects
Networks: advanced migration stage supports collective remittances for productive
projects. This core hypothesis tests that Mexico’s long term migration provides the infrastructure
for the culture and practices that support and sustain collective remittances. This hypothesis fits a
model to both productive and non-productive projects and compares the results. The model rejects
the null if migration stage is positive and significant for productive projects.
Exchange: migrants fund more projects with rising average community household
income. The exchange hypothesis states that the number of projects migrants help complete
increases as household income in the home community increases. Wealthier communities require
more assistance from migrants in exchange for status conferred by the collective remittances.
Investment: migrants help out more for communities where they also invest more
family remittances. The investment hypothesis classifies remittances into discretionary, staple,
and investment spending. The hypothesis states that migrant’s donations to collective remittances
are positively correlated with their investments in themselves and community. Table 3.9 displays
how the hypothesis groups items from the MMP survey into the three different classes of remittance
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spending. Respondents may indicate up to five different uses of remittances. The model calculates
invested remittances as the proportion of all remittance uses that are investments. The model
rejects the null if invested remittances are significantly and positively correlated with collective
remittances.
Strategy: migrants help out to dissuade future migration. The strategy hypothesis is
the most subjective and relies upon intent–which may not be proven–but enjoys substantial support
in qualitative case studies. The dissertation adapts this hypothesis from the strategy hypothesis
that Stark (Stark, 1995) developed for family remittances, and the logic remains similar. At the
family level the strategy hypothesis states that migrants send money home to lessen incentives for
migration so that additional family and community members will not migrate and contribute to
labour supply that can place downward pressure on wages. This is especially so if migrants believe
they are more talented than an average family or community member and do not want to dilute
the employer’s expectations of migrant talent.
The test for all hypothesis use a single model with controls and fit to three different dependent
variables. The independent variables for the hypothesis are 1) indicators for stage two and three
2) community average household income in 2014 pesos 3) proportion of remittances and savings
invested in the community, and 4) migrant’s hourly wages abroad in 2014 dollars. The dependent
variables are the number of productive, non productive, and total projects migrants help finance.
Municipal population is in the model to control for the effect of rural or urban contexts. The models
scale all the data prior to fitting, primarily to aid the algorithms fitting the data, but also to assist
model interpretation and presentation.
The analysis fits the model using quasilikelihood and generalized linear modeling. The dependent
variables are counts of the types of projects migrants help fund, and typically are low values, where
discrete counts differ substantially from a continuous normal distribution. Regression-based tests
for the models fit to a Poisson distribution find an overdispersion parameter from about 1.3 for
the model of non productive projects to about 2.4 for the model of all projects (Cameron, 1990),
and the parameter is consistent across imputations. Where the mean and variance are equal in the
Poisson distribution, quasilikelihood specifies variance as a linear function of the mean:
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var(Y ) = θµ
if θ ≡ 1 then quasilikelihood corresponds to the mean-variance relationship of the Poisson distri-
bution. Negative binomial is another option for overdispersion that uses a probability distribution
and specifies a quadratic relationship between the mean and variance:
var(Y ) = µ+ κµ2
At small mean values, the quasilikelihood variance is similar to negative binomial. As a practical
matter, quasilikelihood usually better fits data (Hoef & Boveng, 2007), but negative binomial fit
the data to a distribution, with all the benefits of having a likelihood function. The models fit to
each imputations are combined by Rubin’s rules (Rubin, 1987) to obtain a single set of coefficients
and variances.
Hypothesis testing uses bootstrap to estimate bias of the statistics and find confidence inter-
vals. Bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) percentile confidence intervals correct for bias and non-
uniformity of the distribution of the statistics (Efron, 1987). Bootstrap techniques are well suited
for the analysis because most communities receive little or no help from migrants with development,
and random deletion or addition of communities can substantially impact the models. Jackknife
after bootstrap identifies those communities that have unusually large impact and influence on
model results (Davison & Hinkley, 1997; Efron, 1992).
The analysis draws R bootstraps from each of the m imputations and finds confidence intervals
using BCa from the R ∗m replicates. Another method is to draw replicates from the original data
and impute each bootstrap to again obtain R ∗m replicates. The later procedure is more accurate
and usually delivers narrower confidence intervals (Schomaker & Heumann, 2016). The multilevel
imputation procedure of the MMP data, however, is computationally intense and would take too
long to complete over 1000 or more replications.
Due to complexity of migration, endogeneity is a risk for models testing hypothesis concerning
migration rates. The stage of migration is a function of migration rates and also a candidate for an
endogenous variable. At least two instrumentation strategies exist in literature. The first strategy
instruments migration rates with distance to the border, given the hypothesis that, ceterus paribus,
people closer to a border are more likely to migrate across it than those further away (Garip, 2012;
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Woodruff & Zenteno, 2007). The second strategy instruments contemporary migration rates with
historical migration rates (Mckenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Woodruff & Zenteno, 2001). The validity of
historical migration as an instrument rests upon cumulative causation theory, or the hypothesis that
historical migration seeds migrant networks in a location such that historical variation in migration
explains some of the contemporary variance in migration rates independent from the many potential
confounds surrounding present day migration.
Figure 3.2 shows that Mexico’s northern states are a more advanced stage than the southern
states, but that central states are the most advanced due to the rail lines, economy, and history of
recruitment. For Mexico combining the instrumentation strategies may be most appropriate, with
the assumption that distance instruments for stage after controlling for historical effects in Mexican
migration.
The analysis implements instrumental variables regression within a generalized linear model
using two stage predictor substitution (2SPS) (Terza, Bau, & Rathouz, 2008). 2SPS proceeds like
two stage least squares (2SLS) but uses maximum likelihood estimation algorithms to fit parameter
estimates and provides discrete classifications rather than continuous linear values. In the first step
a model fits instruments and classifies the values of the endogenous variable. The second stage
substitutes the classifications for the endogenous values and fits a model to the dependent variable.
The first step of 2SPS use cumulative link modeling to fit the ordinal values of migration stage
(Agresti, 2010; McCullagh, 1980). Cumulative link modeling recodes a single ordered factor with
c levels into c − 1 binomial variables that recognize category order. The first binomial variable
indicates cases that belong to the first category or less, the second binomial variable indicates cases
that belong to the second category or less, and so on. Cumulative link modeling fits the c − 1
independent variables using multivariate modeling and exploits the property of strict stochastic
ordering to fit the c − 1 variables as a single latent linear model (Fahrmeir & Tutz, 2001). The
cumulative link model has a single set of coefficients and c− 1 intercepts that represent the ordinal
classification thresholds on the latent model. Another common conceptualization for a cumulative
link model is a proportional model, because with one set of coefficients and c − 1 intercepts the
cumulative link model fits c− 1 proportional, or parallel, models.
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Figure 3.7 plots the classification probabilities of a proportional odds model for migration stage
for the first step of 2SPS.
The second step of 2SPS uses a generalized linear model to fit the number of projects that
migrants help complete, and a quasilikelihood to accommodate overdispersion. In the second step
migration stage is now an ordinal independent variable. Ordinal independent variables are typically
insensitive to violations of linear and interval-spacing assumptions (Bollen & Barb, 1981; Pasta,
2009). Ordinal categories can also act as nominal categories that ignore the ordinal nature, but
methods exist that respect the category order (Gertheiss & Tutz, 2009). Migration stages are
ordinal but also a function of structural contexts and equally nominal. With only three migration
stages, specialized ordinal methods may add little value, and nominal variables provide a simple
and theoretically satisfying solution.
3.5.1 Results
The analysis fits three models: 1) help migrants provide for all projects, 2) for productive projects,
and 3) for non-productive projects. The three models are fit using both generalized linear regression
and instrumental variables regression via 2SPS. The analysis uses both asymptotic and bootstrap
methods to estimate bias and confidence intervals for the 3x2 models, resulting in twelve sets of
confidence intervals for the hypothesis testing. The bootstrap confidence intervals provide a check
for the confidence intervals found using conventional asymptotic theory. The models are organized
into three figures, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. Each figure plots asymptotic and bootstrap confidence intervals
for generalized linear regression and 2SPS, with 90% and 95% confidence intervals represented by
the thick and thin lines, respectively.
The models are different between the three project types. The strategy hypothesis, represented
by migrant’s wages, are significant for all project types, but for productive projects only significant
at 90% confidence intervals and not signficant for instrumented models. The investment hypoth-
esis, represented by purpose of remittances, are significant only at 90% intervals for any type of
project, significant only for the instrumented model of non-productive projects, and only the non-
instrumented model for productive projects. The network hypothesis, represented by stage 3, is
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significant for non-instrumented models of non-productive remittances at all confidence levels and
calculation methods. For total projects, the strategy hypothesis is significant at all 95% intervals
in non-instrumented models, and the investment and network hypotheses are significant at 90%
intervals for non-instrumented models.
Looking deeper, the generally non-significant and lower levels of significance for the hypotheses
for productive projects does not imply that migrants don’t help out with productive projects.
Figure 3.11 plots a logistic regression curve for the relationship between years since a community
obtained electric service and an indicator for migrant’s helping out with electric service in the
community. As years since start of service increase migrants become less likely to help out with
that service. Figure 3.12 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function for years since start
of electric service and shows that most communities have had electric service for at least 45 years.
The instrumental variables (IV) models correct for potential endogeneity of the migrant stage
indicators. The IV models in general have wider confidence intervals and fewer items significant.
The only IV models with significant hypotheses are the models for non productive projects, with the
strategy hypothesis significant at 95% for all intervals, and the investment hypothesis significant
at 90% for bootstrapped intervals. Although the IV models correct only the stage indicators,
endogeneity of migration stage can bias other variables via multicollinearity.
The models show the strongest evidence for the strategy hypothesis with non-productive projects.
A strategy motivation for non-productive projects implies that the primary goal of collective re-
mittances is to dissuade future migration by improving quality of life in the home community.
While it seems counterintuitive that migrants would ignore service and infrastructure projects, it
may be that communities lacking foundations of basic infrastructure are not good candidates for
reduction of future migration. Table 3.10 shows that migrant’s wages share moderate to strong
multicollinearity with the other test variables, and may obscure the relationship between collective
remittances and the other test variables.
The models provide weaker evidence for the investment and network hypothesis. If migration
stage requires instrumentation, then the investment hypothesis is significant at 90% bootstrapped
intervals for only non-productive projects, and the network hypothesis is not supported by the
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models. If instrumentation is not necessary, then the investment hypothesis is significant only for
productive and total projects at 90% intervals, and the network hypothesis is signficant only for non-
productive and total projects at 95% and 90% intervals respectively. Weakness of the investment
hypothesis could imply that where migrants do not contribute to community development via
collective remittances, they may instead contribute to community development through private
investment.
The exchange hypothesis finds no support in the tests. Table 3.10 shows the test variables
for the exchange hypotheses shares no more multicollinearity with the the data than any of the
other variables, so failure to reject the null can not be waived off as a technicality with the data.
Failure to reject the exchange hypothesis suggests that migrants are altruistic, or at least not
economically motivated. Though not significant, the test demonstrates an interesting pattern.
Domestic wages are negatively correlated to non-productive projects, but positively correlated to
productive projects. Domestic wages are the only variable to switch signs between models.
The strength of support for the strategy hypothesis suggest that migrants and their organizations
support community construction and lifestyle projects out of a desire to attenuate future migration.
Most communities have enjoyed basic water and electric infrastructure for decades, and communities
without basic infrastructure are probably not candidates for future reduction of migration. Ergo,
support of the strategy hypothesis for non-productive projects suggests that non-productive projects
are the best option for community development in those communities that can reasonably expect
to reduce future migration and develop local economies that are sustainable without migration.
3.6 Conclusion
The hypothesis tests demonstrate that both migrant’s agency and their structural contexts influ-
ence collective remittances. Migrant’s wages in the host state are the most important factor in the
models. Migrant’s wages are a function of host state structural contexts, but are largely indepen-
dent from direct influence of migrant’s home state structural contexts. Any relationship between
migrant’s wages in the host state and collective remittances back home reflect migrant’s agency.
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Secondary factors are migrant investments and networks. Migrant investments are likely sensitive
to conditions in both the home and host nation, and require success in the host nation and recep-
tivity to investment in the home nation. Migrant networks emerge from history and are beyond
any one migrant but are important for the lives of all migrants.
A relationship between migrant’s wages and collective remittances imply a strategic motivation.
Strategic behavior is not the only implication, but the relationship is one of the most important
for the strategy motivation. The hypothesis of the strategy motivation states that migrants use
collective remittances to discourage future migration, reduce migrant labour supply, and buoy their
own wages in the host state. Interestingly, the strategic motivation seems to be present only in
migrant’s support of non-productive projects. Communities that are candidates for reduction of
migration via development likely already have good infrastructure, so that community construc-
tion and restoration present the best available projects for improving community development and
mitigating the need for future migration.
A relationship between migration stage and collective remittances suggest the importance of
migrant networks for collective remittances. From migrant networks spring migrant organizations,
and migrant organizations are key facilitators of collective remittances to Mexico (Villela, 2014).
Community stage of migration is significant only in models of non productive projects. Migrants
often prefer non-productive projects, and migrants may have more influence in communities of an
advanced migration stage.
Investments of remittances represent a nexus between structure and migrant’s agency, and
between conditions in migrant’s home and host state. Migrant’s must have sufficient wages to
invest, and their home communities must offer suitable investment opportunities. The relationship
between invested and collective remittances is tenuous, and while significant for both productive
and non-productive projects is significant for different modeling methods within each project type.
The bootstrapped intervals of the instrumented model are significant for non-productive projects,
and the asymptotic intervals of the generalized linear model are significant for productive projects.
The uncertainty of the relationship may be a product of the fact that the relationship exists at the
nexus between structure and agency, host and home nation.
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The available data for the hypothesis testing is both a limit and an opportunity. The data
provides only a series of binary response from each community indicating if migrants helped with
a type of project. The data lacks information on project specifics and funding. At the same time
the data is not limited to a particular type of project or funding source. Data from tres por uno
provides more project specifics and funding, but is limited to projects funded by tres por uno. The
MMP data, however, is coarse but unlimited in scope. The hypotheses tests reflect the range of
help migrants can supply towards community development, and not just help funneled through tres
por uno or some other funding mechanism.
Future research can expand on the findings with datasets or case study of examining particulars
of the relationships between migrant’s lives and wellbeing in the host state and the help migrants
provide to their homes. The separation between home and host state structural contexts pro-
vides space for empirical and experimental investigation of migrant’s agency, and presents a good
opportunity to investigate migrant’s motivations to help out back home.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Stage classification
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Figure 3.2: State stage classifications
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Figure 3.3: 2010 Human development index by stage
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative frequencies of communities by stage for each survey year
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Figure 3.5: Community education by stage
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Figure 3.6: Community education by migrant’s wages
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Figure 3.7: Left to right: probability of stage 1, 2, and 3 by linear model η = Xβ
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Figure 3.8: total projects
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Figure 3.9: productive projects
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Figure 3.10: non-productive projects
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Figure 3.11: Probability migrants help fund electric service given years since first electric service
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Figure 3.12: Empirical cumulative distribution function of years since first electric service
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Tables
Table 3.1: Historic migration rates of Mexican states
state 1959 rate
Aguascalientes 0.0322
Baja California 0.0084
Baja California Sur 0.0084
Campeche 0.0001
Coahuila 0.0275
Colima 0.0134
Chiapas 0.0000
Chihuahua 0.0338
Distrito Federal 0.0010
Durango 0.0549
Guanajuato 0.0406
Guerrero 0.0132
Hidalgo 0.0026
Jalisco 0.0199
Estado de Me´xico 0.0057
Michoaca´n 0.0306
Morelos 0.0079
Nayarit 0.0081
Nuevo Leo´n 0.0266
Oaxaca 0.0083
Puebla 0.0030
Quere´taro 0.0144
Quintana Roo 0.0002
San Luis Potosi 0.0249
Sinaloa 0.0046
Sonora 0.0053
Tabasco 0.0020
Tamaulipas 0.0088
Tlaxcala 0.0052
Veracruz 0.0004
Yucata´n 0.0018
Zacatecas 0.0594
From (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2001)
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Table 3.2: Mean of months of migration experience per capita and average years since first migration
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3
months of experience 4.10 12.98 33.06
year since first 0.63 2.05 4.87
n 43 81 27
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Table 3.3: States of Mexico and their stage of migration
number name stage
1 Chihuaua 2
2 Coahuila NA
3 Nuevo Leon 2
4 Tamaulipas NA
5 Sinaloa 2
6 Durango 2
7 Zacatecas 3
8 San Luis Potosi 3
9 Jalisco 3
10 Aguascalientes 2
11 Veracruz 1
12 Guanajuato 3
13 Queretaro 2
14 Yucatan 1
15 Quintana Roo NA
16 Hidalgo 1
17 Campache NA
18 Puebla 1
19 Michoacan 3
20 Mexico 3
21 Tlaxcala 1
22 Colima 3
23 Distrito Federal NA
24 Morelos 1
25 Guerrero 3
26 Oaxaca 1
27 Tabasco 1
28 Chiapas NA
29 Sonora NA
30 Baja California 2
31 Baja California Sur NA
32 Nayarit 2
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of independent variables by stage of migration
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3 range
population 237925 152457 6882 1000-1650000
household head hourly wages MXN 24.38 24.13 19.57 8.79-48
proportion remittances invested 0.01 0.018 0.024 0-0.06
migrant’s hourly wages USD 10.77 11.35 13.09 7.53-14.69
projects financed by migrants 0.49 1.32 2.81 0-8
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Table 3.5: Percent of communities that receive help from migrants by stage and project type
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3
electricity 0.03 0.14 0.17
water 0.04 0.15 0.25
lights 0.03 0.16 0.19
plaza 0.01 0.16 0.38
market 0.02 0.04 0.12
sports 0.08 0.13 0.24
church 0.24 0.32 0.61
school 0.03 0.14 0.18
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Table 3.6: Percent of communities by number of projects funded by migrants for total projects,
projects including church, and projects excluding church
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
total 1 0.49 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.03
church NA 0.40 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.03
no church 0.56 0.09 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 0 NA
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Table 3.7: Percent of communities by migration stage and number of projects funded by migrants
stage 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 0.30 0.09 0.05 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0.49 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04
3 1 0.80 0.58 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.04
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Table 3.8: Project types
productive electric service
water service
lighting
non-productive plaza
market
sports facility
church
school
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Table 3.9: Remittance types
conspicuous recreation & entertainment
vehicle
event
consumer goods
maintenance construction or repair of house
education
health
debt
savings
other
investment house or land
tools
livestock
agricultural inputs
business
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Table 3.10: Covariance matrix of independent variables
STAGE2 STAGE3 invested wages income NAFTA pop
STAGE2 1 -0.50 0.12 -0.01 0.27 -0.27 -0.16
STAGE3 1 0.28 0.48 -0.01 0.09 0.08
invested 1 0.22 -0.05 0.00 -0.41
wages 1 0.20 -0.20 0.13
income 1 -0.93 0.08
gini 0.31 -0.16
NAFTA 1 -0.09
population 1
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Chapter 4
Extending the model: Latin
America and beyond
An effort to broadly apply the strategies of collective remittances requires an equally broad analysis
of migration, development, and transnationalism. Each diaspora has it’s own way of doing things,
structural contexts, obligations, and goals. Within diasporas around the world collective remit-
tances have surged in the last quarter of the 20th century. Mexico’s diaspora often serves as an
exemplar, but diasporas world over often support some sort of collective remittance. Each diaspora
departs from a different set of geographical and structural contexts that in turn lead each to arrive
at a different set of strategies for using collective remittances to advance development goals (Caglar,
2006; Glick-Schiller & Caglar, 2009; Lacroix, 2014).
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section applies the model of Mexican collective
remittances to migrants of Latin and Central America, it will test the na¨ıve generalizability of the
Mexican collective remittances model. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data extends into
Latin American with the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) and provides a dataset that
is congruent with the MMP and therefore conforms to a statistical model fit to MMP data. The
second section analyzes countries outside the Americas in light of the result of the modeling with
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the LAMP data. If the Mexican model fits LAMP data relatively well, then it suggests the Mexican
model of collective remittances are applicable to other countries and regions of the world. Otherwise
the Mexican model is likely not a good fit for other regions of the world. The second section will
look for the similarities between Mexico’s collective remittances and those to other regions of the
world, and highlight aspects that are important for collective remittances to other nations that are
missing from the model of collective remittances to Mexico.
With a focus on developmental strategies and state-migrant partnerships, the comparison be-
tween nations will reveal differences in how diasporas and governments of each nation solicit and
manage collective remittances from migrants for development. The results will shed light on the
role migrants and governments play for migration & development in each nation, and through the
comparison suggest generalizable concepts from Mexico’s experience with collective remittances
that are applicable to future analysis of new or continuing diasporas.
For the sake of brevity, this chapter cannot analyze enough nations in each region to provide a
complete representation of emigration, but the primary emigrant nations in each region generally
are characteristic of international migration from the region. The interregional analysis will compare
Turkey from Europe, India in Asia, Morocco in Northern Africa and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa.
The type of data also does not exist to facilitate application of a common statistical model of
collective remittances across all nations of the analysis. The global analysis will depend on theory
from previous literature, theory developed from the empirical analysis of Mexican data, and analysis
of application of the Mexican model to data from Latin and Central America.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display country stats for the nations of the analysis. Overall, Turkey is the
most developed nation of the analysis, and Zimbabwe the least. The Latin and Central American
diasporas have either about half or all of their population in the U.S., Morocco, Turkey, and
Zimbabwe have less than one percent of their population in the U.S., and reside largely in France,
Germany, and the U.K.
Western liberalized nations and core nations are notably absent from the analysis. The U.K.
ranks 8th in emigrant population, and Russia ranks 3rd, but more remittances leave these nations
than return, and migration is not a modern strategy for development of U.K. or Russia. Turkey
85
ranks 10th in emigrant population and has less emigrants than the U.K. in terms of both percent and
absolute numbers. Turkey is a nation currently in transition from a net importer of remittances to
a net exporter, and despite a smaller diaspora than some more developed nations, Turkish migrants
will likely remain an important aspect of Turkey’s economic and political development in the next
generations.
With an interregional and international comparison, anchored to Mexico as an exemplar, this
chapter seeks to explore the features of the triad of home state, host state, and diaspora that support
and drive collective remittances and other forms of transnationalism and development. The chal-
lenge inherent in an international comparison of migration and development is to embed knowledge
of local contexts in an analysis of global and regional dynamics. As analysis transcend community
scales, local realities of migration and development quickly give way to abstract metrics of migra-
tion, money, and political influence. Previous chapters developed a model for Mexican collective
remittances based upon migrant’s motivations. Motivations of migrants provide a generalizable and
scalable foundation for linking micro-level study to macro-level systems. Emigrant’s destinations
and the manifestation of development in emigrant’s home communities may vary dramatically, but
the motivation of agents at all scales is relatively less complicated, even if motivations are complex.
4.1 Latin American collective remittances
Remittances to Latin America reached about 23 billion annually by 2004; including 16 billion to
Mexico, 5 billion to Columbia, between 2 to 3 billion to Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and
Guatemala, and less than half-a-billion to Ecuador (Cortina & de la Garza, 2004). With the rising
volume of remittances comes increased investments of expatriates in housing, land, and businesses
at home, and greater levels of cross-border civic and philanthropic activities (Portes et al., 2007).
Emigrants and states alike recognize the significance of a new transnational gestalt (Guarnizo et
al., 2003; Vertovec, 2004). Latin and Central American states establish ministries and agencies
to oversee emigrant relations and provide incentives to encourage remittances, investment, and
philanthropy, and the emigrants organize to leverage their rising political power and enforce greater
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state transparency and participation (Villacres, 2009). Latin American diasporas have similar
experiences because the overwhelming majority of emigrants reside in the U.S., and their home
nations often have similar histories of internal conflict and economic and foreign relationships with
the U.S.
Many Latin American diasporas are conflict driven and have tense histories with their home
states. The U.S. exacerbated or ignited conflicts in Latin and Central American nations in the
mid-twentieth century but today serves as host to the migrants who fled these conflicts. Civil
wars and state violence broke out across Central America, and violence was especially intense in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Destability that began in El Salvador and Guatemala
ignited fears from states of neighboring Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Honduras’ military
independently scoured the borders for guerrilla movements spreading from neighboring populations.
In Nicaragua, leftist-revolutionary movements in 1979 overthrew the dictatorial Somoza dynasty
and installed a new leftist government. From the U.S. the Reagan administration internationally
isolated the new Nicaraguan government, and supported right-wing rebel groups often composed
of disbanded Nicaraguan military. All Central American nations experienced sudden shifts as
populations fled conflict. Relatively peaceful nations, like Ecuador, absorbed large numbers of
displaced people.
Latin and Central American nations share two similarities with Mexico. First is that most Latin
and Central American emigrants travel to the U.S. A common host nation eliminates variability
from analyzing multiple diasporas spread across multiple host nations. Second is that Latin And
Central American emigrants and collective remittances support projects similar to those in Mex-
ico. Emigrants from Mexico, Latin, and Central America show a willingness to fund public goods,
whereas worldwide emigrants seem to prefer using collective remittances to fund business oppor-
tunities. Similar preferences and meanings for applications of collective remittances mean that
metrics of collective remittances are more faithfully measuring the same thing in each community.
The similarities between Mexico and Latin and Central American are critical for the analysis, but
differences among nations of the region also pose difficulties. Migration patterns between Mexico
and the U.S. emerged from geographical and historical relationships between the two nations.
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Mexico shares a border with the U.S. and migration patterns between Mexico and the U.S. arose
from U.S. business needs in the 1800s. Mexican migrants are historically seasonal and since the new
century migration between Mexico and the U.S. is net zero (J. S. Passel & Cohn, 2009; J. Passel,
Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). 85-95% of returnees to Mexico are voluntary (Haza´n, 2014).
Migration from Latin and Central America began with conflict that forced people to flee for their
physical integrity with indirect economic impacts on almost everyone in the nations. Latin and
Central American emigrants must cross through Mexico to reach the U.S., where Mexico intercepts
and deports the majority of migrants, and the U.S. forcibly returns about half of those who reach the
U.S. border (Orozco & Yansura, 2015). Only 2-5% of Central American migrants voluntarily return
(Orozco & Yansura, 2015). The differences in migration patterns mean that metrics of migration
and migration stage do not have the same meaning for each nation. The conflict driven migration
of Latin and Central America may also not equally impact all communities so that those Latin and
Central American communities with any migration have on average greater migration prevalence
than communities in the Mexican Migration Project data. Unequal geographical distribution of
migration is an important aspect of migration stages and migrant network theory, and models
calibrated to Mexican migration stages may not be applicable in Latin and Central America.
The following sections first describe the nations in the analysis, and then present the statistical
data. The qualitative descriptions are necessary to understand the statistical descriptions. The
final sections present and apply the Mexican model of collective remittances to the Latin American
data, and then refit the models with the new data. The section ends with a discussion of the results
of the refit statistical model, and the implications for generalization of empirical models beyond
Mexico and Latin America.
4.1.1 Colombia
Colombian migrants are distinct in that until the end of the 1980’s they were almost exclusively
upper-middle and upper-class professionals. Internal conflicts fueled Colombian migration for most
of the 20th century. Most conflict refugees remain within Colombia and that nation now hosts
Earth’s second largest internally displaced population. Those who left Colombia include only those
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with the requisite wealth, education, or social connections. The exit of a substantial proportion
of Colombia’s professional, skilled, labour force resulted in a brain drain. By the 1990’s greater
numbers of Colombians were entering the United States, possibly enabled by Colombia’s existing
diaspora. Colombian migrants also compose one of the largest groups of U.S. asylum applicants,
along with Salvadorians and Chinese.
The Colombian Conflict began in earnest in 1964 when soldiers of the Colombian Army loyal
to the National Liberation Front–a new political coalition–began raiding peasant communities in
search of bandits and communists. The conflict was preceded by unrest and civil war with roots
to the 1920’s, but the 1964 event solidified the existence of guerrilla groups fighting against the
Colombian state. The guerrilla groups exclaimed a message of greater equality through communism
while the Colombian state insisted the groups threaten national stability and order. The Colombian
Conflict is a low level civil war that persists even to the present as the state continues to battle
guerrilla groups funded by drug trade. In the 1990s the violence intensified as drug cartels began
to interfere in the conflict. But by 2002 tensions greatly deescalated as the Colombian state retook
many guerrilla held lands and many guerrilla and paramilitary organizations demobilized.
The Colombian diaspora’s most successful venture is Conexion Colombia–which is an NGO
that channels money to Colombian development projects but is unassociated with any particular
community. Conexion Colombia, according to it’s homepage, is an organization that operates with
the help of a network of 40 foundations and allied organizations. Conexion Colombia began in 2003
as the Colombian Conflict was waning and developmental projects became less risky. Between 2003
and 2005 Conexion Colombia channeled 2 million USD to 22 projects around Colombia (Khoudour-
Caste´ras, 2007). Conexion Colombia ceased after 11 years in Oct 2014, but left a message on the
organization’s web page that it had accomplished its goal and felt confident that Colombians would
pick up where Conexion left off.
Colombia’s diaspora organizes primarily via NGOs unassociated with any particular location or
hometown. This contrasts with most other diasporas that depend upon HTAs. Three important
structural factors may cause this difference. First is that Colombia’s diaspora is dispersed across
and within host nations and do not gather in ethnic enclaves. Second is that Colombian emigrants
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have an antagonistic history with their state. Finally Colombian emigrants are more often well
educated and professional and willing to locate where they will have the best job opportunities and
life chances. All these factors result in a diaspora that lacks geographically based social cohesion
that may be necessary for HTAs, but possesses the wealth and human capital to engage a broad
range of partners often via virtual platforms.
Geographic and social obstacles haven’t slowed the philanthropy of Colombia’s diaspora. The
diaspora engages, instead, via religious organizations, non-profits, and NGOs, and often does so
using the web. Colombian emigrant’s greater wealth also attract non-profits targeting wealthy
migrants for large individual donations to assist with development in the home nation. Most
existing Colombian HTAs emerged to provide relief to a hometown or locations following a natural
disaster (Portes, Escobar, & Radford, 2005). Qualitative data also suggest Colombia’s diaspora
philanthropy more often fund productive and humanitarian projects–in contrast to other Central
American diasporas that often fund churches, sports facilities, and other non-productive projects.
4.1.2 El Salvador
El Salvador has unique characteristics that make it an interesting case for the study of collective
remittances. Like other Central American nations it suffered through long and violent civil wars
that generated a large refugee diaspora. But today, like Mexico, El Salvador has implemented
policy to leverage its diaspora for social and developmental goals. Thus today El Salvador has
swung, schizophrenically, from violently driving out it’s population to aggressively courting that
same diaspora for developmental help at home. El Salvador lacks Mexico’s long migration history,
and both family and collective remittances to El Salvador have arisen in similar time frames. Where
Mexico’s collective remittances exist within the context of a long relationship between migrants and
their families, state, and communities, El Salvador’s diaspora and transnationalism is much younger.
The Salvadorian diaspora was driven by conflict between the state and leftist guerrilla fighters.
The Salvadorian Army used a strategy of forced displacement to eliminate the civilian populations
suspected of hosting guerrilla fighters, and as a result civilians fled en mass to seek asylum abroad.
Unlike their Colombian peers, Salvadorian migrants often come from conditions of poverty. The
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Salvadorian army used widespread violence against civilians and forced broader ranges of social
classes to flee for their lives.
In conflict driven diaspora migrants rarely have time to make plans for travel or employment.
Many people fled to Honduras, with which El Salvador shares its longest border. Honduras hosted
many refugees, but economic turmoil in that nation led to the Honduran population and politicians
to blame their problems upon the refugees, and shortly the Honduran government discharged many
refugees back to El Salvador despite dangerous conditions. Refugees at this time began to flee
in greater numbers to Guatemala and Mexico, but here also they found very little assistance.
Ultimately the Salvadorian diaspora pushed into the U.S. and by 1990 half a million Salvadorian
emigrants entered U.S. borders fleeing violence and its effects in their home nation.
The rate of Salvadorian refugees into the U.S. began to fade following the conclusion of the
civil war in 1992. Recently, however, Salvadorian refugees again began crossing U.S. borders in
greater numbers, but this time fleeing from drug and gang related crime. Children are especially
overrepresented in contemporary migration because they specifically are targeted by cartels and
gangs for recruitment, and failure to enlist can result in brutal punishment for both children and
their families. Families might send young ones on the trek to the U.S., often alone and with nothing
more than a scrap of paper holding the name, address, or telephone number of family or friends
in the U.S. Rather than cross into the U.S. and attempt to evade authorities, these migrants often
head straight into the detainment of border patrol hoping to obtain help.
Inspired by Mexico’s tres por uno, the Salvadorian state initiated a similar program. The
Salvadorian program was more centralized and the state retained more power to choose locations,
select projects, and delegate partners and managers to the project with little or no input from
participating HTAs (Burgess & Tinajero, 2012). This may reflect the synthetic nature of the
program relative to tres por uno. In Mexico migrants often took initiative in designing dos por uno
and tres por uno, and the state only cooperated out of political necessity. El Salvador’s program was
centrally designed, centrally initiated, and the state retains more control in program applications.
El Salvador’s diaspora is younger than that of Mexico, and the Salvadorian state has been en-
gaged with its diaspora for a substantial portion of the diaspora’s history. In El Salvador family
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remittances and state initiated remittance matching programs arose in similar time frames. Collec-
tive remittances to Mexico exist within the long historical context of family remittances, and are
difficult to separate from family remittances. This is not the case for El Salvador, where the Sal-
vadorian state jumpstarted collective remittances for development with aggressive policy designed
to entangle the diaspora with the state and third party NGOs in order to leverage remittance dollars
for homeland development. Case studies of El Salvador find that family remittances are, at best,
neutral but that collective remittances are most likely beneficial despite the distrustful relationship
between the diaspora and the state (Villacres, 2009).
El Salvador’s deep involvement in its diaspora remain one of that nation’s notable characteristics.
In the U.S., El Salvador lobbies for its migrant’s rights and refugee status. Despite lacking a long
history of migration Salvadorian emigrants and communities are well organized and the state is eager
to use the Salvadorian diaspora to advance developmental goals. El Salvador is an international
counterexample to the long creative process underlying transnational engagements between states
and older diasporas like those of Mexico and Morocco.
4.1.3 Guatemala
As in other nations aﬄicted by the Central American Crisis, Guatemalan emigrants fled civil war
in the last quarter of the 20th century. What differentiates the Guatemalan civil war from others
is the degree of violence against indigenous people, with about 83% of those killed being Mayan
and close to a million Mayans dislocated from their homes (Commission for Historical Clarification,
1999).
The first armed confrontations of the Guatemalan civil war began in 1962. The war smoldered
through the 1960s and 1970s. Early phases did not prompt significant migration to the U.S.
but generated a trickle of political refugees who often fled to Mexico City. By the late 1970s
Guatemalan forces focused efforts in the Western Mayan highlands where leftist guerrillas often
operated. The counter-insurgency sparked a flood of mostly Mayan refugees across the Mexican
border where a few continued to the U.S; most, however, were not granted legal asylum in either
Mexico or the U.S. The bloodiest period began in 1978 and continued until 1985, and it is during
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this time when emigration increased to the greatest levels. The years between 1981 and 1983
were the most intense and when the most people were displaced. Between 1981 and 1983 the
Guatemalan counter-insurgency destroyed 440 highland villages, killed or “disappeared” 150,000
civilians, primarily Mayans, internally displaced 1 million villagers and prompted about 200,000
across the Mexican border (Ball, Kobrak, & Spirer, 1999). After 1985, even as violence was winding
down, the Guatemalan state continued or expanded violence against indigenous people, and from
1986 to the end of the conflict in 1996 the Guatemalan security forces violated and harassed the
physical, social, and economic integrity of indigenous populations.
Guatemala’s conflict disrupted trade and cut the nation off from external assistance. Many
people lost their livelihoods due to the effects of violence on the national and regional economies.
Economic consequences of conflict pushed additional labour migration to join the flows of conflict
refugees. Guatemala has a larger population than El Salvador and both nations suffered comparably
violent civil wars, but Guatemala’s U.S. diaspora is only about 880 thousand compared to El
Salvador’s 1.2 million (Migration Policy Institute, 2015)
Guatemalan refugees generated an echo of labour migrants. Most Guatemalan emigrated to the
U.S. after the conflict when refugees helped families and friends across the border. Guatemalans
were a small fraction of the population in the 2000 U.S. census, but by the 2010 Guatemalans are
tied with Dominicans as ninth largest foreign born population. When Guatemala’s diaspora began
to balloon in the new century remittance flows went from 584 million in 2001 to 3000 million in
2005 (Migration Policy Institute, 2015).
Guatemala’s large indigenous population define the organizations within it’s diaspora. In a
survey of Guatemalan hometown associations in Los Angeles, 8 of 33 organizations were indigenous
members only (Popkin, 2003). Whereas most of the 25 Latino or mixed ethnicity organizations
cooperate loosely with government or state actors, indigenous organizations worked almost exclu-
sively with religious organizations in their home town, and the indigenous organizations typically
federate only with other indigenous organizations (Popkin, 2003).
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4.1.4 Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic (DR) is unique among Caribbean nations in that it experiences substantial
immigration from Haiti, persistent internal migration, and emigration to the U.S. along with sig-
nificant return migration. Unlike Central American conflict driven diasporas, Dominican migrants
are motivated primarily by economic and filial goals. Without threat of violence the migrants have
time to locate family, plan moves, or find employment and this also provides migrant networks the
space, resources, and opportunity to emerge and grow.
Almost all DR migrants obtain green cards via family reunification; few Dominicans migrate
solely for employment and almost all Dominicans in the US are legalized. Dominicans are also more
likely to naturalize and 50% of Dominicans are naturalized compared to 46% naturalization rate
among all other immigrant groups. Dominicans are more likely to possess at least limited English
proficiency (LEP) yet also are more likely to be in poverty and have lower average incomes among
Caribbean immigrants (Portes et al., 2007).
Dominicans began large scale emigration in the 1960s to escape economic and political turmoil
following the assassination of dictator Rafael Trujillo. The U.S. Dominican immigrant population
was 12,000 in 1960 but grew rapidly to 350,000 by 1990 and 879,000 by the year 2010. The Domini-
can immigration rate continues to accelerate and by 2012 960,000 Dominicans reside in the U.S.
Dominicans currently are tied with Guatemalans at about 2.1% of the U.S. immigrant population
but Guatemalan migration rates are surging faster than those of Dominicans. Women dominate DR
immigration to the U.S. and about 56% of Dominican immigrants to the U.S. are female (Portes et
al., 2007). Dominicans are the 5th largest Hispanic group in the U.S. and their population concen-
trates in New York City but substantial numbers also exist in Florida, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey.
Dominican U.S. immigrants are more likely to hold jobs in service, sales, or transportation but
less likely to hold professional careers or work in lowest skilled sectors like construction or natural
resources, as compared to other Latin American immigrant groups. For unknown reasons the D.R.
U.S. population is much more likely to have health insurance. Remittance flows from the U.S.
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to the D.R. have increased faster than the rate of migration indicating that D.R. immigrants are
increasing the volume of remittances they send home.
The HTAs of the Dominican Republic are typically political in nature, well funded, and very
large with collective remittances being a secondary goal perhaps used to forward political ambitions.
Qualitative research is limited but suggests that Dominican HTAs may be institutionalized closely
with the Dominican political party system and HTAs serve primarily as political organizations
(Portes et al., 2007).
4.1.5 Ecuador
Ecuador was controlled by a series of military governments between the 1960s and 1990s, but never
experienced the bloody civil wars of other Central American nations. Political tensions were brisk
into the 21st century and accompanied by widespread and frequent protesting. The nation suffered
a series of economic shocks in the 1980s and 1990s, topped off by a rapid fall in the price of oil–
Ecuador’s chief export. An oil crash in the 1980s sparked a debt crisis and prompted Ecuador’s first
large scale emigration. The crisis was especially hard on subsistence farmers. The relative peace
in Ecuador made it attractive to emigrants of other Central American nations, however, and even
as Ecuadorians departed Central American immigrants, especially from Colombia, flooded across
Ecuador’s borders. Today Ecuador hosts the largest refugee population in Central America.
Ecuadorian emigrants differ from those of other Central and Latin American nations in that
most go to Spain. Ecuadorians are the most numerous Latino immigrant group in Spain. Statistical
analysis suggest that compared to their peers in the U.S. Latinos in Spain face less discrimination,
stigmatization, and other social obstacles but are still subject to racism similar to that experienced
by immigrants in America (Connor & Massey, 2010).
Collective remittances exist within the Ecuadorian diaspora primarily as informal grassroots
transfers, but nonetheless maintain the link between Ecuadorian emigrants and their home commu-
nities, and are a forestay in the lives of Ecuadorian migrants (Boccagni, 2010). Due to the informal,
uninstitutionalized, nature of Ecuadorian collective remittances the Ecuadorian government, organi-
zations, and NGOs have little role in collective remittances. The great geographic distance between
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Ecuadorian emigrants and their home country imposes great social distance between the emigrants
and their community’s affairs. Ecuadorians are less involved in their home communities than other
Latin and Central American emigrants, and are unwilling to donate where they have little control
over the money and its applications. Maintaining collective remittances over greater social distance
is one of the main obstacles confronting collective remittances for development.
Ecuadorian immigrants engage in collective remittances only under special circumstances and
usually as part of spontaneous translocal initiatives, and almost never as part of a communal strat-
egy as is the case with other Latin American nations. A common case is Ecuadorian migrants who
pool funds to carry the hefty expense of shipping a body overseas following the death of another emi-
grant from their hometown. Repatriation of a body isn’t an uncommon use of collective remittances
(Orozco, 2003) but absent a broader program of pooling funds for development applications it’s a
stretch to consider funds for postmortem repatriation as collective remittances. Collective action
among Ecuadorian migrants generally result from fragmented and parochial social ties, and rarely
or never involve assistance from the state, charities, or NGOs that often help organize collective
remittances among immigrants of other Latin American nations.
Ecuadorians show an ambivalent attachment to their homes, patriotism and homesickness mix
with the economic hardship that triggered their emigration in the first place. Ecuador is more stable
than many of the other Latin and Central American emigrant states, yet the vast distance between
Spain and Ecuador obstructs cooperation as migrants feel they lack any control over projects and
how donations are used by the government or community.
The great distance between Ecuadorian migrants and their homes questions the geographic
agnosticism of transnationalism. Family and individualistic goals provide the most stable links
between migrants and their homes, and for Ecuadorian migrants collective engagement is fleeting
and unorganized (Boccagni, 2010). Mexican HTAs often emerge from family ties maintained by
frequent visits, and the organizational ties in turn are strengthened by frequent visits between HTA
members and authorities in Mexico. The geographic distance between Ecuadorian migrants and
their homes increases the social distance between the migrants and their families and communities so
that the Ecuadorian diaspora lacks the family and community support required for stable collective
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transnational engagement.
4.1.6 Data
The Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) extends the surveys and methodologies of the
MMP to Latin American states with large emigrant populations. LAMP began operations in 1982
and last completed a major survey in 2012. LAMP provides data similar if not congruent to that
in the MMP so that the collective remittance models fit to MMP data also conform to LAMP
data. LAMP data covers fewer communities than the MMP and may skew towards high migration
communities.
Latin and Central American migrants emigrate to wider range of destinations than their Mex-
ican peers, who emigrate almost exclusively to the US. Along with a wider range of destinations
come also a wider range of currencies and host economies. To limit complexity and preserve compa-
rability with Mexican emigrants, the analysis restricts the data to US emigrants. The assumption
is that US emigrants are in a better position to supply and manage collective remittances to Latin
or Central America than emigrants in non-US destinations. Most Guatemalans and Dominicans
emigrate to the U.S. The majority of Ecuadorian emigrants travel to Spain or Italy, and large
portions of Colombians also emigrate to the European Union, but most returnees to these nations
are emigrants to the U.S. For Ecuadorians the assumption may obtain. From Spain and Italy,
collective remittances may be an important part of an Ecuadorian’s transnational identity, but the
geographical separation obstructs their ability to observe and influence the impacts that collec-
tive remittances have on their homes. Among Colombian emigrants the non-US migrants may be
equally important to US migrants. The Colombian diaspora is organized online, where emigrants
can observe and take an active role collective remittances, no matter where they are.
To conform to the statistical model of Mexican collective remittances, income data must be
in Mexican Pesos and US Dollars. Because the analysis restricts the data to US immigrants, all
migrant wage data is in US dollars and only needs to be converted to a consumer purchasing index
(CPI) using US inflation. The analysis converts all home community income into Mexican Pesos
but uses the home nation inflation to calculate CPI.
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A key element of the Mexican model is a method for classifying stage of migration. The ap-
plication of the Mexican model to LAMP data begins by classifying LAMP communities using the
Mexican stage classification model. The Mexican stage model uses community average months of
total migration experience and community average years since first migration to classify the stage
of a community. Figure 4.1 shows the Mexican and LAMP data together, and illustrates the dif-
ficulty applying the Mexican model in Latin America. The community average months of U.S.
experience in Latin and Central American communities is similar to the Mexican communities, but
the minimum value of community average years since first migration is higher in the LAMP sample.
Migration from Latin and Central America began with conflict in the region, and any community
from the LAMP sample will have migrants from the 1970s and 80s, when conflict was the most
intense, so the community average of years since first migration will have an upward skew within
the LAMP sample. The data driven model does not consider the externalities of the LAMP data,
and classifies 27 of the 28 LAMP communities in stage 3, although a human analyst might consider
most of the communities in stage 2.
An advantage of limiting application of the Mexican model to Latin America is that collective
remittances within Latin American diasporas are similar enough to Mexico’s diaspora that the
metrics from the Mexican models are applicable to the Latin American data. The descriptive
statistics in table 4.3 suggest that collective remittances may not have the same nature in all Latin
American diasporas, however.
No Colombian community has completed any project with help from migrants, but case studies
show that Conexion Colombia is one of the most successful development oriented migrant orga-
nizations among all diasporas (). Conexion Colombia is not hometown based, and furthermore
may not support the infrastructure and community restoration type of projects more common for
Mexican collective remittances. Thus, the metrics of collective remittances in the Mexican models
may not represent the strategies and projects more common within the Colombian diaspora. It is
also possible that Conexion Colombia routes collective remittances to areas most in need, and areas
of Colombia most in need may not always be emigrant communities.
Another interesting pattern is that Guatemala reports the most help from emigrants. Guatemala
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and Dominican Republic have very similar population sizes in the U.S. Guatemalans work for lower
wages and come from poorer communities but have migrant organizations more similar to Mexican
HTAs than the Dominicans whose migrant organizations are usually politically oriented. The
organizational differences may help explain why Guatemalan emigrants on average help with more
projects than any others in the LAMP data.
Ecuador’s transnational relations with their homes may be the most different from the others
because Ecuador’s largest emigrant population lives in Europe. Ecuadorians in Spain or Italy are
so far from home they rarely engage in large domestic projects because they have little control.
Nonetheless Ecuadorian communities report that migrants on average helped with 1.5 types of
community projects. Ecuador raises questions about communities that might coordinate HTAs
from multiple nations, and what might be the relationships between HTAs located in two different
nations. It seems likely that Ecuador’s diaspora in the U.S. is responsible for the most collective
remittances, but via community coordination diasporas in different nations may have a joint effect
on collective remittances.
El Salvador is notably absent from the data. The Salvadorian respondents in the LAMP data
provided no information on the projects migrants help support in their home communities. El
Salvador’s diaspora may be the most similar to Mexico’s in terms of collective remittance strategies
and goals, so it is unfortunate that the data is unavailable to apply the Mexican model to any
Salvadorian communities.
Descriptive statistics are overall reasonable but in some cases suspicious. The Guatemalan dias-
pora is the poorest, and multiple data sources support that the Colombian diaspora is the wealthiest,
but the Dominican respondents claim to be equally or more wealthy than their Colombian counter-
parts. Dominicans also report the greatest domestic wages, yet the Colombian economy and GDP
outrank that of the Dominican Republic. It is possible that Dominicans are more likely to over
report wages, or that Colombians are likely to under report wages, or both. Thus, another problem
of international comparisons via statistical models are cultural differences among nations in data
reporting. Another explanation is that returnees–those available to be sampled by LAMP–differ
from emigrants who do not return or return less frequently. In contrast many Mexican emigrants
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are seasonal, and returnees represent a large portion of the emigrant population. Thus differences
in migration patterns are another confounding factor of international comparison.
4.1.7 Applying and extending the Mexican model
Table 4.4 show the collective remittance models of total, productive, and non-productive projects
fit to Mexican data. The models were fit to a quasi-likelihood with variance defined as a linear
function of the mean, commonly known as quasi-Poisson, and used an exponential link yˆ = eXβ .
Figures 4.2 plot the predicted against the observed values, or calibration plot, for the count
of types of projects that migrants help fund in each community. The three plots are for total,
productive, and non-productive projects. The model overpredicts the data because most cases are
zero, but underpredicts those cases that do receive any collective remittances.
Figures 4.3 show predicted against observed values for the Mexican data. The models were fit to
the Mexican data and with it make more accurate predictions. As with the LAMP data, the many
zeros result in a model that underpredicts the counts of types of projects in those communities
that do receive collective remittances. Underprediction is most pronounced in the prediction of
productive projects.
Both Mexican and LAMP data have large numbers of zeros and a quasi-Poisson model does not
do enough to model extra zeros. Communities that receive any collective remittances tend to have
more types of projects completed with collective remittances than a single quasi-Poisson can allow.
A zero-inflated model might be more appropriate, and could analyze the generation of communities
without collective remittances as a separate process from the generation of communities with any
collective remittances.
Refitting the models with the Latin American data may also improve the fit. The refit models
include a random country-level effect to control for any omitted country-level variables. Random
effects are ideal for the model because the Latin American data has few communities in each
country and a fixed effect would over fit the model to the new data. Random effects do not enter
into predictions and are ideal for application of the model to countries not in the data. The models
fit to Mexican data used quasi-likelihood, but the random effect models use a case-level random
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effect to control for overdispersion (Elston, Moss, Boulinier, Arrowsmith, & Lambin, 2001; Harrison,
2014).
Table 4.5 show the model refit with Latin American data. The refit equations are similar to
those of fit to the Mexican data, but the negative effect of municipal population and domestic wages
are stronger and the intercepts are shifted downwards. The stronger negative effects imply lower
overall predictions that worsen the existing problem of underprediction.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show calibration plots of the refit models for LAMP and all data. The
new data does not help the model. The larger negative effect of domestic hourly wages suggests
that Latin American emigrants might contribute relatively more to poor communities. The larger
negative intercepts ensure lower predictions. Adding new data did not solve the problem of too
many zero counts in the data. As a model incorporates greater variety of contexts the problems
of zero inflation may compound. If data is not available to solve the problem with a quasi-Poisson
model, then a zero-inflated model may be necessary.
The application and extension of the Mexican model of collective remittances to Latin American
communities demonstrates the difficulty of applying models of collective remittances across multiple
contexts. The poor performance of the models suggests that other countries and diasporas have
attributes unrepresented within the analysis of Mexico, and may use collective remittances for
different goals. The next sections will carry these insights forward into a worldwide comparison of
collective remittances.
4.2 Collective remittances worldwide
Outside of North and South America, there exist few regions of the world where a single host nation
overwhelmingly directs surrounding migration patterns. Close exceptions are Russia, Germany,
France, and the U.K. who all support large immigrant populations due to their economic might,
colonial history, and geographic locations. Worldwide, immigrant nations are often also emigrant
nations, for example the U.K., Russia, and Turkey have large immigrant and emigrant populations.
The US is largely an immigration nation, but elsewhere in the world migration is rarely as one-
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sided, and most nations have both immigrant and emigrant populations, and a diversity of home
and host nations.
Collective remittances within Mexico’s U.S. diaspora are a paradigm for collective remittances
and migration & development worldwide. Mexico serves as a model for policy makers and activists,
and a base for academic comparisons. The Mexican diaspora in the U.S. is more likely an excep-
tion, and the models and theory that research has developed on Mexican data may not be wholly
applicable to other diasporas.
The sections below describe the diasporas and transnational engagement of four nations: Turkey,
Morocco, Zimbabwe, and India. Each diaspora supports some sort of collective remittance, but the
forms and strategies each diaspora employs are different from Mexico and each other. The criteria
for selecting these nations is that each is a primary emigrant nation in the region. Some regions
are misrepresented, for example Asian migration is dominated by China and India, but the analysis
discusses only India because China’s diaspora is mostly intraregional or concentrated in the U.S.
and Australia. India’s diaspora too has an intraregional component and Asia is characterized by rich
intraregional migration. But again the comparison is concerned largely with interregional patterns.
This necessarily gives a different picture of a region’s migration patterns.
4.2.1 Turkey
Turkey is one of the world’s leading emigrant nations with about 6% of it’s population abroad, but
today is slowly transitioning from an emigrant to an immigrant nation (Ic¸duygu, 2009). Beginning in
the 1960s Turks began emigrating to West Germany in large numbers. Large scale labour migration
continued through the mid-1970s with the vast majority departing for Germany and lesser flows
to France, Netherlands, Austria, and later Middle Eastern nations. In the mid-1970s Germany
and other popular labour destinations closed the door on new labour migrants and encouraged
immigrants to return home. Turkish labour immigrants had to choose between settling permanently
or returning home but losing the opportunity to work or settle in Europe. Many Turkish immigrants
chose to settle and bring their families, thus through the last quarter of the 20th century labour
emigration from Turkey faltered as filial migration increased.
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Today Turkey is becoming an immigrant nation. Turkey has hosted immigrants from the Balkans
and surrounding nations since the first quarter of the 20th century. Throughout the Cold War
immigrants began to arrive in greater numbers from Eastern Bloc nations. Beginning in the 1980s
asylum seekers arrived from Iran and Iraq and later from former Yugoslavia and ethnic Turks
from surrounding regions. In 2003 Turkey approved the “Law on work permits for foreigners” and
unintentionally marked official acceptance of Turkey as an immigration nation. In 2010 the number
of immigrants to Turkey exceeded the number of emigrants leaving the nation (Ic¸duygu, Go¨ker,
Tokuzlu, & Elitok, 2013). The increase in immigration is attributable to conflict in North Africa,
political turmoil in the Eastern Bloc, and return of emigrants.
The majority of Turkish emigrants travel to Germany. Other major host nations include France,
Netherlands, the U.S., Austria, and Saudi Arabia. Turkish diaspora to Germany began with Ger-
many’s economic boom of the 1960s and 70s that resulted in acute labour shortages. Initial waves
of Turkish labour migration were about 33% skilled but declined as Turkish emigration expanded.
In the early 1970s Europe entered a recession and oil crisis while simultaneously the Middle East
began an economic boom, and during this time a fraction of Turkish emigration shifted also to
Middle Eastern nations. By the 1980s Germany was extinguishing labour migration and in re-
sponse Turkish migrants elected to settle permanently and bring their families. Since the 1980s
more emigrants depart Turkey for family reunification or education, and represent an increasingly
skilled portion of Turkey’s population.
Germany pulled Turkish migrants across their borders with the 1961 labour recruitment treaty.
This makes Turkey similar to Mexico in that Mexican emigration to the U.S. began when U.S.
business interests actively recruited Mexican workers into employment. Germany’s initial treaty
limited Turkish workers to a two year stay with the idea that limiting the stay would return larger
number of workers to Turkey with new skills and human capital and prevent Turkish migrants from
settling permanently. But by 1964 German business interests lobbied to remove the two year limit
to avoid continually training new workers.
Sociopolitical turmoil and a series of military coups in Turkey, roughly one a decade beginning
in 1960, encouraged additional emigration. Threat of physical violence was perhaps a greater
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motivation for Turkish emigrants than for Mexicans, but Turkish migrants are not like the conflict-
driven refugees of Central and Latin America. Turkish migration was primarily economic with
threats against physical integrity also pushing out many skilled migrants.
Economic factors initiate migration but for Turkish emigrants transnational networks are the
strongest pull factor (Unan, 2009). Turkish labour migration to Germany began later than Mo-
rocco’s into Spain, France, and Italy because Moroccan communities possessed migrant networks
established from colonial migration (Ic¸duygu, 2009). Today Turkish migrant networks associate lo-
cations in Germany or France with a particular region or village in Turkey. Turkish HTAs also serve
to facilitate networking between migrants and business contacts and politicians back home, perhaps
moreso than HTAs of other diasporas. Emigrants are highly regionalized also within Turkey. As
with emigrants from Mexico, most emigrants from Turkey originate in wealthy and middle income
regions (Unan, 2009). Middle income regions send the most emigrants but wealthy regions also act
as transition zones where people migrate internally before making an international trip.
Remittances to Turkey are declining rapidly. Turkish migrants remitted almost 2.8 million in
2001 and by 2011 this amount declined to 1 million. Between 1960 and 1980 remittances covered
about 80% of Turkey’s trade deficit and 60% of that nation’s current account deficit. Remittances
covered about 50% of the trade deficit in the 1980s, around 35% in the 1990s (Ic¸duygu, 2005), and
by the late 2000s remittances were around only 2% of the trade deficit (Ic¸duygu, 2009). As Turkish
migrants settle and bring their families they divert money from remittances to savings in their host
nation (Cortina & Ochoa-Reza, 2008). Concurrent with declines in remittances Turkish migrants
also have increased “suitcase trade” revenue, wherein migrants buy goods in Germany, France, or
Russia transport the goods in their luggage, and resell them for a profit in Turkey, or vice-versa.
In 2007 suitcase trade revenue was 6000 million, almost double annual revenue of suitcase trade of
the previous year, and five times more than remittances in 2007 (Ic¸duygu, 2009).
The initial decline of remittances coincided with both economic crisis in Europe and increasing
permanent settlement of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Remittances are usually most dependent
upon events in the migrant’s home economy but Turkish migrants in Germany also seem to react
to German economic cycles (Bettin, Elitok, & Straubhaar, 2012). Labour emigrants who remit
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generally work in a nation with a vastly superior economy to migrant’s home nations, but this
is not the case for Germany and Turkey. Turkey boasts Europe’s 6th largest economy so that
economic movements in Germany are just about as meaningful to Turkish immigrants as the cycles
in Turkey. Turkey weathered well the economic crisis in the new century but remittances continue
to decline due to permanent settlement and possibly because the Turkish nation and families are
less dependent upon remittances.
Migrants are sending fewer remittances but remain transnationally engaged. The recently in-
dustrialized Turkish economy is one of the fastest growing in Europe, but the state maintains a
nonchalant attitude of migrants and is selective in receiving returnees (Bilgili & Siegel, 2014). In
interviewing, representatives from the Department of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities in-
sisted that Turkish emigrants can better assist in the development of Turkey by staying abroad
(Bilgili & Siegel, 2014). From the first waves of labour migration, Turkey linked migrants to de-
velopment, provided migrant’s incentives to invest in Turkish business, and favored for migration
those who would contribute the most in remittances and investments (Bettin et al., 2012)
In the early 1960s the Turkish state launched two mechanisms designed to channel remittances
towards development projects. These mechanisms are a form of state engagement with emigrants
and with a developmental focus, but neither are HTAs because they are entirely state initiated and
located in Turkey. The programs are managed by the state and provide incentives to migrants to
participate in development, but do not depend upon migrant organizations or networks.
The first mechanisms launched in 1962 were village development cooperatives with the mission
to promote development in rural areas. Between 1965 and 1973 roughly 1400 cooperatives registered
(Ko¨ksal, 2006). Village development cooperatives were designed to encourage rural development
by prioritizing emigrants who pledged to assist the cooperatives with their savings from abroad.
Migrants abused the intent of cooperatives by using them to secure priority labour migration, and
the Turkish state often failed to provide sufficient support (Ko¨ksal, 2006). Despite these failings
the money emigrants funneled to rural communities via the cooperatives helped to industrialize
agriculture in Turkey through the 1960s (Ic¸duygu, 2009).
The second initiative were worker’s joint stock companies. Emigrants launched the first com-
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panies in the mid-1960s and by 1975 had registered one hundred companies. The joint stock
companies were nationally, not hometown, based and overall received more migrant and state sup-
port. To qualify as a joint stock company the organization had to be migrant owned and at least
50% financed with migrant’s capital. Workers’ joint stock companies were supposed to channel
remittances into underdeveloped regions by allowing migrants to establish and manage business in
Turkey while remaining abroad. Migrants established about 600 joint stock companies since the
1960s and in the mid-2000s 20-30 remained active (Ic¸duygu, 2006).
Early Turkish HTAs emerged in the 1970s and focused on cultural activities, similar to the first
HTAs of Mexico and other nations. Where Mexican transnationalism has grown towards social
and political goals, Turkish HTAs serve transnational business ties between migrants and their
home towns. Trade networks, in fact, appear to be essential for Turkish transnationalism and HTA
activity (Caglar, 2006). Turkish HTAS often invest in private sector and economic development
projects. The transnationalism and remittance flows of the Turkish diaspora are fundamentally
different from those of the Mexican emigrants in the U.S.. Political-economic geographical contexts
explain some of the difference in Turkish expression of transnationalism (Caglar, 2006).
As with other nations, Turkish HTAs began to emerge in significant numbers beginning only in
the 1990s (Caglar, 2006). Turkey’s state-diaspora relation highlight the economic-rational aspects
of transnationalism. The Turkish state uses spatial economic incentives to encourage collective
remittances and investment in target industrial districts (Caglar, 2006). Turkey provides spatial
subsidies by incentivizing investment from migrants in particular localities, which results in HTAs
based in Germany focusing on particular locations in Turkey. HTAs also facilitate engagement
between migrants and home officials, buttressing migrant networks and in turn supporting business
engagements between migrants and their homes. Turkish state policies seem limited to these eco-
nomic incentives but travel by local authorities to meet diaspora organizations in Germany have
increased into the 21st century. Personal visits are also an opportunity for transnational business-
men to build status or rapport with mayors and other local authorities from Turkey. Turkish local
authorities travel to meet diaspora organizations and provide remittances their transformative ca-
pacities. They are transformative not only because the market surrounding this form of capital flow
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has expanded but also because the enlarged market draws in new actors who ground the neo-liberal
agenda in recipient countries.
Transnationalism of the Turkish diaspora is founded upon entrepreneurial and industrial net-
works. The organizational interface between the Turkish state and diaspora is based in Turkish
industry as much as it is in migrant organizations abroad. Turkey’s activity in its diaspora con-
trasts with that of Mexico where policies are intended to implement equitable social development
often targeting poor and rural areas. The goals of the Turkish state are economic development,
modernization, and political influence abroad. The unique forms of Turkish transnational engage-
ment are a function of its economic and geographic contexts and the political demands that Turkish
politicians place upon the diaspora.
Turkey’s migrant-state partnerships differ from those of Mexico in nature but display a similar
degree of institutionalization. Like HTAs of the Mexican diaspora, ambitious Turkish migrants
often establish HTAs to help them pursue political and economic goals. Turkish politicians and
business leaders visit HTA events, and the HTAs support entrepreneurial and political relationships.
To the extent that strategies of the Mexican diaspora and state depend upon institutionalization
of the relationship, similar strategies may apply also to Turkey.
While Turkey maintains developmental engagements with it’s diaspora, it also hosts a growing
immigrant population that may be involved in development of their home states. Turkey may be a
in a position to experiment with multi-state migration and development strategies, leveraging both
emigrant and immigrant populations for development while providing a developmental incentive to
immigrant’s home states.
4.2.2 Morocco
Of all nations of the globe, Morocco’s might be the diaspora that is most similar to Mexico’s.
Morocco’s economic and human development lags Mexico’s, but both nations face similar develop-
mental challenges and have nearby northern neighbors that once sought to import cheap labour.
Morocco’s emigration history into Europe is shorter than Mexico’s into the US, but both nations
historically pursue a policy of emigration and today are leading emigrant and transition nations.
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Both nations also act as transit states for other emigrants leaving states of the Global South. Em-
igration from both nations accelerated in the last half of the 20th century, and now about 10% of
both nation’s population live abroad, but Morocco’s population is about a quarter of Mexico’s thus
its diaspora is smaller in absolute terms. Morocco’s diaspora reside in host nations that are similar
to the US but Morocco’s diaspora is geographically diverse and spread across nations of the EU
and the UK. Most Moroccans travel to France and Germany, but also comprise large proportions
of immigrants in Belgium and Netherlands (Zimmerman, 1996).
Morocco’s emigration flows are rooted in the nation’s geography and colonial history. Morocco’s
capital and major cities lay along the Atlantic coast and inland encircled within The Rif mountains
to the north and the Atlas range to the east and south. Morocco’s hinterlands, over the mountains,
have historically remained beyond the reach of the central government and in a sense have always
been a self-governed diaspora in situ. After a prolonged struggle with Germany, France gained
protectorship of Morocco with the 1912 Treaty of Fez. French occupation was unpopular in Morocco.
Moroccan askars stationed in Fez mutinied against their French commanders and threw the city
in to chaos. The sultan fled to the present-day capital Rabat while the French shelled Fez into
submission. The tribes along the river valleys and oases of the southern Atlas mountain ranges were
too inaccessible. France instead recruited tribal populations into labour migration to work at French
factories and farms and established colonial migration patterns that persist today. When Morocco’s
government later gained independence in 1956 it used the same tactics of labour exportation to
resolve unemployment and political unrest in both The Rif and Atlas Ranges (Lacroix et al., 2010).
The Atlas range was the western cap of the trans-Saharan trade routes. Outposts guarded
oases along the valleys of the High Atlas range, and over the range the imperial city of Marrakesh,
Morocco’s ancient capital, received travelers onto the Atlantic coastal plains. Today Marrakesh is
depopulating and supported almost entirely by tourism. By the 20th century trans-Saharan trade
was made defunct by the rise of sea-borne trade and the abolition of slavery. The once vibrant
trading hubs had fallen into literal decay, the remaining population were largely Berber and Arab
tribes of subsistence farmers dependent upon specialized techniques to work the arid soil. The tribes
were historically isolated from government rule and were fiercely resistant to the French occupiers.
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The French used labour migration to relocate and pacify population in the southern Atlas range.
The Rif is a mountainous region with fertile valleys and a coast on the Mediterranean; the
region’s name means “the edge of cultivated land.” Rifian Berber tribes were for centuries self-
governed and maintained a religious relationship to Morocco’s sultan but defiant to political rule.
Spain through the 19th century made military incursions into the Rif, and took protectorship of
the Rif with the 1912 Treaty of Fez. Around August 1921 a Spanish general determined to conquer
the tribal lands. The Rifian tribes in September 1921 responded by declaring themselves the
independent Republic of Rif. The Rifian forces succeeded in pushing back the Spanish to Melilla–a
city that today remains under Spanish autonomy and is a gateway for many African migrants into
Spain. The Rifian general feared that assaulting Melilla would arouse an international backlash
and disbanded his militia. Four years later in April 1925 the Spanish returned with French allies
and an overwhelming force. The Republic of Rif resisted for a year but eventually surrendered to
French forces and returned to Spanish Morocco in 1926. Morocco gained independence in 1956
and the Rif was reunited with a Moroccan state. The Rifian tribes remained restive and in 1958
revolted against state authority. Through the last half of the 20th century Morocco’s sultans have
neglected the Rif, abused human rights through the region, and pursued a policy of emigration to
export the discontented and unemployed populations.
Morocco’s colonial emigration patterns were translated into contemporaneity when in 1963,
following Algerian independence, the Algerian-Moroccan border closed and at the same time Europe
was within a reconstruction boom and demanding labour supply. Morocco didn’t believe emigration
would be a significant aspect of future foreign policy, but did see it as a short term solution
to relocate unemployed, troublesome, or marginalized populations. Morocco in 1963 signed the
first labour migration agreements with Germany and France, followed by Belgium in 1964 and
Netherlands in 1969. Morocco’s 1968-1972 five year plan was the nation’s first to mention emigration
and set a goal to increase labour migration at the end of the five years. Successive five year plans
provided remittances an increasingly important role.
The 1973 Oil Crisis followed by the 1973-1974 stock market crash prompted a reversal of immi-
grant labour recruitment in both European nations and the U.S. Immigrant nations implemented
109
increased border enforcement and return programs but, paradoxically, migrants responded to the
changing policy with even greater migration rates, reduced circular and return migration, increasing
settlement, and increased illegal migration. This is a completely logical response for immigrants
trying to “get in” and stay in as the national borders were becoming less and less porous. Spain
and Italy required visas of Moroccans beginning in 1990 and 1991, respectively. During this time,
for many Moroccans, undocumented entry became the only pathway into Europe. Moroccans were
one of the greatest beneficiaries of amnesty and regularization programs in Europe.
By the 1980s Moroccan leaders understood remittances to be the difference between economic
crisis and relative solvency (Brand, 2006). For Morocco, emigrants had gone from exportable labour
to vital national resource. Moroccan politicians needed emigrant’s support and so established or-
ganizations and positions to attend to emigrant’s needs. Morocco in 1990 established Banque al
Amal, the Fondation Hassan II for Moroccan Residents Abroad, and the Ministry for non-resident
Moroccans. Banque al Amal was designed to be an emigrant’s bank and remains operational
today, but has largely failed to attract emigrant clients who overwhelmingly prefer the semi-state
Bank Centrale Populaire (BCP). The Fondation Hassan II serves emigrant information needs, funds
emigrant cultural education initiatives, and works to promote cooperation between the state and
emigrants in social, economic, and cultural affairs. The Ministry, like the Fondation, supports
emigrant funded-development but also provides investment planning and advice for emigrant in-
vestors. The 2000-2004 five year plan was the first to include emigrant rights, but the two plans
since then, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, have dropped the subject of emigration altogether. Morocco’s
most recent emigrant institution is the Council of the Community of Moroccans Abroad (CCME)
established in 2007. The CCME was established for an initial period of four years amid demands
that Moroccan emigrants have voting rights. In 2011 CCME was made constitutional and today
has the mission of monitoring public policies in regards to Moroccans abroad. The Moroccan gov-
ernment also provides direct support for non-resident investment, and the Moroccans of the World
Invest fund supplies 10% of the startup capital for business projects costing between about $250k
and $1250k USD.
Moroccan emigrants have a contentious history with their state. Crown prince Hassan responded
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to Rifian overtures of violence following Moroccan independence with a campaign of state terror,
often bombing entire villages in the region. A history of violence often impedes diaspora-state
cooperation, but this does not appear to happen in Morocco. The background of the relationship
between the Moroccan diaspora and state bears some similarity to the conflict driven diaspora’s
of Central and Latin America. Despite past hostility Moroccan emigrants remain cooperative and
engaged with their homes. In 2005 Morocco opened a truth commission to acknowledge past
violence and work toward mending rifts between diaspora and state.
Home nation development occupies an important place for Moroccan emigrants but the environ-
ment and strategies are rather different from those of Mexico’s diaspora. Moroccan emigrants have
substantially lower literacy rates than Mexicans. Morocco’s diaspora concentrate in France but
disperse across a greater diversity of nations and languages than Mexico’s. Moroccan HTAs have
difficulty federating due to lower literacy rates and Europe’s geographic, legal, and linguistic diver-
sity. Moroccan emigrants seem to have no pan-European HTAs. Morocco’s HTAs are less involved
in host nation rights than those of Mexico and are more likely to work with NGOs and host nations
than Mexican HTAs who partner almost exclusively with their home government. Moroccan HTAs
also receive support from European states who assist with immigrant’s home development as part
of return policies based on the theory that developing home nations will mitigate the need for future
emigration (Lacroix et al., 2010).
Moroccan migrant state partnerships are similar in nature to those of Turkey and favor in-
vestment and entrepreneurial goals over public goods. Moroccan state-migrant partnership efforts
focus on providing investment information and start-up capital for migrant business ventures. The
partnerships between Moroccan emigrants and their home state seems less institutionalized than
that between Turkish or Mexican emigrants and their homes. Nonetheless Moroccan emigrants are
possibly the most progressive in demand for political and voting rights.
Mexico is often the exemplar for migration and development but Morocco may be more salient
to future diasporas of the world. Mexico’s institutionalization of migration and development is
made possible by the nation’s long migration history into the U.S, high concentrations of emigrants
in host locations, greater levels of literacy among emigrants, and relatively fewer linguistic and
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legal obstacles to federation of migrant organization. Moroccans instead engage with their state
in a piecemeal fashion and are more likely to partner also with host states or NGOs. Moroccan
state emigrant programs are fractured but broad and provide a range of services to help emigrants
support national development. Mexico’s institutionalized transnationalism may, indeed, insulate
Mexican emigrants from overarching development trajectories and strategies (de Haas & Vezzoli,
2010). Morocco’s initiatives are often innovative and reflect personal commitments of politicians to
support the diaspora and its financial goals but may fail to involve emigrants in a cohesive national
developmental plan (S. Cohen, 2010). Moroccans use developmental finance to initiate productive
enterprise, often in tourism or agriculture. Instead of Mexican emigrant’s institutionalized and
monogamous relationship with their home state, Moroccans demonstrate a greater willingness to
work with other partners and attempt a wider array of developmental projects.
4.2.3 Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe was once a jewel of southern Africa, rich in agricultural lands and natural resources,
but in the last decade fell into rapid decline. In 1980 Zimbabwe gained independence from Great
Britain, and the new electorate selected as prime minister Robert Mugabe, who had emerged a hero
after fighting for decades against white minority rule. Mugabe’s government pursued redistribution
of the farmland seized by whites during British rule, but the structural integration of colonialism
confounded their efforts. By the end of the 20th century Zimbabwe’s white minority, less than 1% of
the population, still owned 70% of Zimbabwe’s most fertile land. Droughts and volatile commodity
markets perennially challenged Zimbabwe’s economy through the 1980s and 1990s, which grew on
average 4.5% annually during this time frame. Neighboring Botswana grew at 9%, the fastest
worldwide. The difference is possibly due to Botswana’s governance and liberalized policies.
In the 1990s greater numbers of Zimbabweans began to migrate into South Africa and more
recently Botswana and the UK. The South African Migration Project (SAMP) estimate that 1 in
4 Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002). Historically, Zimbabwe
was an immigrant nation, with large volumes of labour migrants from Mozambique, Zambia, and
Malawi. Zimbabwe’s recent diaspora was mostly unskilled and unmarried young men, but today
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greater numbers of women also now migrate as part of a household survival strategy.
In about 1997, Zimbabwe’s government and economy spiraled increasingly out of control. In
1998 Mugabe supported Congo’s new president in the Second Congo War and drained hundreds of
millions of dollars from Zimbabwe’s coffers. Zimbabwe printed money to finance the war and other
debts, and Zimbabwe’s currency entered hyperinflation. By late 2008, just prior to dollarization,
inflation stood at over 79 billion percent.
In 1999 Mugabe, an authoritarian ruler, attempted to amend the constitution to extend his
term, but failed. Furious at defeat, Mugabe enacted “fast track” land reform and forcibly seize
farmland from whites, whom he suspected of supporting his political opposition. Mugabe did not
redistribute farmland but instead granted the vast majority of the land to himself, his cabinet,
and parliamentarians. The government officials had little interest or expertise in farming, how-
ever, and allowed the lands to fall into mismanagement. After decades of British colonialism, the
native population of Zimbabwe was unprepared to reclaim the nation’s agricultural sectors. The
industries that support agriculture, including finance and manufacturing, also began to decline and
collapse. Inflation coupled with economic mismanagement thrust Zimbabwe into economic and
political meltdown that lasted until 2009.
Violence and economic implosion in Zimbabwe initiated a second wave of migration at the turn
of the century. The second wave are largely political migrants, skilled professionals, and more likely
to have held a job in Zimbabwe; these are people with the means to flee. Also during this time
greater number of people, often women, became informal cross-border traders who purchase goods
abroad and resell them in Zimbabwe for a profit. Migrants of the second wave might be termed
“survival migrants.” Refugees are a type of survival migrant, but this class includes anyone for
whom migration is a necessary act of survival.
Zimbabwe today remains a fallen state with some hopeful signs. Following dollarization in 2009,
the economy resumed slow growth. Unemployment, however, remains the world’s largest at 95%,
and the nation suffers an 80% poverty rate. Life expectancy fell to among the lowest worldwide at
37 for men and 34 for women in 2006 but have since rebounded to 58 years on average and in line
with life expectancy in South Africa (World Health Organization, 2015).
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Migrants since 2009 remain similar to those of the second wave, with about 44% female and
large numbers of skilled migrants. Zimbabwe’s short history of migration is already apparent, as the
majority of migrants now follow a family member. More migrants today are younger, about 30%
between 15 and 24, unmarried, unemployed, and uneducated. Recent migrants continue to remit but
only 27% remit monthly compared to 62% monthly remitters from the second wave. Migrants are
also more likely to use informal channels for remittances than previous waves. Circular migration
is reduced by still predominant. Fewer migrants today visit regularly, but 80% visit once a year.
Zimbabwean HTAs are still emerging and basing some of their strategy on Mexican hometown
associations (Gonouya, 2012). The Zimbabwean diaspora is similar to Colombia’s. It is diverse and
relatively richer than those who stay behind–but much poorer than the Colombians. Zimbabwe’s
diaspora might also be more distant from their homes than Colombia’s and more dispersed. For
these reasons a national level strategy organized using the internet might ultimately be important
for Zimbabwe’s diaspora.
Zimbabwe is a south-south diaspora whereas most collective remittances and strategies exist in
south-north diasporas. Nations with both a southern and northern component to their diaspora
often target only the northern portion with migration and development strategies and incentives.
Southern diasporas are poorer, the data is sparser and more politicized, and the research is more
difficult. A southern diaspora may require specialized state-engagement methods from the diaspora,
the state, and third parties that seek to assist the Zimbabwean state or diaspora in migration &
development efforts. In a state like Zimbabwe where the experiences and effects of migration are
pervasive and yet the state lacking the ability to engage migrants, domestic civil society may come
to be an important partner to migrant organizations seeking to help out with development.
4.2.4 India
India’s diaspora dominates the globe in sheer size, antiquity, and economic might. The diaspora
is centuries old, but only in the last few decades has the nation invested in its diaspora and
drafted policy to protect and leverage migrants for developmental goals. India’s emigration policy
is shifting in sync with that of other major emigration nations. The Indian state historically ignored
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or disparaged emigrants but in the 1990s rapidly assumed the cooperative transnational attitude
now typical of emigrant nations. India may indicate the future of relationships between nations
and diasporas as the entire world becomes more transnational.
India’s diaspora stem from a nation with a population of over one billion people. 25 million In-
dians, or about 2% of India’s population, live abroad–which is less than the global average emigrant
ratio of about 3% but is still second largest in absolute terms. India’s remittance inflows are the
largest in the world at about 70 billion and currently make up 3.4% of the nation’s GDP (Afram,
2012), which is a similar percentage as Mexico, Morocco, and other emigrant nations. Despite
their magnitude remittances are not that significant for India’s national economy but are essential
for some sending locations and are important component of India’s balance of trade (Srivastava &
Sasikumar, 2005).
India also hosts large immigrant populations from neighboring Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan.
The 2001 census reports that 6 million immigrants reside in India but India also hosts many illegal
immigrants. India receives large refugee inflows from Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Tibet,
India’s emigration is highly regionalized and most emigrants are from Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab. For sending regions emigration remittances contribute to large
portions of the regional economy; for example remittances to Kerala are 20% of the gross product
of the regional economy (Castles, 2007) and among the highest proportion of any economy in the
world. Given India’s vast population and the regionalized emigration it is misleading to talk about
Indian migration. Most Indian’s lives are untouched by emigration but in some locations a majority
of households have emigrant members.
Indian emigrant’s destinations are among the most various of any diaspora. Destinations fall
into three major categories: English-speaking industrialized nations, gulf states, and southeast
Asian countries. The U.S. is the major receiving country for India’s emigrants, but the Asian
continent receives more emigrants than North America. North America and the U.K. receive the
greatest share of professional and skilled emigrants whereas continental Europe, Asia, and the Gulf
states receive the larger shares of unskilled emigrants. Contemporary routes of human capital via
migration have persisted since Indian independence in 1947 but regional distribution of volume has
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shifted. Emigration to gulf states remains constant since the oil boom of the 1970s but professional
and technical emigrants have shifted their preferred destination away from the U.K. to North
America and Australia.
India’s diaspora is one of the oldest and through the centuries has been driven by mercantilism,
colonialism, and globalism. British parliament in 1833 set the stage for modern Indian migration
with the abolition of slavery in the empire. British colonial entrepreneurs needed to fill labour
vacated by slavery and turned to recruiting indentured Indian labour. In 1835 France and Denmark
followed the British example and abolished slavery in colonies. By 1863 and 1869 Netherlands and
Portugal, the other major of the colonial powers, abolished slavery. Through the 19th century
Indians emigrated to colonies around the globe to fill labour needs.
The period of the British Raj defined modern Indian emigration. The British empire and other
colonial nations used Indians to supply labour in colonies around the world. Indentured servitude
dominated earlier colonial periods when most emigrants were recruited to work on plantations in
the West Indies, Fiji, and Mauritius. During the Raj indentured servitude was replaced by the kan-
gani system, wherein an immigrant foreman recruited and supervised immigrant labourers on the
plantations. The foreman typically recruited from people in his home village and encouraged forma-
tion of migrant networks between Indian villages and plantations in the British colonies (Guilmoto,
1993). During this time most emigrants came from Tamil and traveled to present day Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Myanmar. Tamil was the largest contributor to Indian emigration during
the British Raj due to its proximity to colonies in the Pacific.
Colonial independence movements took advantage of mid 20th century postwar chaos to garner
support for anti-colonial resistance movements. Britain’s empire was filled with unrest and also
vulnerable to growing Chinese and Japanese presence. Britain decolonized; beginning notably in
1947 with India. A cascade of decolonizations followed through the 1960s as colonies around the
world obtained independence from European powers. Newly independent domestic populations
drove out Indian immigrant labourers who posed unwanted competition. India refused to accept
most returnees leading them into a secondary emigration to Australia, Europe, and North America
(Khadria, 2009). The kangani system facilitated networking, organization, and eventually union-
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ization of Tamil workers, and their trade unions often protected their status in newly independent
colonies allowing some Tamils to remain in their host nations (Guilmoto, 1993).
Decolonization completely transformed global labour demands. India’s south-south low skilled
circulation to British colonies reoriented south-north to the U.K., U.S., and Canada. Since indepen-
dence India’s diaspora dichotomized, with unskilled emigrants locating to the Gulf and West and
Southeast Asia while skilled emigrants left for Australia, North America, and the U.K. (Vezzoli &
Lacroix, 2010). The contemporary diaspora is no longer dominated by colonialism, but the effects
of colonialism still linger.
Indian emigration since independence consists of waves divided among regions. The first wave
consisted of Punjabis emigrants to U.K., after the India and Pakistan partition left millions of Pun-
jabis displaced. The Punjabis were joined by smaller flows from Gujarat and secondary emigrants
expelled from newly independent ex-colonies. Britain in 1962 implemented restrictive immigration
policy that discouraged temporary migration, accelerated family reunification, and spurred the for-
mation of immigrant communities in the U.K. By the mid 1960s most Indian immigrants to the U.K.
were dependents of earlier immigrants. The European reconstruction boom began in the late 1960s
and attracted new immigrants from around the world including a fresh wave of Indian immigrants.
In the early 1970s an oil boom opened persistent routes of mostly unskilled migration between Ker-
ala and southern India and the gulf states. Industrialized nations in the 1980s introduced restrictive
immigration law. In response Indian emigrants grew more skilled and more specialized, especially
in IT and software. At this time also more emigrants headed for the United States and Canada and
eventually diversified also to Australia, Germany, Japan, and Malaysia. By the the 1990s Indian
immigrants dominated IT and other specialty technical professions. In the 1990s the US surpassed
the UK as the preferred destination for Indian emigrants and Indians are the top beneficiaries of
H1B visas. High-skilled emigration reached a peak during the internet boom of the early eighties
and late nineties. From the early 2000s onwards, a large highly-skilled migration wave of engineers,
students and doctors arrived in Europe and North America, diversifying further the profile of the
Indian Diaspora.
India’s contemporary emigration policy reflects it’s roots in colonial migration. Most unskilled
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emigrants must pass background checks and provide proof of employment and housing and India
requires most foreign employers to uphold standards of worker compensation and treatment. Emi-
gration policy is as much a means of protecting emigrants as it is protecting India’s image abroad.
After independence India used passports as a foreign policy tool, but in 1966 amended the consti-
tution with the right to travel. India’s attitude until the 1990s was that emigrants were deserters
undeserving of return. By the 1990s remittances had grown to a small but important part of India’s
national economy and invaluable for local economies in sending regions.
India’s diaspora engagement strategies reflect contemporary national needs. India desperately
needed foreign currency during its 1990s balance of payments crisis, and offered emigrants special
savings vehicles to encourage remittances in foreign currency.
India’s diaspora supports thousands of organizations. 13% of Indian migrants to the U.S. belong
to a hometown association (Orozco & Garcia-Zanello, 2009), but interviews suggest Indian emi-
grants are disinterested in India’s state policies for diaspora engagement (Tejada, Hercog, Kuptsch,
& Bolay, 2013). This is in contrast to Mexico’s U.S. diaspora that has similar HTA participation but
greater cooperation between HTAs and the Mexican state. Nonetheless India’s state engagement
is relatively new and remains active and vigorous
Human, not economic, capital might be the primary contribution of India’s diaspora to their
home nation. Compared to most other major diasporas, collective remittances do not seem to be a
concern of Indian emigrants or their organizations. Indian emigrants are also much less willing to
invest in their home nation than their Chinese peers (Tejada et al., 2013), who are probably the most
comparable diaspora. More important than money are the business networks and technical expertise
Indian emigrants return to their home nations. Rather than return of monetary remittances, Indian
emigrants believe return of human and social capital is more important for development of their
home nation (CODEV-EPFL, IDSK, JNU, & ILO, 2013).
The focus on human over other forms of capital for development may be a function of the Indian
diaspora’s history and geographical contexts. The Indian diaspora is geographically distant from
their homeland. As with the Ecuadorian diaspora, the vast distance may leave Indians uncomfort-
able with remitting monetary resources for development. At the same time, the Indian diaspora
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experienced a history of rejection, and return of human capital may fulfill some emotional desire in
collective memory. India is also not an underdeveloped nation but some regions are under served,
and Indian professions who have built skills, wealth, and networks in the West may believe that
have something to give and gain in India.
4.3 Conclusion: Generalizing models and theory of collec-
tive remittances
Mexico is an exemplar for migration scholarship and diaspora engagement strategy, but represents
only a slice of the characteristics relevant to collective remittances. Mexican communities favor
using collective remittances for public goods, and the migrants and state maintain a well funded
and effective working relationship. The vast majority of the Mexican diaspora is in the US or
Canada, two nearby and well developed nations. Mexican migrants to the US usually fill low
skill labour and their immigrant status often leaves them suspended at lower socioeconomic levels.
Mexican migrant organizations emerged in these contexts. Mexican migrants needed a place to
belong and socially advance; migrant clubs and collective remittances provided this outlet. In time
politicians realized the clubs were political resources, and a relationship emerges between migrants
and state.
A few elements stand out as important for research and widespread use of collective remittances.
1) How communities and migrants use collective remittances, 2) the rights and resources that a
diaspora obtains from their home state, 3) the social attitudes a diaspora face at home and abroad,
4) the geo-political contexts of a diaspora, and 5) the diaspora’s partners in development.
First, collective remittances take many forms and are difficult to strictly define. Collective
remittances support not only public goods but also entrepreneurial projects. Diaspora bonds are
another form of migrant investment that are critical for the financial support and development of
some countries, and is another valuable migration and development strategy. Collective remittances
are not always money, and can include equipment and durable goods to stock community clinics or
other free public services.
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Second, each diaspora have a different home state. The relationship of a diaspora with its home
state and government is essential for collective remittances, and the relationship means different
things for different migrants. States command great resources, but not all migrants welcome state
involvement. Some diasporas fled their home state, and some communities find that state resources
are not worth state involvement. Some states lack any capacity to partner with migrants. Home
state capacity is correlated with the factors that cause initial migration, including weak governance
and violence. It’s more likely that home states are both unable to partner and unable to govern,
rather than only one or the other. Functioning states provide rights and services to migrants
that are part of a larger relationship including collective remittances. State resources come with
requirements, but overall they are a benefit to those diasporas that enjoy a functional working
relationship.
Third, social attitudes shape migration and collective remittances policy and perception of that
policy. As nations recognize the contribution migrants make to national development and financial
solvency they take a warmer view of migrants and provide greater services and rights. Migrants
distrust homes that have disparaged them in the past. In the host nations, migrant organizations
can emerge in part as an escape from discrimination and limited socioeconomic opportunities in
the host nations. Poor treatment from host states can also result in migrants and home states
distrusting host state assistance.
Fourth, geo-political contexts largely determine the structure and patterns of migration. The
Mexican diaspora is embedded in a historical and geopolitical context that allowed for the emergence
of circular and seasonal labour migration and strong transnational links between migrants and their
homes. Mexican migration patterns are made possible by the geographical proximity of Mexico and
the US, the US need for labour through the first three-quarters of the 20th century, and the economic
differences between Mexico and the US. Other diasporas are similarly shaped by their historical
and geographical realities.
Fifth, diasporas have different partners available to them, those partners have varying capacity
to cooperate with migrants for development, and those relationships between migrants and part-
ners have different types and degrees of institutionalization. Typical partners include home state,
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host state, and NGOs. Institutionalization provides stable organizational platforms that facilitate
collective remittances and their management. With low institutionalization and formality migrants
must self-organize and identity development needs and how they can contribute. With higher levels
of institutionalization migrants and their partners have an established relationship and programme
that streamlines solicitation and contribution of collective remittances and provides organizational
bodies and agents to manage collective remittances. Most diasporas will depend upon a formalized
relationship with a home state to identify needs and help manage the projects.
These five factors together characterize the opportunities that migrants have available to orga-
nize, partner, and contribute to collective remittances. Migrant’s expectations of collective remit-
tances differ, but regardless of the form all emigrants have a desire to remain involved with their
home. Analysis of Mexico suggests migrants want to develop their home to reduce the need for
migration, perhaps to protect their own wages. Indian emigrants return social and human capital to
help build Indian industry and business. Moroccan emigrants donate to support schools or clinics
and use funds to help start businesses back home. Sometime emigrants want to fund something
for their own enjoyment, and in El Salvador emigrants often build sports facilities even as the
communities are in need of water, electricity, or road infrastructure.
Table 4.6 summarizes the values of the countries across the general characteristics relevant to
collective remittances. The Mexican diaspora, for example, most often contributes to public goods
and entrepreneurial projects. The next chapter will further distill these tables to a set of attributes
and values that characterize collective remittances within a diaspora.
Migration stages are an important factor for migration, community socioeconomic structure, and
collective remittances in Mexico, but are absent from the international comparison. Application of
the statistical model of collective remittances to Latin and Central America demonstrated that the
theory and model of migration stages in Mexico doesn’t na¨ıvely apply to another country. Different
contexts of migration yield different migration behaviors and patterns, and the models of migration
stages based upon Mexican data are poorly suited to Latin and Central America. A model of
migration stages helped explain differences among communities in Mexico, but that model doesn’t
apply to the populations of communities in other countries. The international comparison did not
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need to consider intranational effects, and so migration stages become part of a black box of each
nation’s particular history of migration.
Migrants are the originators of collective remittances, while states and other stakeholders bring
additional resources and requirements to the process. Changing attitudes towards state-diaspora re-
lationships have lifted collective remittances to the forefront of migration and development. Shifting
state perception of emigrants will quickly influence state engagement with the diaspora, but history
is also important. State’s that include migrants in plans and planning bridge the gap between what
migrants are willing to do and how migrants fit into national development. States require sufficient
resources, but also transparency and the trust of migrants. If collective remittances are truly an
efficacious developmental method, then external international pressures may also help some states
to establish emigrant engagement.
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Figures
Figure 4.1: LAMP data with stage classifications of MMP data
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Figure 4.2: Calibration plot of model with LAMP data
llll ll l ll llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll l
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5
predicted
o
bs
er
ve
d
l lll ll llllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll l
0
1
2
3
4
0.5 1.0 1.5
predicted
o
bs
er
ve
d
llll ll l ll ll
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
ll l0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4
predicted
o
bs
er
ve
d
124
Figure 4.3: Calibration plot of model with MMP data
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Figure 4.4: Calibration plot of refit model with LAMP data
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Figure 4.5: Calibration plot of refit model with MMP data
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Tables
Table 4.1: statistics of some Latin and Central American emigrant nations
Colombia Ecuador El Salvadore Dominican Republic Guatemala
population (1000s) 48228.7 16144.36 6126.58 10528.39 16342.9
GDP per capita $6056 $6205 $4219 $6469 $3903
gini index 53.5 45.4 48.1 47.1 48.7
US immigrants 2 million 500000 1.7 million 1.5 million 1.5 million
non-US immigrants 2 million 500000
HDI 0.548 0.570 0.488 0.546 0.443
median income $6544 $6858 $4828 $6302 $4516
primary US destinations NJ, south FL NY CA, TX NY, NJ, FL CA, TX
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Table 4.2: Statistics of some global emigrant nations
India Morocco Turkey Zimbabwe
population (1000s) 1311050.5 34377.51 78665.83 15602.75
GDP per capita $1598 $2878 $9126 $924
gini index 35.1 40.7 40.2 50.1
US immigrants 3.2 million 113000 250000 45000-100000
total immigrants 24 million 4.6 million 3.8 million 3 million
HDI 0.435 0.433 0.645 0.369
median income $3168 $6634 $8955
primary destinations UK, US France, Israel, Spain Germany, France SA, UK
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables in LAMP data
Colombia Dominican Republic Ecuador Guatemala
population 1101214 681142 360500 14829
household head hourly wages MXN 31.05 37.36 32.67 21.97
proportion remittances invested 0.002 0.002 0.02 0.01
migrant’s hourly wages USD 14.92 16.98 14.06 10.12
projects financed by migrants 0 1.86 1.5 3
n 14 7 3 4
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Table 4.4: Models of collective remittances fit to MMP data
total productive non-productive
(intercept) 0.05 -1.16 -0.33
population -0.11 -0.25 -0.04
household head hourly wages MXN -0.03 0.28 -0.18
proportion remittances invested 0.22 0.31 0.17
migrant’s hourly wages USD 0.36 0.24 0.39
stage 2 0.35 0.42 0.32
stage 3 0.36 0.40 0.34
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Table 4.5: Models of collective remittances fit to LAMP and MMP data
total productive non-productive
(intercept) -0.99 -1.89 -1.86
population -0.31 -0.43 -0.14
household head hourly wages MXN -0.12 0.32 -0.19
proportion remittances invested 0.26 0.34 0.19
migrant’s hourly wages USD 0.34 0.22 0.38
stage 2 0.29 0.36 0.29
stage 3 0.36 0.45 0.33
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Table 4.6: characteristics of collective remittances
India Mexico Morocco Turkey Zimbabwe
contributions networks,
skills
public
goods, en-
trepreneur-
ship
supplies/goods,
public
goods, en-
trepreneur-
ship
networks,
en-
trepreneur-
ship
state resources diaspora
bonds,
cultural
services
remittance
matching
in-kind
matching,
cultural
services,
political
services
entrepreneurial
incentives
social status high-skill,
middle-class
low-skilled,
low-
socioeconomic
low-skill,
low-
socioeconomic
mixed-skill
geopolitical contexts regionalized
emigration,
global
immigration
broad
emigration,
overwhelm-
ingly US
immigrants
regionalized
emigration,
immigration
across
Europe
broad
emigration,
immigration
to Germany
and France
broad
emigration,
mostly
South
African
immigrants
partners None home state home state,
host state
NGOs home state
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Collective remittances have increased in magnitude worldwide (Vargas-Lundius, Lanly, Villarreal,
& Osorio, 2008). Since the 1980s collective remittances have risen dramatically, and the HTAs
that support collective remittances have equally increased in frequency. Collective remittances are
particularly expansive in Mexico, but since the 1990s more diasporas worldwide are cooperatively
engaging their home communities and nations to help provide for developmental needs.
Some nations attempt to replicate the Mexican model. Both El Salvador and Guatemala have
used top-down institutionalization to leverage existing collective remittances and in both cases
migrants are often unwelcoming of state involvement (Popkin, 2003). Mexico’s HTAs and mi-
grant friendly policies are creative responses to circumstance and not exactly replicable via policy
(Iskander, 2010). Like the squiggly lines that characterize organically demarcated national borders
also indicate stability and antiquity, the transnational space where Mexico’s state and diaspora meet
is messy and political but organically developed. Mexico’s diaspora negotiated with the state the
terms of it’s engagement and the migrants share substantial control in the cooperatively managed
developmental projects.
Collective remittances and migrant-state relationships may be unique to their contexts but are
not entirely idiosyncratic and there exist several structural attributes pertinent to collective remit-
tances that characterize all transnational developmental relationships. Geography and historical
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relationships among migrants and their home and host state are relevant to collective remittances
in all places. Geography includes how few or many areas send emigrants, the distance between
migrant’s homes and their destinations, and the number of destinations. History is more complex
and includes civil wars or gang violence in the home state, how the home and host state perceive
migrants, and migrant’s political rights and activism.
The hypotheses abstracted away from Mexico’s context with a test of migrant’s motivations.
Motivations ideally are consistent between contexts, but structural opportunities bring different
motivations to the fore and influence how motivations become action. The hypothesis testing sup-
ports that migrant goals drive collective remittances, rather than community requirements. The
hypotheses tested structural elements that migrants actually influence over time, for example the
wages back home and their wages abroad. Many other structural elements exist that grossly de-
termine migrants access to opportunities necessary to establish and support collective remittances,
and that migrants are unaware of or unable to influence.
Table 5.1 describes abstract characteristics that might determine the opportunities available to
migrants for collective remittances, and a rough coding rubric to classify nations on these char-
acteristics. Some characteristics are implicated in the analysis of Mexican collective remittances,
but they are not directly represented in the model, or they are part of the dependent variable.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display radar charts that visually characterize the relevant structural attributes
for emigrant nations of Latin America and around the globe, based on the rubric in table 5.1
Migrant participation is the most typical feature of collective remittances. Migrants initiate
most transnational engagements (Portes, 2001, 2003) but states may attempt to encourage addi-
tional participation. With formalized migrant-state relationships most migrants can contribute to
collective remittances without needing to be involved in direct communication with home commu-
nities or any organizational duties. A smaller number of officials and volunteers representing states,
communities, and migrant organizations take over the role of facilitating collective remittances and
initiating transnational engagements.
Community participation is important for collective remittances and has many aspects. Migrant
and community developmental goals often do not align and communities must remain active to
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ensure collective remittances fund projects that best fulfill community needs. Regardless of goals,
communities are an important partner for managing and supporting projects that migrants help
fund (Bada, 2011, 2014), and Mexican HTAs often depend upon civic authorities with expertise to
help select and manage projects (VanWey et al., 2005).
Cooperation between host states and migrants is uncommon. Migrants and their home gov-
ernments often perceive host state assistance as a veiled return strategy (Be´jar, 2011; Orozco &
Lapointe, 2004). A few nations across European support host state co-development partnerships,
including Spain, France, and the Netherlands. All these nations also host diasporas that are spread
across multiple nations. A diaspora spread across multiple nations may not self-organize as read-
ily as a diaspora focused in one nation, and an unorganized diaspora may be more receptive to
assistance from host states.
Dispersion across many destinations can limit the formation of migrant organizations. Mexico’s
large and federated organizations emerged from concentrations of Mexican immigrants in a few
locations within a single country. Moroccans concentrate in France but are also spread across Italy,
Netherlands, and Spain, and their geographical dispersion obstructs formation of large hometown
oriented migrant organizations. India, too, is dispersed across many regions of the globe and
Indian migrant organizations are more fragmented than others (Lacroix, 2012). In contradistinction,
diasporas of Mexico, El Salvador, and Turkey are more concentrated in a single nation and have
also established larger migrant organizations that establish more complex and involved relationships
with their home state. These relationships are merely observational, but is seems that breadth of
geographic and nation dispersion abroad is an important factor in the formation of migration
organizations, networks, and relationships with home states.
Regionalization of emigration is also important for the formation of migration networks. Region-
alized emigration is when emigrants are geopolitically divided by regions, and it can be an outcome
of geography, conflict, economics, or all three. Thus, regionalization is interrelated with the other
structural aspects important for collective remittances. Remittance matching began in Mexico as a
regional affair, but ascended to the federal level because migration in Mexico is not constrained to
a few regions. Moroccan emigrants, in contrast to their Mexican peers, stream primarily from the
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country’s far northern and southern hinterlands. Morocco has pioneered migrant political rights (de
Haas, 2006; Lacroix et al., 2010), and financial institutions to serve migrants (Iskander, 2010), but
has never made remittance matching a component of it’s strategy for engaging migrants. Moroc-
can emigrants are not politically impotent, but the northern and southern regions have distinctive
geographic, economic, and political characteristics. Regionalized differences may result in differing
goals and limit the size and strength of migrant organizations. Nations with federal remittance
matching programs seem to be those with the least regionalized emigration–like El Salvador and
Mexico–where a single “one size fits all” federal program might be more effective.
Host state hostility towards a diaspora impact collective remittances in two ways. First, the
hostility can be an important impetus for migrant organization and nostalgia that underlay col-
lective remittances (The Oaxacalifornian Reporting Team, 2013). Second, past hostility can lead
migrants to distrust later host state assistance.
Migrants face hostility also from their home state, and some migrants fled threats of violence
from home states. Memories of hostility flavor migrant’s relationship with their home state for
decades or even centuries. Political refugees rarely return voluntarily, but survival migrants fleeing
a failing state or economy may return if a new state or economy can stand up and meet citizen’s
needs.
Political rights are most important to emigrants of developed nations where citizenship is more
valuable; both for the emigrant (citizenship and acceptance at home) and the immigrant (citizenship
and acceptance abroad). Political goals often supplement hometown goals of migrant organizations
and collective remittances. Political rights are important for migration and development because
emigrants who enjoy political rights back home are more likely to invest back home.
Home state policies distinguish contemporary collective remittances from transnationalism of the
past. With remittance matching programs, states take an active role in migration and development,
and make claims on how migrants should assist with development. States can incentivize collective
remittances, and organize collective remittances to better address national developmental needs.
States elevate collective remittances to the national level and can involve migrants who might not
otherwise participate. Some collective remittances are not monetary, but are goods or even skills,
137
and likewise states might also match migrant’s charity in kind.
With business assistance home states direct and leverage remittances that migrants invest in
enterprises back home. Mexico began offering business assistance after observing the success of
remittance matching, but other states, like Turkey, have made incentives for migrant enterprise
they keystone of their migration and development strategy. Business assistance is ambitious but
can be contradictory. Migrant’s hometowns and underdeveloped regions of the home country often
are not sound business investments. Turkey, however, successfully used localized business incentives
to modernize agriculture in underdeveloped regions (Caglar, 2006). Business assistance might
supplement or supplant remittance matching grants. Whereas remittance matching focus on public
goods and infrastructure, business assistance pursues commercial enterprise that provides jobs
and economic viability to a community or region. Business assistance is a tool of migration and
development that is usually interrelated to collective remittances but a separate strategy with it’s
own motivating circumstances and goals (Goldring, 2004).
Diaspora bonds allow a home state or private company to tap into migrant savings to finance
development or supply foreign currency to fund balance of payments. Diaspora bonds provide
migrants with attractive interest rates and the borrowing state or company with lower-cost and
longer-term financing than is otherwise available. Diaspora bonds reflect in migrants a home nation
bias. Migrants often invest in diaspora bonds despite having alternative investments available to
them with similar returns at lower risk. Home nation bias may be a function of nostalgia, but
migrants may also possess better knowledge of their home and believe a diaspora bond provides
a better investment return than similar risks. States with large emigrant populations in wealthy
destination countries are more likely to benefit from diaspora bonds. Fragile home states lack the
bureaucratic structure distribute diaspora bonds, even if they could benefit. Diaspora bonds reflect
both a government’s need for financing or liquidity, and the government’s ability to issue bonds.
Diaspora bonds are another tool of migration and development that can accompany remittance
matching, and nations like India have used diaspora bonds as a centerpiece of their migration and
development strategies.
The goal for applying a rough rubric and characterization of geography and history is to un-
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derstand the potential for collective remittances and other forms of migration-driven development.
Mexico provides a foundation for analyzing the motivations and structural contexts of collective
remittances, and other major emigration nations of the world provide case studies for fleshing out
the analysis, but all these nations already have programs to leverage collective remittances and or-
ganize or assist migrants with development in their home communities. What makes all the major
emigration nations useful for developing a model of collective remittances is precisely the fact that
these nations already have experience with collective remittances and other forms of migration and
development, but the model should be tested on a new nation.
The next section demonstrates that the research results and insights are helpful for quickly
assessing the future potential for institutionalization of migration and development in a nation
with relatively less research on the existing migration and development environment. Nicaragua
will serve as the case study. Nicaragua is historically similar to El Salvador and Guatemala, but
today has remarkably different migration patterns and socioeconomic characteristics. Migration
and development in Nicaragua is relatively less scrutinized than in the other Latin and Central
American migration nations, perhaps because much of Nicaragua’s diaspora resides in Costa Rica
and is less easily accessible than a diaspora located in the U.S. or a European nation. Nonetheless
some data is available on Nicaragua from the Latin American Migration project.
5.1 Example: The potential for collective remittances in
Nicaragua
Nicaragua shares a similar history with neighboring Central American nations. Like other Cen-
tral American nations, Nicaragua went through a period of violence, civil war, and revolution
that began in the 1960s, peaked in the late 1970s and continued into the 1980s. Unlike their
neighbors, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas successfully ousted the dictatorial government and installed a
socialist government. The new government of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
inherited a nation in ruins after a decade of civil war and an earthquake that had leveled the
capital city, Managua. The FSLN overhauled the deformed agricultural system and implemented
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human development programs that have improved literacy, education, healthcare, and childcare.
The conservative Reagan administration attempted to strangle the new left-leaning government
and discontinued aid flows that began under Carter’s term, mustered and armed Nicaraguan Na-
tional Guard units loyal to Somozoa, and mined Nicaragua’s harbors to block shipping. Nicaragua
today remains the second poorest country in the Western hemisphere, behind only Haiti. Despite
widespread poverty, Nicaragua doesn’t suffer from gang violence that is common in neighboring El
Salvador and Honduras.
Nicaraguan emigrants have different motivations for migration and choose different migration
destinations and goals from most of their Central American peers. The Nicaraguan revolution gen-
erated a refugee diaspora of about 200,000, but almost all refugees returned following the overthrow
of the Somozoa regime. The new FSLN government generated an emigration wave composed of
landowners and industrialists fleeing the nation ahead of deprivatization reforms, whom the U.S.
welcomed as “refugees.” Migrants also fled from the violence of the U.S. sponsored contra war in
Nicaragua. Distinguishing economic from political motivations of Nicaraguan emigrants is difficult,
but analysis of survey data and macro-economic factors suggests most Nicaraguans to the U.S.
fled from violence rather than economic reforms (Lundquist & Massey, 2005). Unlike their Central
American peers who travel primarily to the U.S., Nicaraguan emigrants divide among Costa Rica,
the U.S., Panama, and Spain as favored destinations. The reason is partly geographical, Nicaragua
is further south than El Salvador and Guatemala, and borders Costa Rica. Costa Rica offers one
of the strongest economies in Central America, shares a language with Nicaragua, and is easier to
enter. The reason may also be partly political. The refugees of El Salvador and Guatemala have
no intention of returning, whereas Nicaraguans are primarily economic migrants who may plan to
return, and prefer a destination that is easier to leave and re-enter.
A comparison and contrast between Nicaragua’s diaspora and those of neighboring Central
American nations bring into focus the economic, social, and political elements important for collec-
tive remittances and institutionalized migration and development. Figure 5.3 displays a radar chart
for Nicaragua on the characteristics important for understanding collective remittances. The score
for migrant and community engagement, number of destinations, and number of emigrant regions
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is supported by data in the Latin American Migration Project. Literature provides no evidence
that NGOs or host states partner with Nicaraguan immigrants for development goals, nor that
Nicaragua provides emigrants with remittance matching grants, diaspora bonds, business guidance,
or political rights. Nicaragua’s diaspora is similar to others from Central and Latin America, with
geographically broad emigration, a history violence at home, and anti-immigrant hostility in host
locations. But whereas their Central American peers largely migrate to the U.S., Nicaraguan emi-
grants travel in large numbers to both the U.S. and Costa Rica. Nicaragua’s history with civil war
and violence is similar to that of its Central American neighbors, but the Nicaraguan diaspora in
the U.S. is more similar to Colombia’s. Nicaragua’s refugee population in the U.S. is composed from
wealthier classes and is smaller and wealthier than Salvadorian and Guatemalan refugees (Lopez,
2015, n.d.), although poorer on average than Colombians in the U.S. Nicaraguans join HTAs at
about the same rate as Mexicans and Central Americans, about 4$ (Orozco & Rouse, 2007), but
Nicaraguan HTAs seem to have no relationship with their home state. Colombians also have little
or no relationship with their home state, but have used their advantages and resources to establish
an overarching transnational organization–Conexion Colombia–that coordinates the diaspora and
also incorporates NGOs to focus efforts for migration and development on high priority needs in
Colombia. Nicaragua is not a failed state, and has a stability on par with Colombia, but less so
than El Salvador. Elsewhere in the world, Turkey, India, and Morocco also have stability indices
similar to Nicaragua, but are much wealthier. Nicaragua seems to have the right ingredients for
institutionalized migration and development, but for some reason partnerships between emigrants,
NGOs, or the Nicaraguan state have not emerged.
The research results of the collective remittance strategies of Mexican migrants may partly ex-
plain the failure of Nicaraguans to establish organizations, partnerships, and programs for migration
and development. The reason has not to do with attributes of Nicaragua’s diaspora or state, but
rather with the poverty of Nicaraguan communities. Poverty and income was not a significant pre-
dictor of collective remittances to Mexican communities. The research results did show, however,
that Mexican migrants prefer to donate for urbanization, recreation, restoration, and beautification
projects rather than basic infrastructure. The reason may be that communities in need of basic
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infrastructure are not good candidates for eliminating future migration via development. Nicaragua
is the second poorest nation in the Western hemisphere, and although the nation’s diaspora is ca-
pable of providing help, the migrants may not believe their help would do anything to reduce future
migration.
Nicaragua remains in a phase of flux and smoldering revolution. One reason fewer refugees flee
the nation may be that citizens of Nicaragua still believe they have an opportunity to change their
nation. Even the indigenous tribes who have suffered from FSNL counter-insurgency efforts remain
recalcitrant. Since the revolution, political power has shifted from the left-wing to the right and
back again to the left-wing FSNL party. Unusual alliances emerge as politicians jockey to shore up
their support and rewrite laws to favor themselves. Nicaragua appears to be a government in need
of the economic and political support that emigrants can provide.
Iskander’s “Creative State” suggests that Morocco and Mexico have developed institutionaliza-
tion of migration and development because of the creative process between the states and their
respective migrants. Where Iskander sets out to critique compilations of best practices in migration
and development, she also implies that any diaspora and state, with the right motivations, can
establish institutionalized migration and development relationships. Iskander maps out how inter-
national shifts in migration alongside messy state politicking gave rise to the institutionalization
of migration and development that we observe in Mexico and Morocco, but she does not go far
enough to question the motivations of migrants in the process.
Analysis of motivations in Mexico suggest that, in Nicaragua, communities likely need access to
basic infrastructure before migrants will consider state partnerships to be a worthwhile economic and
political investment. The strongest factor associated with migrant funding for any type of project is
migrant’s wages. Nicaragua’s diaspora on average have higher wages than Mexicans, Salvadorians,
and Guatemalans. Nicaraguan emigrants possess the resources, ability, and even desire to help
out, but perhaps do not think that collective remittances are the best way to accomplish their
goals. The strategy motivation states that the goal of (collective) remittances is to reduce the
need for future migration (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004; Stark, 1995) and predicts that remittances
increase with migrant’s wages. In El Salvador, migrants often resist state preferences for using
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collective remittances for infrastructure development. If collective remittances are going to be a
viable strategy in Nicaragua, and other impoverished areas of the world, states and policymakers
need to find new methods of cooperating with migrants to fund infrastructure that will satisfy
migrant’s motivations.
Institutionalization of migration and development can also take forms other than collective re-
mittances. Migrants may be want to help out back home, develop their home nation, and reduce
future migration, but may not use monetary remittances for this goal. Moroccan emigrants often
supply material goods to support development back home, for example computers or medical sup-
plies, and Indian emigrants sometimes provide their skills, networks, and human capital to support
business and technological development in India. In other contexts the motivations found among
Mexican emigrants may obtain, but how the motivations crystallize into collective action may be
different from the methods of Mexican emigrants. To echo Iskander’s criticism of “best practices”
for collective remittances: Similarities between Nicaragua and its neighbors can advise strategies
to institutionalize migration and development of Nicaragua, but the fact that Nicaragua and it’s
diaspora have not adopted methods that are successful for Mexicans or Colombians should indicate
that alternative methods will be necessary to mobilize Nicaraguan emigrants. Given that Nicaragua
seems to be a good candidate for institutionalization of migration and development, host states and
NGOs may provide an impetus for state-diaspora partnerships in Nicaragua by making the first
moves to work with Nicaraguan HTAs.
5.2 Wither collective remittances
The remittance-decline hypothesis maintains substantial theoretical sway and states that remit-
tances decline over time. The hypothesis enjoys empirical support but is overly simplistic. Later
generations of migrants–that is the children of immigrants–typically do not maintain their parent’s
degree of support and remittances to their home nation. This does not mean, however, that the
diaspora as a whole does not sustain or even increase support. As long as emigration from a nation
is ongoing those emigrants will provide support to their homes. The future of remittances doesn’t
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depend on individuals, families, or even communities, but rather the nation and diaspora as a
whole. For as long as people cross international borders, remittances and transnationalism will re-
main salient for development of sending states. Moreover, states today encourage transnationalism
and provide incentives for future transnationalism
Collective remittances too decline overtime. Hometown associations have about a 10 year lifes-
pan (Orozco, 2003), however clubs are prolific and new clubs spring up regularly. Migration and
development is interested primarily in HTAs’ contributions to development, but the HTAs often
fulfill other needs, and for some organizations the collective remittances are a side effect. Indeed,
the reason collective remittances are effective is because they are a side effect to other activities
in which migrants have a personal stake, and the institutionalization of collective remittances help
entrench them as a side effect. Another important side effect is the growth of civic skills and of
human and social capital migrants accrue as they participate in social activities and manage collec-
tive remittances. Along with economic motivations, collective remittances exist because migrants
want to be part of something bigger, leave a lasting legacy, and enjoy and remember their cultural
heritage.
Home states are an important proponent and stakeholder for collective remittances, and a stable
home state can provide support, longevity, and continuity for collective remittances across migrant
generations and the coming and going of migrant HTAs. The contemporary state is extraterritorial
and treats emigrants with deliberation. Through emigrants states secure economic and political
capital both home and abroad. States depend on emigrant transnationalism, but also provide
structure and incentives for migrant transnationalism to expand. Transnationalism today reflects
a symmetry between migrants and the state rather than an action-reaction relationship.
Home states help sustain collective remittances with matching grants or in-kind contributions.
Mexico’s Tres por Uno program remains active as of this publication (Secretar´ıa de Desarrollo
Social, 2017). The Inter-American Development Bank reports that Mexico obtained a X dollar
loan in 2012 to maintain Tres por Uno. Remittance matching grants represent an alternative for
conventional development funding, not necessarily a new funding source. In that sense, remittance
matching remains subject to the drawbacks of conventional development funding, including that is
144
it financed through additional debt.
Collective remittances and state engagement grew organically from political and economic ne-
cessity in nations with long histories of large emigrant populations. States and emigrants formed
partnerships over decades in nations like Mexico, Morocco, and Turkey. States with newer popula-
tions of emigrants today attempt, with mixed results, to adopt the programs developed in nations
with long histories of emigration. The programs emerged in contexts that are often different from
the adopting state. Newer emigrations often are composed of migrants fleeing for survival from
less stable states. Differing contexts should not dissuade younger diasporas and their home states
from learning from the experiences of older diasporas, but it’s important to understand the effects
of context, the motivations of migrants, and how the two interact.
Heretofore collective remittances are built on partnerships between migrants and their homes,
but the future of collective remittances may involve another stakeholder: the host state. In the past,
host state, or co-development, partnerships carried negative implications of host states attempting
to return migrants to their places of origin (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004; Be´jar, 2011), but host state
partnerships offer non-ignorable advantages. Partnerships between host nation and immigrants can
help immigrants integrate and develop their homes to reduce the need for future migration, and
programs for these goals already exist in Spain, France, and the Netherlands. Host states may also
be in a position to fill essential needs for realizing collective remittances and the broader goals for
migration and development. For example, migrants are reluctant to fund infrastructure, but infras-
tructure projects may provide the foundation for follow-on development. Funding infrastructure
seems to be a sticking point between migrants and their home states, but host states may provide
additional input, resources, or ideas that can resolve the differences and enable cooperation for
advancing migration driven development of infrastructure needs.
NGOs are also active in development but rarely coordinate their efforts with emigrants. Similar
to host states, NGOs are a 3rd party that can fill needs that neither migrants or home states cannot.
NGOs can provide HTAs guidance for project identification that home states are unwilling or unable
to supply. NGOs are ideal candidates to provide support to migrants in social development, financial
infrastructure, and business development (Orozco, 2003).
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Policymakers in the 1990s didn’t believe collective remittances could significantly contribute to
development (Goldring, 2004), but by the new century collective remittances had become the new
development mantra (Kapur, 2004). Migrants and policymakers often have different expectations
for collective remittances, however. As policymakers accept remittances as a potentially significant
source of development, they also expect all remittances to be fungible toward this goal. Policy-
makers expect that remittances come with no strings attached, and that migrants shouldn’t require
the same rates of return on remittances for development as with other investment vehicles. The
policymaker vision for migration and development ignores what remittances mean to migrants, and
what migrants expect from their investments and contributions.
The recent migration-development nexus invokes the concept of bottom up development (Sinatti
& Tinajero, 2011). Bottom up development begins with the local populations, rather than distant
decision makers, to select and implement local development. Behind this paradigm is a theory
that local populations know better what infrastructure the community most needs, and how best
to implement this infrastructure (Hayami, 1998). In this theory, governments can more efficiently
funnel money into development by sharing power with local actors. Migrant’s motivations and
developmental priorities are critical for bottom up development. Migrants may have superior local
knowledge but may not share the same goals or interests as their home communities and nations.
Migrants preferences are associated with structural characteristics. Migrant’s motivations and their
situations in both home and host nation shape how they will engage with developmental interests
and goals.
If migrant-state partnerships remain a relevant aspect for the future of migration and devel-
opment, then host states and NGOs will likely need to become a part of the relationship. Host
state and migrant partnerships may seem ludicrous, but when transnational theory exclaimed that
states no longer regulate the cross border lives of their citizens, the repositioning of the home state
as a central entity in migrant’s support of development also seemed dubious. Yet contemporary
transnationalism is again distinguished by the role of the home state in migrant’s cross border lives.
If transnational lifestyles become more prevalent, then host states will be unable to ignore the role
of immigrant’s transnationalism within their own borders.
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Migration remains both a challenge and a promise to the nations of the globe. Whatever its
outcome migration will almost certainly always exist. Since the last decade of the 20th century
migrants have grown increasingly transnational. Not only will migration continue, transnationalism
is likely to grow. While some may question the sustainability of collective remittances, hometown
associations, and diaspora driven development, this pessimism may be overwrought; diasporas are
a promising investment for emigrant nations.
It is likely that in the not too distant future for a significant portion of the earth’s inhabitants
a transnational life will come as natural as the interstate life is for most of us now. The thought
of not living a transnational life will seem as preposterous as the thought of living on the same 20
square mile patch of land for a whole life.
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Figure 5.1: Structural contexts of collective remittances in some Latin American emigrant nations
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Figure 5.2: Structural contexts of collective remittances in some global emigrant nations
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Figure 5.3: Structural contexts of collective remittances in Nicaragua
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Tables
Table 5.1: Characteristics of diasporas
0 1 2
migrants help not transnationally en-
gaged
unorganized or ad-hoc
transnational financial
engagement with commu-
nity or nation
history of organized
transnational develop-
ment; institutionalization
of collective remittances
community helps does not participate in de-
velopment
community leaders visit
migrant organizations
community forms commit-
tees or organizations to
partner with migrants
host state helps does not participate in im-
migrant’s development of
home
officials of host state visit
migrant organizations or
communities
host state provide pro-
grams to assist migrants
with home nation develop-
ment
NGOs help no NGOs help NGO agents visit migrant
organizations
NGOs provide programs
or resources to assist mi-
grants with home nation
development
many-few destinations less than 75% of diaspora
in single nation
less than 90% of diaspora
in single nation
greater than 90% of dias-
pora in single nation
emigration regionalized-
broad
emigrants from less than
50% of home state admin-
istrative areas
emigrants from greater
than 50% of home state
administrative areas
emigrants from greater
than 75% of home state
administrative areas
destination hostile-
friendly
host state policies and
populations openly harm-
ful to immigrant group
host state policies and
populations discrimi-
natory to immigrant
group
immigrant group easily in-
tegrates with host state
home state hostile-
friendly
home state physically or
psychologically violent to
emigrants
home state considers emi-
grants traitors
home state accepts emi-
grants as citizens abroad
political rights home state grants emi-
grants no political rights
home state responds to
emigrant dissatisfaction
home state grants emi-
grants citizenship rights
broad; voting; dual citi-
zenship
remittance matching home state does not
match remittances
some administrative areas
of home state match re-
mittances
home state federal govern-
ment matches remittances
diaspora bonds home state does not offer
diaspora bonds
home state offers but does
not depend on diaspora
bonds
home state depends on di-
aspora bonds for solvency
business assistance home state does not pro-
vide business assistance
home state provides busi-
ness counseling or financ-
ing for emigrants
home state provides busi-
ness grants for emigrants
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